Clarifying the Internal-Relocation Standard: Singh v. Bondi (2d Cir. 2025)

Introduction

Singh v. Bondi, No. 23-7009 (2d Cir. July 23, 2025), is a summary order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirming the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of asylum and withholding of removal to Akramjeet Singh, a Sikh political activist from India. Although designated as a non-precedential summary order, the court’s reasoning supplies an important clarification of the internal-relocation rebuttal in asylum cases: the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) need not identify a single city or town where the applicant may safely reside; rather, it suffices to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the risk of persecution falls below the “well-founded fear” threshold in a broader, well-defined region of the country.

At its core, the litigation examined whether Singh—who experienced past harm in Punjab for his low-level involvement with the Shiromani Akali Dal (Mann) party (SADA)—could reasonably and safely relocate elsewhere in India. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the BIA found that he could. The Second Circuit agreed, addressing—and rejecting—Singh’s principal contention that Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I.&N. Dec. 28 (BIA 2012) obligates DHS to name a specific relocation site.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Second Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the BIA’s decision.
• The agency had assumed past persecution and thus applied the regulatory presumption of future persecution.
• DHS successfully rebutted that presumption by proving that Singh could (1) safely relocate outside Punjab and (2) it would be reasonable to expect him to do so.
• The court held that:
  • DHS need not pin down a specific city of relocation; showing safety in any area outside Punjab suffices.
  • The IJ properly weighed country-conditions evidence, including—but not limited to—U.S. State Department reports.
  • Singh’s unexhausted arguments (e.g., pattern-or-practice persecution nationwide) could not be entertained.
• All pending motions and applications were denied; stays were vacated.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

a. Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I.&N. Dec. 28 (BIA 2012): Established that DHS must show “a specific area of the country where the risk of persecution falls below the well-founded fear level.” Singh argued this mandated naming of an exact city. The Second Circuit reiterated earlier circuit authority (Rispudaman Singh v. Garland, 2023) that “specific area” does not require a pinpoint location when broad regional data demonstrates safety.

b. Jagdeep Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106 (2d Cir. 2021): Provided the doctrinal frame for reviewing internal-relocation findings under the substantial-evidence standard and reaffirmed that Khalistani-related persecution is largely confined to Punjab.

c. KC v. Garland, 108 F.4th 130 (2d Cir. 2024) & Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2020): Clarified the rebuttable presumption structure following a past-persecution finding.

d. Additional Authorities: Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland (2021) and Siewe v. Gonzales (2007) on evidence-weighing; Tian-Yong Chen v. INS (2004) cautioning against over-reliance on State Department reports. The court distinguished these, noting balanced use of varied evidence.

2. Legal Reasoning

1. Presumption and Rebuttal Framework
   • Because the IJ assumed past persecution, Singh enjoyed a regulatory presumption of future risk.
   • Under 8 C.F.R. §§1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) & 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B), DHS may rebut by showing safe and reasonable internal relocation.
2. Safety Prong
   • The record showed that SADA activists function openly in Delhi and other non-Punjab states, with no evidence of extra-provincial police tracking.
   • Lack of any documented targeting of low-level SADA members outside Punjab supported the finding.
3. Reasonableness Prong
   • Indian constitutional guarantees of internal mobility + practical ability to acquire employment/driver’s license in the U.S. indicated adaptability.
   • No geographical, cultural, or legal impediment preventing Singh from moving.
4. Specificity Critique
   • The Second Circuit read “specific area” contextually: DHS must identify a zone of safety but not necessarily a singular municipality. Delhi was mentioned illustratively, satisfying even the stricter view.
5. Evidence-Weighing
   • The IJ canvassed multiple sources—State Department, Library of Congress, expert statements, and Singh’s affidavits—before crediting DHS’s narrative.
   • The court reaffirmed that appellate review does not re-weigh evidence but checks for compelling error.

3. Impact of the Judgment

• Internal Relocation Doctrine: Solidifies an agency-friendly interpretation of M-Z-M-R-; circuits may cite this reasoning to minimize hyper-technical “city-naming” objections.
• Sikh/Khalistan Claims: Continues a line of cases limiting viable persecution claims to Punjab, thereby narrowing relief avenues for low-level activists.
• Evidentiary Guidance: Endorses balanced but meaningful reliance on State Department reports while reminding advocates to provide concrete rebuttal evidence.
• Waiver & Exhaustion: Reaffirms that arguments not raised before the BIA, including pattern-or-practice assertions, will not be considered on review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Past vs. Future Persecution Presumption: If an asylum applicant proves serious harm in the past, the law automatically presumes they fear future harm. The government must then overturn this presumption.
• Internal Relocation: A safety valve allowing DHS to defeat an asylum claim by showing the applicant can move to another part of the home country where persecution is unlikely and relocation is feasible.
• Substantial-Evidence Standard: Appellate courts will uphold agency fact-finding unless no reasonable fact-finder could have reached the same conclusion.
• Pattern-or-Practice Claim: Instead of showing personal targeting, an applicant may show a nationwide or region-wide practice of persecuting a protected group. This must be raised before the agency first.
• Summary Order (2d Cir.): A non-precedential disposition; it may be cited but carries no binding authority. Nonetheless, its reasoning can shape future arguments.

Conclusion

While formally non-precedential, Singh v. Bondi delivers a robust clarification of the evidentiary burden in internal-relocation cases: DHS may satisfy its rebuttal obligation without pinpointing a single sanctuary town, provided it marshals credible, region-specific evidence that the applicant can live safely and reasonably elsewhere in the country. The decision also underscores the Second Circuit’s continued skepticism toward claims of nationwide persecution of low-level Khalistani sympathizers, and it reinforces the procedural imperatives of issue exhaustion and balanced, multi-source country-conditions analysis. For practitioners, the ruling serves both as a blueprint for mounting or challenging internal-relocation arguments and as a cautionary tale: failure to confront relocation evidence with concrete, location-specific rebuttals will likely prove fatal to persecution claims going forward.