Clarifying the Evidentiary Threshold for Race Discrimination under Title VII: Pretext, Subjective Promotion Processes, and Discretionary Sanctions

Introduction

This commentary addresses the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Gayann Miller v. Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (“SMART”), No. 24-1478/1503 (6th Cir. May 27, 2025). The plaintiff, Gayann Miller, a Caucasian bus driver, sued SMART for race discrimination after being passed over for promotion to road-supervisor in favor of two African American colleagues. A jury found that SMART discriminated against Miller on the basis of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Post-verdict, the district court awarded Miller attorney fees and costs, adjusted downward from her request. SMART appealed the jury’s liability finding, evidentiary rulings, closing arguments, juror exclusion, and the fee award. Miller cross-appealed the reduction of her attorney-fee request. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment in all respects.

Key issues:

Whether SMART was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Miller’s discrimination claims;
Admissibility and sanctioning of a key witness’s late-disclosed testimony;
Proper scope of closing arguments concerning the employer’s promotion process;
Batson challenge to the exclusion of an African American juror;
Reasonableness of the attorney-fee award and the district court’s downward adjustments.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed:

Denial of SMART’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Miller, a reasonable jury could find pretext in SMART’s stated reasons for its promotion decision and conclude that race was a motivating factor.
Denial of a new trial under Rule 59(a) based on discovery violations related to Gerald Burns’s contradictory depositions. The court found the district court acted within its discretion in managing discovery and that any prejudice was cured by additional depositions and impeachment at trial.
Overruling of SMART’s objections to plaintiff’s closing arguments about the lack of an objective promotion process. The court concluded these remarks were proper criticisms of a central defense issue and that instructions to the jury neutralized any potential unfairness.
Rejection of SMART’s Batson challenge to Miller’s peremptory strike of an African American venire member. The court found Miller’s race-neutral explanations—hesitation in voir dire answers, family connections to SMART, and economic hardship—were facially valid and not rebutted as pretextual.
Affirmance of the district court’s attorney-fee award. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court reasonably adjusted Miller’s requested rates and hours downward to reflect prevailing market rates and duplicative time entries, without abusing its discretion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000): Established the standard for reviewing Rule 50 motions post-verdict in discrimination cases, emphasizing that courts must view evidence favorably to the non-moving party and may not weigh credibility at that stage.
2. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993): Adopted the burden-shifting framework for Title VII analysis but clarified that, post-verdict, only the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination remains.
3. Burdine, Tex. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981): Defined the burdens of production in discrimination claims and held that a plaintiff’s prima facie burden is “not onerous.”
4. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019): Governs the three-step inquiry into peremptory strikes alleged to be racially discriminatory.
5. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26, 37, 50, and 59: Address discovery obligations, sanctions for non-compliance, motions for judgment as a matter of law, and motions for new trial, respectively.

Legal Reasoning

1. Denial of JMOL under Rule 50. The court recapitulated Reeves’s command to consider all evidence in the record—direct evidence of bias, patterns of non-promotion of Caucasian drivers under the same supervisor, and inconsistencies in SMART’s explanations—and to draw all reasonable inferences in Miller’s favor. Subjective evaluation criteria (e.g., “confidence,” “articulate”) cannot shield defendants from discrimination claims when the process yields racially disparate outcomes and management alters its justifications post hoc.

2. Discovery management and harmlessness. The district court initially struck the testimony of a key witness, Burns, for five-month delay in supplementing disclosures. Upon reconsideration, given Burns’s availability and SMART’s full opportunity to depose and impeach him, the court held the violation harmless. The Sixth Circuit emphasized courts’ broad discretion in managing discovery and sanctioning misconduct, provided that opposing parties suffer no unfair prejudice.

3. Closing arguments. Miller’s counsel’s remarks about SMART’s “terrible” promotion process were directly connected to the pretext theory. The court viewed them as permissible argument on an issue central to the case and not inflammatory attacks on SMART’s general funding or integrity. The district court’s jury instructions that counsel’s statements are not evidence further dispelled any risk of unfair influence.

4. Batson framework. Miller offered multiple race-neutral reasons for striking the juror—hesitation in answering voir dire questions, prior experience with discrimination, familial ties to SMART, and potential financial hardship. SMART failed to show these reasons were pretextual. The Sixth Circuit applied clear-error review and affirmed the dismissal of the Batson challenge.

5. Attorney fees and the lodestar method. The district court correctly calculated a reasonable hourly rate—lower than Miller’s sought rates—based on prevailing market standards and reduced or disallowed entries for duplicative or non-attorney work. It then applied the Hensley factors, including the “results obtained,” to settle on a reasonable fee. The Sixth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in these adjustments.

Impact

This decision reinforces several important principles for employment-discrimination litigation:

Subjective hiring or promotion criteria do not immunize employers from discrimination verdicts when evidence shows racial animus, inconsistent explanations, or disparate outcomes.
Direct eyewitness testimony of racially prejudicial comments, combined with statistical patterns, can satisfy a plaintiff’s burden of persuasion post-McDonnell Douglas.
District courts enjoy broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes. Sanctions for late disclosures are not mandatory if any prejudice is cured by subsequent proceedings and effective impeachment.
Closing arguments critiquing an employer’s decision-making process are permissible so long as they relate to a central pretext theory and are balanced by proper jury instructions.
Batson challenges in civil cases require clear-error review; a multi-factor, race-neutral explanation that withstands objective scrutiny will defeat a prima facie case of juror discrimination.
In fee petitions under Title VII and analogous state law, courts may substantially adjust requested rates to align with market norms and to eliminate duplicative or clerical work, even where a plaintiff achieves a partial victory.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Prima Facie Case and McDonnell Douglas Framework: At trial, a plaintiff first must show basic facts suggesting discrimination (protected class, qualifications, adverse action, treatment of others). The employer then offers a neutral reason, and the plaintiff must prove that reason is a pretext. In a post-verdict Rule 50 context, courts focus on whether the total evidence permits a finding of intentional discrimination, not just the four prima facie elements in isolation.

2. Judgment as a Matter of Law (Rule 50): This motion asks the judge to overturn a jury verdict when no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Courts must view all evidence in the non-movant’s favor and may not make credibility calls.

3. Sanctions and Harmless Error in Discovery (Rules 26 & 37): Parties must disclose key witnesses and material facts. If they don’t, courts can sanction them by excluding evidence. But if the opposing side has ample opportunity to prepare and cross-examine later, courts may find any prejudice “harmless” and allow the evidence.

4. Peremptory Challenges and Batson: Each side has a limited number of strikes. They cannot use strikes based solely on race. If challenged, the striking party must give a race-neutral reason; the court then decides if that reason is genuine or pretextual.

5. Lodestar Method for Attorney Fees: Calculate reasonable fees by multiplying reasonable hourly rates by hours worked. Then, adjust up or down for case complexity, results achieved, and other fairness factors.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Miller v. SMART clarifies the standards for proving race discrimination under Title VII when subjective promotion processes, shifting justifications, and direct evidence of bias converge. It underscores the careful balance district courts must strike in managing discovery and sanctioning late disclosures, the permissibility of focused criticism of a defendant’s decision-making at trial, and the exacting but flexible approach to attorney-fee awards. This ruling will guide litigants and courts in future employment discrimination disputes, reinforcing that genuine issues of bias, adequately supported by direct and circumstantial evidence, will withstand motions for judgment as a matter of law, and that trial courts retain broad discretion in preserving fairness throughout discovery and fee determinations.