Clarifying the Franks Threshold and “Mere Tipster” Privilege: Seventh Circuit Affirms Probable Cause Built on a Corroborated, In‑Person CI Appearance

Introduction

In United States v. Deandre Maxwell and Tyrone Fulwiley, Nos. 23‑2910 & 24‑1174 (7th Cir. July 16, 2025), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of motions to suppress, for a Franks hearing, and to disclose a confidential informant’s identity, and it upheld the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury’s verdict against Fulwiley on drug and firearms offenses. The opinion, authored by Judge Kirsch and joined by Chief Judge Sykes and Judge Scudder, provides a detailed application—and notable clarification—of three recurring criminal-procedure issues:

When a corroborated confidential informant’s observations, capped by the informant’s personal appearance before the issuing judge, suffice for probable cause under Illinois v. Gates.
What “substantial preliminary showing” means under Franks v. Delaware—specifically, that defendants must present evidence supporting a reasonable (not merely possible) inference of intentional or reckless falsity or material omission, and that a stray oral misstatement of the burden at a pre‑Franks hearing does not taint a correct written ruling.
How the “mere tipster” vs. “transactional witness” distinction controls informant-identity disclosure under Roviaro, and how DNA plus context can sustain constructive possession and the §924(c) “in furtherance” nexus.

The case arose from a warrant-backed search of Apartment 209 at the Park Place Apartments in Champaign, Illinois. Police seized over 629 grams of cocaine, two loaded “ghost guns,” and distribution paraphernalia. Maxwell pleaded guilty; Fulwiley went to trial and was convicted on all counts. Both defendants challenged the search; Fulwiley additionally challenged the sufficiency of the evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed across the board:

Probable Cause and Suppression: The warrant was supported by a confidential informant’s detailed, firsthand observations corroborated by multiple sources, including a Crime Stoppers tip, property manager reports, social media identification, prior convictions, and another police tip; importantly, the CI appeared and swore before the issuing judge. Controlled buys or further corroboration were not required.
Franks Hearing: Defendants did not make the requisite “substantial preliminary showing” of a deliberate or reckless falsehood or material omission. The court clarified that defendants must offer evidence supporting a reasonable inference of a Franks violation; speculation that the CI might be a disgruntled neighbor was insufficient. The district court’s isolated oral reference to a preponderance standard at the pre‑Franks hearing did not undermine its correctly framed written decision.
CI Identity Disclosure: The CI was a “mere tipster” whose identity was not relevant or essential to the fairness of the proceedings, so non-disclosure was within the court’s discretion.
Sufficiency of the Evidence: The government proved constructive possession of cocaine and firearms by linking Fulwiley to the master suite and to the firearms via DNA on both gun grips; it also showed that the firearms were possessed “in furtherance” of drug trafficking, given their loaded status, accessibility, ghost-gun nature, proximity to drugs and cash, and the illegal status of possession by both occupants.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983): Set the totality-of-the-circumstances framework for probable cause, emphasizing practical, commonsense judgments about informant information. The court applied Gates to weigh detail, firsthand observation, corroboration, timing, and the CI’s in-person appearance.
United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811 (7th Cir. 2014): “Great deference” to issuing judges; probable cause requires a substantial basis that evidence will be found. Also key for Franks: defendants must make a substantial preliminary showing; courts need not indulge all innocent explanations in defendants’ favor.
United States v. Schenck, 3 F.4th 943 (7th Cir. 2021): “Probable cause is not a high standard.” The panel used this framing to reject demands for more intrusive corroboration like controlled buys.
United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2011): Reinforced non-formulaic, totality-based informant assessments—no single factor is dispositive.
United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2003): Defendants relied on these to argue the CI was unreliable. The court distinguished them because Kirk provided detailed, firsthand observations, appeared before the magistrate, and her account was substantially corroborated.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978): Requires a substantial preliminary showing of deliberate or reckless falsehood/omission material to probable cause. The Seventh Circuit emphasized the evidentiary quality and the need for a reasonable, not speculative, inference.
United States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2013): Endorses “pre‑Franks” hearings to sharpen the threshold inquiry; applied here to test defense proffers before deciding whether a full Franks hearing was warranted.
United States v. Sanford, 35 F.4th 595 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Daniels, 906 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dessart, 823 F.3d 395 (7th Cir. 2016): These cases underscore the Franks threshold and courts’ ability to weigh plausibility and probative value of defense showings; relied upon to reject inferences based on speculation.
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); United States v. McDowell, 687 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Harris, 531 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 2008): Framework governing informant-identity privilege and the “mere tipster” versus “transactional witness” dichotomy; used to uphold non-disclosure.
Constructive Possession and §924(c):
- United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2012): Joint occupancy requires a substantial connection to contraband, not just the premises.
- United States v. White, 95 F.4th 1073 (7th Cir. 2024): Proximity plus other factors can establish constructive possession of firearms.
- United States v. Wilson, 922 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Price, 28 F.4th 739 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Kitchen, 57 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 1995): DNA/fingerprint and context-based inferences can support possession.
- United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Seymour, 519 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2008): Define “in furtherance” and enumerate nexus factors for §924(c).
- United States v. Gaston, 357 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2004): Accessibility/strategic placement supports “in furtherance.” Cited approvingly.

