Clarifying the Preclusive Effect of State-Confirmed Tenure Arbitration Awards on Subsequent Federal Title VII Claims – A Commentary on Gregory Janicki v. Washington Township Board of Education

Introduction

In Janicki v. Washington Township Board of Education, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (per curiam, June 10 2025) affirmed a district court decision that dismissed a pro se teacher’s federal Title VII religious-discrimination suit on summary judgment. The dismissal rested on two pillars:

• New Jersey tenure-arbitration findings, subsequently confirmed by a state court, had preclusive effect and barred relitigation of essential issues under Title VII in federal court; and
• The appellant’s failure to meaningfully challenge the district court’s reasoning on appeal resulted in forfeiture of potential arguments.

Although the opinion is labelled “Not Precedential”, it offers an instructive roadmap on how federal courts within the Third Circuit will treat state-confirmed arbitration awards—particularly those arising out of New Jersey’s Tenure Employees Hearing Law (TEHL)—when employees attempt to pursue subsequent federal discrimination claims.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit held that:

• The state-court judgment confirming the TEHL arbitration award had issue-preclusive effect (collateral estoppel) on Janicki’s Title VII religious-discrimination and retaliation claims. Accordingly, there was no triable issue of material fact, making summary judgment proper.
• Janicki forfeited appellate challenges to the district court’s detailed preclusion analysis and denial of leave to amend because he failed to address them in his opening brief.
• The absence of a jury trial did not violate the Seventh Amendment because summary judgment is permitted where no genuine factual dispute exists.
• Allegations of judicial bias were speculative and unsupported by the record.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982)
  Confirmed that federal courts must give full faith and credit to state-court judgments rejecting employment discrimination claims, even when the subsequent action is brought under Title VII.
  Influence: The panel relied on Kremer to hold that the New Jersey court’s confirmation of the arbitration award barred relitigation of the same discrimination issues in federal court.
• Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)
  Established there is no individual liability under Title VII in the Third Circuit.
  Influence: Guided the district court’s dismissal of all individually named defendants.
• Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009)
  General articulation of the summary-judgment standard—no genuine issue of material fact if a rational trier could not find for the non-movant.
  Influence: Provided the analytical lens for affirming summary judgment.
• In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999)
  Clarified that summary judgment does not offend the Seventh Amendment.
  Influence: Used to rebut Janicki’s jury-trial argument.
• M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2020) and Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1991)
  Addressed forfeiture for failure to raise arguments on appeal.
  Influence: Provided the doctrinal basis for rejecting new arguments not advanced in Janicki’s opening brief.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel)

The panel emphasized that under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, federal courts must apply the preclusion law of the state rendering the judgment. New Jersey treats arbitration awards confirmed by its courts as final judgments with the same preclusive effect as any other state-court decision. Because the TEHL arbitrator found “just cause” for dismissal—including findings that directly contradicted Janicki’s claim of religious discrimination—and the state court expressly forbade relitigation of those findings, the district court correctly concluded that Janicki was collaterally estopped.

b. Timeliness and Individual Liability

Though not contested on appeal, the district court had alternatively found Janicki’s EEOC charge untimely and dismissed all individual defendants under Sheridan. These rulings stood unchallenged, reinforcing the appellate court’s view that no triable claims remained.

c. Seventh Amendment and Summary Judgment

The court reiterated that summary judgment does not infringe the Seventh Amendment when there is no factual dispute. Once preclusion extinguished the core factual issues, no jury could find for Janicki, making a trial unnecessary.

d. Forfeiture Doctrine

By failing to address the district court’s reasoning—including the preclusion analysis and denial of his motion to amend—Janicki forfeited any appellate review of those matters. The court relied on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 and well-settled Third Circuit precedent that “a passing reference” is insufficient to preserve an argument.

3. Impact of the Decision

• Teacher-tenure litigation in New Jersey. Public-school employees should expect that an adverse, state-confirmed TEHL arbitration award will effectively bar subsequent federal discrimination suits covering the same events, unless new and distinct issues are raised.
• Strategic timing for Title VII plaintiffs. Potential plaintiffs must either seek vacatur of the arbitration award in state court or timely reserve their federal claims before confirmation; failure to do so risks total preclusion.
• Clarification for practitioners. The decision underscores the necessity of a meticulous appellate brief: unaddressed grounds for dismissal will be deemed forfeited, a pitfall especially acute for pro se appellants.
• No erosion of Seventh Amendment rights. The opinion reaffirms that the constitutional right to a jury does not survive a properly granted summary judgment motion.
• Limited but persuasive authority. Although designated “not precedential,” the opinion carries persuasive weight within the Third Circuit and will likely be cited in district courts confronting similar TEHL-Title VII intersections.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel): A rule that stops a party from re-arguing an issue that has already been decided in a previous legal proceeding where the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.
• TEHL Arbitration: New Jersey’s Tenure Employees Hearing Law provides for arbitration—rather than court trials—when tenured teachers face dismissal charges. The arbitrator’s findings can be confirmed by a state court, giving them the force of a judgment.
• Full Faith and Credit (28 U.S.C. § 1738): A federal statute requiring federal courts to honor state-court judgments to the same extent the issuing state’s courts would.
• Summary Judgment (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56): A procedure that ends a lawsuit before trial if the evidence shows there are no genuine disputes of material fact and one side is entitled to judgment under the law.
• Forfeiture on Appeal: If an appellant fails to argue a point in the opening brief, the court treats that point as abandoned and will not consider it.

Conclusion

Janicki v. Washington Township Board of Education illustrates the formidable preclusive effect of state-confirmed TEHL arbitration awards on later federal discrimination claims. The Third Circuit’s decision harmonizes New Jersey preclusion doctrine with federal Title VII jurisprudence, reinforcing Kremer’s directive that state judgments cannot be casually bypassed. Beyond the immediate outcome, the case serves as a cautionary tale on diligent appellate practice and the limits of the Seventh Amendment in the face of a proper summary-judgment record. Practitioners representing public educators—or any employee emerging from state arbitration—must now weigh more carefully than ever the procedural timing and strategic framing of subsequent federal claims.