Clarifying the Dual Strickland-Scarborough Standard: The Delaware Supreme Court’s Decision in Lolley v. State (2025)

1. Introduction

Lolley v. State is a 2025 ruling of the Delaware Supreme Court that addresses the intersection of ineffective-assistance claims, guilty-plea withdrawals, and Delaware’s post-conviction Rule 61 procedure. The case arises from a double homicide in 2018 for which Walter Lolley entered a Robinson plea to two counts of second-degree murder and was sentenced to an aggregate 100 years’ incarceration, suspended after 30. When his belated attempts to withdraw the plea and seek post-conviction relief failed, Lolley appealed.

The Court affirmed the Superior Court, but in doing so it offered its clearest synthesis to date of:

How Strickland v. Washington (ineffective assistance) dovetails with Scarborough v. State (standards for withdrawing a plea);
The continued force of Reed v. State regarding counsel’s obligations when a client wishes to withdraw a plea; and
The application of Rule 61’s procedural bars to claims of state-plea breaches and actual innocence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court (Chief Justice Seitz and Justices LeGrow & Griffiths) unanimously affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Key holdings include:

The post-conviction petition was timely, but the ineffective-assistance claims failed on both prongs of Strickland.
Counsel’s refusal (or failure) to file a pre-sentence motion to withdraw the plea did not prejudice Lolley because he could not have satisfied the Scarborough “fair-and-just reason” factors.
The State’s alleged breach of the plea agreement was procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) because it was not raised on direct appeal.
Actual-innocence assertions predicated on “unspecified elements” of the crime were conclusory and meritless.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The decision rests on a mosaic of Delaware and federal precedents:

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – two-part ineffective-assistance test (performance & prejudice).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) – adapts Strickland to guilty-plea contexts: the defendant must show he would have gone to trial.
Scarborough v. State, 938 A.2d 644 (Del. 2007) – sets five “fair-and-just” factors governing plea-withdrawal motions under Rule 32(d).
Reed v. State, 258 A.3d 807 (Del. 2021) – counsel must either file a client-requested motion to withdraw a plea or seek leave to withdraw/ seek new counsel.
Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160 (Del. 2020) & Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del. 2016) – ineffective-assistance claims are exempt from Rule 61 procedural bars.
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629 (Del. 1997) – issues not raised on appeal are deemed waived.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552 (Del. 1990) – mandate to address Rule 61’s procedural gateways before merits.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Timeliness Under Rule 61

Because Lolley filed his first Rule 61 motion within one year of his conviction becoming final (30 days after sentencing when no appeal is taken), the Court found the petition timely. This opened the door for substantive review of ineffective-assistance claims despite the usual Rule 61 bars.

(b) Strickland Performance Prong

Discovery: Counsel had provided all non-protected discovery; the record refuted Lolley’s claim of deception.
Suppression Motion: Lolley could articulate no constitutional basis for suppressing the blood-soaked, gun-residue-covered shirt. Counsel’s decision not to file meritless motions was reasonable.
Plea-Withdrawal Assistance: Even if counsel mishandled withdrawal efforts (a point assumed without deciding), mere failure to obey Reed’s mandate does not satisfy Strickland unless prejudice is also shown.

(c) Strickland Prejudice Prong & The Scarborough Overlay

To establish prejudice, Lolley had to demonstrate a reasonable probability that:

He would have insisted on trial and
The Superior Court would have granted the motion to withdraw the plea.

The Court folded the Scarborough factors into step (2). Lolley came up short on every factor: no procedural defects, clear voluntariness, no colorable claim of factual innocence, adequate counsel, and significant prejudice to the State were he allowed to withdraw three years post-plea.

(d) Plea-Agreement Breach Claim

Because Lolley did not raise the alleged breach on direct appeal, Rule 61(i)(3) barred it absent cause and prejudice—neither of which he demonstrated.

(e) Actual Innocence

The Court dismissed the bare assertion that “one element was unsatisfied” as wholly conclusory. Surveillance, forensic, and flight evidence showed overwhelming guilt even under the “reliable new evidence” standard sometimes applied to miscarriage-of-justice claims.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

Cementing the Strickland-Scarborough Link: Delaware practitioners must now contend not only with showing that counsel’s conduct would have altered a client’s subjective choice, but also that the objective Scarborough factors likely favored withdrawal—a dual burden dubbed the “Strickland-Scarborough Standard.”
Guidance on Reed Retroactivity: While the Court assumed Reed applies retroactively, it signalled that, even if counsel violates Reed, relief is unlikely without demonstrable Scarborough merit.
Rule 61 Litigation Strategy: The case underscores the need to raise plea-breach arguments on direct appeal or risk permanent procedural default.
Robinson Plea Significance: Defendants entering plea agreements without admitting guilt should expect rigorous scrutiny of the record; bare later assertions of coercion will usually fail.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Robinson Plea

A unique Delaware plea that allows a defendant to accept conviction while maintaining innocence, analogous to an Alford plea. The court must nonetheless find a factual basis, and sentencing exposure is the same as an ordinary guilty plea.

Strickland Test

Performance: Did counsel’s conduct fall below a “reasonably competent” standard?
Prejudice: Is there a reasonable probability the outcome would have differed but for counsel’s errors?

Scarborough “Fair-and-Just Reason” Factors

Procedure of plea taking
Voluntariness
Legal innocence claim
Quality of counsel
Prejudice to the State / inconvenience to Court

Rule 61 (Delaware)

Delaware’s analog to federal § 2255; it governs post-conviction relief. Certain claims (e.g., ineffective assistance) evade its procedural bars, but others (e.g., issues not raised on appeal) are defaulted unless cause & prejudice are shown.

5. Conclusion

Lolley v. State does not revolutionise Delaware criminal jurisprudence, but it performs an important clarifying function. By fusing Strickland’s prejudice requirement with Scarborough’s plea-withdrawal criteria, the Court has set a clearer roadmap for both defense lawyers and trial judges. Counsel must honor a client’s wish to seek plea withdrawal, but the client must still shoulder the heavy burden of showing the motion would succeed. Additionally, the decision reiterates that defendants who wish to allege state-plea breaches must do so promptly on direct appeal or risk forfeiture.

In the broader context, Lolley strengthens the finality of negotiated pleas while preserving meaningful but narrow corridors for relief where counsel’s errors truly undermine the fairness of the proceeding.