Clarifying the Scope of “Brown”: Attorney Trust-Account Duties in Escrow Transactions Connected to Client Representation – Commentary on In the Matter of Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine (Ga. 2025)
1. Introduction
The Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in In re Lemoine (S25Y0537 & S25Y0538, decided 12 Aug 2025) marks a significant development in professional-responsibility jurisprudence. Consolidating two disciplinary complaints, the Court disbarred attorney Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine for extensive violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (GRPC) centering on trust-account abuses, dishonesty, and client-communication failures.
Key issues included:
- The improper use and commingling of client and third-party funds in IOLTA (Interest on Lawyer Trust Account) and operating accounts.
- Misrepresentations to clients and a transaction counter-party regarding the status and safekeeping of funds.
- Whether the Court’s 2024 decision in In re Brown limited the applicability of Rules 1.15(I) and 1.15(II) when an attorney acts as an escrow agent or fiduciary outside “traditional” representation.
The ruling clarifies that Brown does not exempt an attorney from trust-account rules whenever the attorney claims to act “only” as a fiduciary; if the activity is even connected to legal representation—or the attorney leverages his status as counsel—full compliance with the GRPC remains mandatory.
2. Summary of the Judgment
After adopting a Special Master’s findings and the State Disciplinary Review Board’s recommendation, the Supreme Court:
- Rejected Lemoine’s factual and legal exceptions as “without merit.”
- Held that his conduct constituted knowing violations of nine GRPC provisions, the gravest of which carry a maximum penalty of disbarment (Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(I)(a)&(c), 1.15(II)(a), 1.15(III)(a), 8.4(a)(4)).
- Clarified that In re Brown, 319 Ga. 465 (2024) only shields lawyers performing purely fiduciary functions disconnected from any legal representation; here, Lemoine acted as counsel for an LLC intermediary and for individual tax clients, so the rules unquestionably applied.
- Ordered Lemoine’s disbarment and reminded him of his Bar Rule 4-219 obligations (notice to clients, courts, opposing counsel, etc.).
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited and Distinguished
- In re Brown, 319 Ga. 465 (2024)
Brown held that Rules 1.15(I)(c) and 1.15(II)(b) do not reach a lawyer acting solely as a non-lawyer fiduciary. The Court distinguished Brown because Lemoine served as legal counsel—both to the LLC in an escrowed glove transaction and to elderly French clients in an IRS matter. Accordingly, Brown’s safe harbor was inapplicable. - In re Sicay-Perrow, 310 Ga. 855 (2021); In re Turner, 311 Ga. 204 (2021); In re Cheatham, 304 Ga. 645 (2018)
Each imposed disbarment for substantial trust-account abuses and dishonesty. They provided the Special Master and Court with the primary penalty benchmarks. - In re McDonald, 319 Ga. 197 (2024)
Cited to show that an attorney breaches Rule 1.15 even when managing funds of non-clients, if the handling is “in her capacity as a lawyer in connection with a transaction.” - In re Raines, 319 Ga. 820 (2024); In re Doeve, 303 Ga. 672 (2018)
Reaffirm the Court’s intolerance for conversion or mismanagement of escrowed funds, especially when accompanied by false assurances.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
- Rule Applicability
The Court focused on Rules 1.15(I) & (II), which require strict segregation, record-keeping, and prompt delivery of client/third-party funds. Lemoine’s argument that he was acting “merely” as a fiduciary failed because:• He held himself out as counsel (“attorney escrow account”) thereby leveraging professional status.
• The LLC intermediary and French clients had retained him for legal matters (contractual transaction, IRS dispute).
- Mental State and ABA Standards
Applying ABA Standard 3.0, the Court concurred that Lemoine’s conduct was “knowing” (not merely negligent): he conceded using one client’s money to pacify “the client that screams the loudest” and to “eat.” Injury was substantial: hundreds of thousands diverted, elderly clients harmed, and the public’s trust in lawyers damaged. Aggravating factors outnumbered mitigating ones (only a prior clean record). - Rejection of Exceptions
a) Factual findings: The Special Master’s credibility determinations were not clearly erroneous.
b) Mental-state mitigation: The profession’s fiduciary duties are “a high honor and privilege,” and inadvertence is no defense for trust-account violations (Howard, 292 Ga. 413 (2013)).
c) Brown defenses: By clarifying Brown’s contours, the Court reinforced that trust-account rules extend wherever an attorney’s legal services intersect with money stewardship.
3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision
- Narrowing of the Brown carve-out: Lawyers cannot escape Rule 1.15 scrutiny by labeling themselves “escrow agent” or “trustee” if any thread of client representation exists.
- Heightened Compliance Expectations: Firms and solo practitioners must rigorously verify IOLTA designation details (Tax ID, interest payee) and monitor balances in real time; delegating setup to a bank is insufficient.
- Increased Risk of Disbarment: The decision underscores that knowing conversion—no matter the repayment intent—virtually guarantees disbarment absent extraordinary mitigation.
- Guidance for Disciplinary Counsel: Provides a template for rebutting “pure fiduciary” defenses where the attorney’s law practice context is intertwined.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- IOLTA (Interest on Lawyer Trust Account)
- A dedicated, interest-bearing account into which lawyers deposit client or third-party funds held temporarily. Interest is remitted to the Georgia Bar Foundation for legal-aid purposes, never to the lawyer.
- Commingling
- Mixing client funds with a lawyer’s personal or operating funds. Even a small amount of personal money in the trust account (or vice-versa) violates Rule 1.15.
- Conversion
- Using or misappropriating funds that belong to someone else. In disciplinary law, unauthorized borrowing—however brief—constitutes conversion.
- Special Master
- An attorney appointed by the Court to conduct fact-finding hearings in disciplinary proceedings, akin to a trial judge.
- ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
- A framework guiding courts on discipline by weighing duty, mental state, injury, and aggravating/mitigating factors.
5. Conclusion
In re Lemoine fortifies Georgia’s bright-line stance: attorneys who hold funds—even tangentially connected to legal representation—must observe every technical and substantive safeguard of Rule 1.15. The Court’s integration of Brown confirms that the 2024 carve-out is narrow; any leveraging of legal credentials reinvigorates full professional-conduct duties. Knowing conversion, serial dishonesty, and client harm yielded the profession’s gravest sanction—disbarment—consistent with a long line of trust-account cases. Future practitioners should treat this opinion as a cautionary compass: meticulous trust-account management and truthful client dealings are non-negotiable pillars of lawful practice.
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