Clarifying the Limits of Bivens and Section 1985(3) Private Entity Liability Absent State Action

Introduction

Fernandez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. is a June 2, 2025 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The case arises from an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure of plaintiff-appellant Jesus Fernandez—then a bus passenger—by DEA agents aboard a Greyhound bus in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Fernandez, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, sued under multiple federal theories—including Bivens, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and consumer‐protection statutes—and asserted supplemental state‐law claims. The district court dismissed all federal counts for failure to state a claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Key parties and issues:

Plaintiff-Appellant: Jesus Fernandez, federal prisoner
Defendants-Appellees: Greyhound Lines, Inc.; DEA Agents Jarrell Perry & Kirk Lemmon; Greyhound security manager David Owen Streiff, Jr.; United States
Core Legal Issues:
- Whether a Bivens remedy lay against private entities or their employees
- Whether Fernandez stated a plausible conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
- Whether the district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over state‐law claims

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit unanimously affirmed the dismissal. It held:

Bivens Claim: Fernandez’s Fourth Amendment claim could not proceed as a Bivens action against Greyhound or its employees. Bivens is limited to federal officers; it does not extend to private entities (Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko) or their employees (Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs.).
Heck Doctrine: To the extent the suit sought Bivens relief against the DEA agents themselves, the claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey because Fernandez’s conviction arising from the same search remained valid.
Section 1983: Fernandez could not proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against private defendants because no state‐action allegations were pleaded (West v. Atkins).
Section 1985(3): His private‐conspiracy claim failed for two independent reasons:
- His conspiracy allegations were “vague and conclusory” (Benavidez v. Gunnell; Iqbal).
- § 1985(3) covers only conspiracies to interfere with rights protected against private interference; the Fourth Amendment is not such a right (Scott; Tilton v. Richardson).
Supplemental Jurisdiction: With all federal claims dismissed, the district court permissibly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the remaining state‐law claims.
Rule 59(e) Motion: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration because Fernandez never challenged its core conclusions below, and he advanced new factual allegations for the first time on appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents (403 U.S. 388, 1971): Established an implied damages remedy for certain Fourth Amendment violations by federal officers.
Heck v. Humphrey (512 U.S. 477, 1994): Bars civil claims if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would imply invalidity of an existing criminal conviction.
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko (534 U.S. 61, 2001): Held that Bivens does not extend to private detention‐facility operators.
Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs. (422 F.3d 1090, 10th Cir. 2005): Rejected Bivens suits against employees of private entities performing government‐like functions.
West v. Atkins (487 U.S. 42, 1988): § 1983 requires action under “color of state law.”
Benavidez v. Gunnell (722 F.2d 615, 10th Cir. 1983) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (556 U.S. 662, 2009): Require non‐conclusory factual allegations to state a plausible conspiracy claim under § 1985(3).
United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott (463 U.S. 825, 1983) and Tilton v. Richardson (6 F.3d 683, 10th Cir. 1993): Explain that § 1985(3) protects only rights safeguarded against private interference, not Fourth Amendment rights.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A: Mandates screening of prisoner complaints for failure to state a claim.
28 U.S.C. § 1367: Governs supplemental jurisdiction over state‐law claims.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e): Allows motions to alter or amend judgments, reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Legal Reasoning

The Tenth Circuit’s de novo review confirmed that Fernandez’s pro se complaint failed to satisfy key pleading and jurisdictional prerequisites:

Bivens Limitation: The court reaffirmed that Bivens is a narrow remedy against federal officers; it has not been extended to private actors absent express congressional authorization.
Heck Bar: Because Fernandez’s conviction for narcotics trafficking based on the very bus search was still intact, any damages ruling would necessarily undermine that conviction.
State‐Action Requirement: Under § 1983, private entities like Greyhound and their employees must be shown to act under color of state law; Fernandez pleaded no such facts.
Conspiracy Pleading Rule: To survive dismissal under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must not only allege a conspiracy with factual specificity but also show the targeted right is one protected against private interference. Fernandez’s threadbare assertions and the Fourth Amendment focus doomed his § 1985(3) theory.
Supplemental Jurisdiction: With no viable federal claim, the court properly relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state claims, preserving judicial economy and comity.
Reconsideration Standard: Fernandez’s Rule 59(e) motion was grounded in new factual contentions and did not demonstrate manifest error or newly discovered evidence; the district court’s exercise of discretion to deny relief stands unchallenged.

Impact

Fernandez v. Greyhound Lines underscores and reaffirms established boundaries in civil‐rights litigation:

It reiterates that Bivens remains confined to suits against federal officers for constitutional violations; private corporations and their staff cannot be shoehorned into that framework.
It demonstrates the continuing vitality of Heck v. Humphrey in barring collateral civil attacks on unvacated criminal convictions.
It highlights the strict state‐action requirement of § 1983, discouraging expansion of civil‐rights claims against private entities without clear governmental imprimatur.
It clarifies that § 1985(3) actions against purely private conspiracies must target rights protected against private encroachment—and that courts will not entertain vague or conclusory conspiracy allegations.
It serves as a reminder of the rigorous screening required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to weed out non‐cognizable civil‐rights claims at the threshold.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Bivens Action: An implied cause of action allowing damages suits against federal officers who violate the Constitution. It does not automatically extend to private or state actors.
“Color of Law”: A requirement under § 1983 meaning the defendant must have exercised power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.”
Heck Doctrine: Prevents a plaintiff from seeking damages in federal court for an injury that would invalidate a still‐standing criminal conviction. You must first overturn or vacate the conviction.
Section 1985(3) Conspiracy: A federal civil remedy for conspiracies to deprive individuals of equal protection or equal privileges under the law. It demands: (1) a conspiracy, (2) motivated by class‐based animus, (3) an act in furtherance, and (4) an injury to a protected right—one safe from private interference.
Federal Screening (§ 1915A): Prisoner lawsuits against government entities or employees must be screened at the outset and dismissed if they “fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”
Supplemental Jurisdiction (§ 1367): Allows federal courts to hear state‐law claims linked to federal claims in the same suit—but once all federal claims are dismissed, a court may, in its discretion, decline to keep the state‐law claims.

Conclusion

Fernandez v. Greyhound Lines serves as a comprehensive reaffirmation of long‐standing civil‐rights doctrines and pleading standards:

Bivens remains a narrow remedy; private entities are not Bivens defendants.
Successful constitutional claims must overcome the Heck bar and clearly identify the defendant’s color‐of‐law status.
Section 1985(3) conspiracies require both specific factual allegations and targeting of rights safeguarded from private infringement.
District courts have broad discretion both to screen pro se prisoner filings under § 1915A and to dismiss or retain supplemental state‐law claims under § 1367.

By affirming the district court’s dismissal of all federal claims and its declination of supplemental jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit has reinforced the careful boundaries within which federal civil‐rights litigation must operate—ensuring that civil remedies do not improperly expand into areas governed by criminal law, private contract, or state law.