Legal Reasoning

1) Probable Cause: Corroborated CI + Appearance Before Magistrate

The court applied Gates’s totality test, emphasizing several indicia of reliability:

Detail and firsthand observation: The CI, “Maddison Kirk,” reported frequent short-stay visitors, hand-to-hand exchanges, marijuana odor, and a visible handgun. She described the occupants with more specificity than in cases like Peck and had no identified ties to the suspects.
Temporal freshness: The tip was recent; the warrant was issued within days.
Corroboration from multiple angles: Anonymous Crime Stoppers tip; property manager’s multiple-resident complaints; maintenance reports about two male occupants; a Rantoul detective’s tip linking aliases; Facebook profiles matched to booking photos; defendants’ prior federal cocaine-conspiracy convictions; and the CI’s photo confirmation of both men. The CI herself appeared and swore to the affidavit’s truth before the issuing judge, allowing an in‑person credibility assessment—a significant reliability enhancer.
Notably not required: The court rejected the notion that controlled buys or interviewing every potential witness are necessary for probable cause—especially when substantial corroboration already exists.

The panel gave “great deference” to the issuing judge’s determination and found a substantial basis for concluding evidence of drug trafficking would be found at Apartment 209.

2) Franks: What the “Substantial Preliminary Showing” Requires

The court reaffirmed that to earn a Franks hearing, defendants must provide evidence supporting a reasonable inference of a deliberate or reckless falsehood or material omission—not merely speculate. Several points stand out:

Pre‑Franks hearings are proper: They help courts assess whether the defense proffer achieves the Franks threshold (McMurtrey).
Standard correctly applied despite an oral slip: Although the district court initially misstated “preponderance” orally, it used the correct “substantial preliminary showing” standard in its written order. The Seventh Circuit found no indication of a heightened burden having been applied.
Defense proffer was speculative and immaterial: A defense investigator (Moody) suggested the CI might be “B.F.,” a disgruntled downstairs neighbor with no line of sight to the apartment. But the CI’s vantage point was never specified, the investigator did not speak to all residents, some residents declined to answer, and the property manager said complaints came from multiple tenants. Even if some bias evidence existed, the court found it immaterial given the robust independent corroboration.

The result is a clarifying statement: A Franks showing needs evidence that makes a reasonable inference of intentional or reckless falsity plausible; courts are not obliged to draw every inference for the defense or to credit conjecture where other corroboration creates strong probable cause.

3) Informant Identity: “Mere Tipster” Non‑Disclosure

Applying Roviaro’s balancing test as understood through McDowell and Harris, the court deemed the CI a “mere tipster”—a source whose information led to the warrant but who did not participate in or witness the charged offenses. Disclosure was unnecessary because:

The CI’s testimony was not needed to prove the charged conduct or to mount a fair defense at trial.
The defense’s disclosure rationale overlapped with its unsuccessful Franks theory; non-disclosure did not impair meaningful testing of the warrant’s validity.
The public interest in encouraging citizen reporting weighed in favor of protecting the CI’s anonymity.

4) Sufficiency of the Evidence

The court affirmed on three fronts, viewing the evidence in the government’s favor:

Constructive possession of cocaine (21 U.S.C. §841): Though not present during the search, evidence placed Fulwiley in the apartment generally and specifically in the master suite (south side), where items bearing his name were found. Cocaine was in the master bedroom and the master bathroom (accessible only through that bedroom), with additional distribution evidence in common areas. Under Griffin, this established a substantial connection beyond mere residence.
Constructive possession of firearms (§922(g) and §924(c) predicate): The guns were not found with his personal effects, but the government’s expert found Fulwiley’s DNA on both gun grips. Combined with joint occupancy, drug trafficking context, and other corroborative factors, the jury could infer knowing possession (White; Wilson; Thornton; Price; Kitchen).
Possession “in furtherance” of drug trafficking (§924(c)): The two loaded ghost guns, their accessibility (one hidden under a living-room ottoman cushion), the apartment’s distribution quantities of cocaine and cash, the illegal status of possession (both occupants were felons), and expert testimony about drug dealers’ use of handguns collectively satisfied the Castillo/Seymour nexus factors. Strategic placement and loaded status closely paralleled scenarios upholding §924(c) verdicts (see also Gaston).

