Clarifying Stipulated Criminal Responsibility Evaluations and Speedy Trial Rights: State v. Allman, 2025 ND 75

Introduction

In State v. Allman, 2025 ND 75, the Supreme Court of North Dakota addressed four core issues raised on appeal by Christopher Walter James Allman following his jury conviction: (1) whether the district court erred in ordering a criminal responsibility evaluation over the defendant’s objection; (2) whether the court should have sua sponte ordered a competency‐to‐stand‐trial evaluation; (3) whether Allman’s Sixth Amendment and state speedy‐trial rights were violated by the year‐and‐a‐half delay before trial; and (4) whether his sentence improperly credited only one of several consecutive terms for time served. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Crothers, affirmed the district court on all points.

Summary of the Judgment

Christopher Allman was charged in March 2023 with multiple counts of domestic violence, felonious restraint, and terrorizing. The parties stipulated to a mental health examination for criminal responsibility (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04.1-05), which the district court ordered. Significant delay in completing that evaluation—attributable to Veterans Administration records and release‐form issues—postponed trial until August 2024. A jury found Allman guilty on all counts, and he received consecutive five‐year sentences, with partial suspension and credit for 636 days of time served on the last count only. On appeal, Allman’s challenges were rejected:

• The stipulation to a criminal responsibility evaluation did not amount to a constitutional violation or an admission of guilt;
• No competency evaluation was required in the absence of a proper motion or any factual basis to doubt fitness;
• The trial delay, largely attributable to legitimate evaluation needs, did not constitute a speedy‐trial violation because Allman did not properly assert the right or demonstrate prejudice;
• Precedent permits credit for time served to be applied to a single term of a consecutive‐sentence judgment.

The judgment was affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The Court relied on and explicated several key authorities:

• Statutory Authority for Criminal Responsibility Evaluations: N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1-04.1-01, ‑03, ‑05 setting forth the test for lacking criminal responsibility and the procedures for notice and evaluation.
• State v. Stewart (1999 ND 154): Remedy for forced self‐incrimination is suppression of evidence, not reversal of conviction when the evaluation was not used at trial.
• State v. Rolland (2024 ND 175): Due process precludes trying an unfit defendant and requires examination when there is reason to doubt fitness.
• Barker v. Wingo (407 U.S. 514 (1972)): Federal balancing test for speedy‐trial claims (length, reason, assertion, prejudice).
• State v. Moran (2006 ND 62): Delay of one year is presumptively prejudicial but must be weighed against reasons for delay and prejudice to the defendant.
• State v. Neva (2009 ND 127) and State v. Arcand (403 N.W.2d 23 (N.D. 1987)): A district court need credit time served against only one of consecutive sentences.

2. Legal Reasoning

Criminal Responsibility Evaluation. The Court reaffirmed that when a defendant files a notice under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04.1-03(1) or the prosecutor requests an evaluation, the court may order a mental health examination under § 12.1-04.1-05. Because Allman’s counsel and the State jointly proposed the evaluation order—and Allman did not move to vacate it—the stipulation was binding. The Court applied de novo review to Allman’s constitutional claims and harmless‐error analysis under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52, finding no legal authority for treating an evaluation stipulation as an admission of guilt and no prejudice where the evaluation was not admitted at trial.

Fitness to Stand Trial. Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-04.1 and § 12.1-04-07(1), a court must order a Tier 1a professional examination when there is reason to doubt fitness. Allman did not request such an examination, and the record contained no factual showing of incompetence. A single sentence in the stipulation referencing “fitness” did not suffice to trigger this requirement. The Court found no clear error in the district court’s determination.

Speedy Trial. Applying Barker v. Wingo’s four‐factor test, the Court noted: (1) the eighteen-month delay was presumptively prejudicial; (2) most of the delay was attributable to obtaining complete medical records and the evaluation report—factors beyond improper State tactics; (3) Allman never made a proper speedy‐trial motion or timely objection through counsel (pro se objections were disregarded under “no hybrid representation” principles); and (4) he failed to show actual prejudice to his defense beyond general anxiety and incarceration. Therefore, the balance did not tip in his favor.

Sentencing Credit. Citing Neva and Arcand, the Court confirmed that North Dakota sentencing practice allows credit for time served to be allocated against a single term of a multi‐count, consecutive‐sentence judgment. Allman’s claim that “good time” was improperly removed was moot because each count’s judgment expressly preserved statutory sentence reductions.

3. Impact

State v. Allman clarifies several procedural and constitutional points:

• Defense counsel’s stipulation to a criminal responsibility evaluation cannot later be challenged by the defendant as a forced self‐incrimination or admission‐of‐guilt violation;
• Courts are not required to order competency evaluations except upon proper motion or genuine factual doubt;
• Speedy‐trial rights must be timely asserted through counsel, and pro se requests do not suffice when counsel remains active;
• Credit for time served in a consecutive-sentence scheme need only be applied to a single term under North Dakota precedent.

Trial courts and practitioners should take heed when negotiating stipulations for mental health evaluations, ensure proper motions are made for competency issues, and timely assert and document speedy-trial demands.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Criminal Responsibility vs. Competency: A criminal responsibility evaluation assesses the defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime (insanity defense), whereas competency (fitness) evaluates the defendant’s current ability to understand trial proceedings and assist in defense.
• Stipulation: An agreement between opposing parties, binding on the court when adopted by order—defendants cannot revoke stipulations post hoc.
• No Hybrid Representation: A represented defendant cannot act as co-counsel or file pro se motions without first waiving the right to counsel on the record.
• Barker v. Wingo Balancing Test: Courts weigh delay length, reasons, assertion of the right, and prejudice to decide if a speedy‐trial violation occurred.
• Consecutive Sentences and Credit: When multiple terms run back-to-back, North Dakota allows time‐served credit to reduce one term, not each term.

Conclusion

State v. Allman reinforces that procedural stipulations to mental health evaluations are binding, competency issues require proper notice and factual basis, speedy‐trial rights must be timely asserted through counsel, and sentencing credit in consecutive sentences follows established North Dakota precedent. The unanimous decision emphasizes careful advocacy when entering stipulations, vigilant protection of trial rights, and adherence to statutory and case‐law frameworks governing mental evaluations and sentencing. This decision will guide trial judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel in navigating mental health procedures and speedy‐trial obligations in North Dakota criminal cases.