Impact and Practical Implications

Probable cause building blocks reaffirmed: Officers can rely on a CI who appears before the issuing judge, offers detailed firsthand observations, and is corroborated by independent sources (including digital footprints like social media). Controlled buys are helpful but not indispensable.
Franks threshold clarified and fortified: Defendants must come forward with non-speculative, probative evidence supporting a reasonable inference of deliberate or reckless falsity or a material omission. The opinion underscores that courts may evaluate plausibility and need not assume all defense-favorable inferences at the threshold stage.
Roviaro protection for “mere tipsters”: Where the CI does not participate in the charged conduct, identity disclosure will ordinarily be denied—especially when the CI’s value was limited to probable cause and even more so where independent corroboration exists.
DNA and context matter for constructive possession: DNA on firearm grips, combined with joint occupancy and drug-trafficking context, will often clear the sufficiency bar—even if the firearm is not found in the defendant’s specific room.
Ghost guns in §924(c) analysis: The opinion recognizes the practical realities of ghost guns—unserialized, loaded, accessible firearms—strengthening the inference that they are possessed “in furtherance” of drug trafficking when co-located with distribution quantities and cash.
Process point: A judge’s stray oral misstatement of the burden at a pre‑Franks hearing will not mandate relief where the written order applies the correct standard and the record shows no actual application of a heightened burden.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A practical, commonsense inquiry into whether there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. It is a lower bar than preponderance of the evidence.
Confidential Informant (CI): A person who provides information to law enforcement. A CI’s credibility is judged by detail, firsthand observation, corroboration, timing, and sometimes appearance before the magistrate.
Franks Hearing: A special evidentiary hearing to test whether a warrant affidavit intentionally or recklessly included false statements or omitted material facts that, if corrected, would negate probable cause. To get the hearing, a defendant must first make a substantial preliminary showing with real evidence.
“Mere Tipster” vs. “Transactional Witness”: A mere tipster only provides information to obtain a warrant; identity is usually protected. A transactional witness participates in or directly observes the charged crime; identity disclosure may be required for a fair defense.
Constructive Possession: The law treats someone as possessing contraband if they have the power and intent to control it, even if it is not on their person. In shared spaces, the prosecution must show a substantial connection to the specific contraband.
“In Furtherance” (18 U.S.C. §924(c)): The firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug crime—such as protection, intimidation, or safeguarding proceeds—shown by factors like access, proximity, loaded status, type of weapon, and circumstances.
Ghost Guns: Firearms lacking serial numbers, often assembled from kits or 3D-printed, making them hard to trace. Their presence in drug-distribution settings can support an inference of use in furtherance of the crime.
Inositol Powder: A cutting agent commonly used to dilute cocaine for resale, which tends to corroborate intent to distribute.

Conclusion

United States v. Maxwell and Fulwiley offers a robust, practice-oriented application of established Fourth Amendment and evidentiary principles, while sharpening the Franks threshold in a way likely to influence pretrial litigation throughout the circuit. The court underscores that:

Probable cause can rest securely on a CI’s detailed, firsthand account corroborated through multiple independent channels, especially where the CI swears in person before the magistrate.
The Franks preliminary showing is a meaningful screen: defendants must present evidence supporting a reasonable inference of intentional or reckless falsity or material omission, not conjecture or possibilities.
Roviaro’s privilege strongly protects “mere tipsters,” and disclosure will not be ordered absent a compelling, case-specific showing that the identity is essential to a fair determination.
On sufficiency, DNA on firearm grips plus a trafficking context can sustain constructive possession and a §924(c) nexus, even in jointly occupied premises.

The opinion’s practical guidance will inform police warrant practices (including the value of in-person CI appearances and multi-source corroboration), defense strategies for Franks motions (demanding more than speculative identity/bias theories), and trial proof on constructive possession and §924(c) “in furtherance” questions—particularly where ghost guns and distribution paraphernalia are involved.