Clarifying Statutory Grounds for Parental Rights Termination: A Reversal and Remand

Introduction

IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO G.V. is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of Nevada, filed April 17, 2025. The appeal concerns the district court’s order terminating the parental rights of appellant Mike V. to his minor child, G.V., at the request of respondent Alexandrea P. Mike challenged both procedural issues (the denial of appointed counsel) and the substantive grounds for termination (abandonment, unfitness, failure to support, and token efforts). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the district court misapplied statutory definitions and misallocated burdens of proof.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Nevada held that:

• The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to appoint counsel under NRS 128.100, since Mike did not request it and no due-process analysis was triggered.
• None of the four parental-fault grounds—abandonment, unfitness, failure to support, and token efforts—were supported by clear and convincing evidence.
• The statutory presumption of abandonment under NRS 128.012(2) does not apply when a court-ordered custody arrangement places the child with the other parent.
• “Failure to support” is not an independent ground for termination under NRS 128.105(1)(b).
• The burden of proof rests on the moving party (Alexandrea) to establish each ground of parental fault by clear and convincing evidence.
• Because the district court erred in finding grounds of parental fault, the best-interest determination need not be reached, and the case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• In re Parental Rts. as to N.D.O. (121 Nev. 379, 115 P.3d 223 (2005)) – No absolute right to counsel; due-process analysis required only if parent requests counsel under NRS 128.100.
• In re Termination of Parental Rts. as to N.J. (116 Nev. 790, 8 P.3d 126 (2000)) – Clear and convincing evidence required for fault and best-interest findings; statutory scheme explained.
• In re Parental Rts. as to A.L. (130 Nev. 914, 337 P.3d 758 (2014)) – Standard of review clarified: de novo for legal questions, substantial-evidence for factual findings.
• Matter of L.R.S. (140 Nev. Adv. Op. 62, 555 P.3d 1175 (2024)) – Presumption of abandonment does not apply when the noncustodial parent had a court-ordered parenting role.
• Sernaker v. Ehrlich (86 Nev. 277, 468 P.2d 5 (1970)) – Best interests of the child must be supported by evidence beyond parental fault.

Legal Reasoning

1. Counsel Appointment
Under NRS 128.100(3) the court “may appoint” counsel for an indigent parent who requests representation. Because Mike never requested appointed counsel, no procedural due-process obligation arose to inquire further. The Supreme Court applied In re Parental Rts. as to N.D.O. to confirm that no absolute right attaches absent a request.

2. Abandonment
NRS 128.012 defines abandonment and creates a six-month presumption when a parent leaves a child without support or communication. However, Matter of L.R.S. held that this presumption is inapplicable when a court order places the child with the other parent. Here, the prior custody order granted Alexandrea sole custody, and Mike’s subsequent efforts to modify custody and seek visitation rebutted any inference of intent to relinquish parental claims.

3. Unfitness
Under NRS 128.018 and NRS 128.106, a parent is unfit only for “severe and persistent” misconduct—felony convictions, abuse of the child, or other conduct rendering the parent unsuitable. Alexandrea relied on non‐conviction domestic incidents and historical substance abuse. The Court held that neither met the statutory threshold: Mike had maintained employment, had been sober for nearly a year, and had previously provided proper care.

4. Failure to Support
Although financial support bears on a parent’s general fitness, “failure to support” is not an enumerated ground in NRS 128.105(1)(b). The district court conflated neglect provisions (NRS 128.014) and unfitness considerations (NRS 128.106), thus misapplying the statute.

5. Token Efforts
Token efforts (NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6)) require that the moving party prove by clear and convincing evidence that visits or support were mere “token” gestures. The district court improperly shifted the burden to Mike to produce receipts, when Alexandrea bore the burden to prove insufficiency of his efforts. Mike’s attempts to visit (denied by order) and to provide for G.V. weighed against a finding of token efforts.

Impact

This decision clarifies critical points for future Nevada parental-rights terminations:

• Court-ordered custody changes neutralize statutory abandonment presumptions.
• “Failure to support” alone cannot terminate parental rights unless subsumed under neglect or unfitness.
• The burden of proof remains squarely on the petitioner to establish each ground by clear and convincing evidence.
• Due process does not require appointed counsel absent a request, even in parental-rights settings.
• Best-interest determinations cannot rest solely on faulty findings of parental fault.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Clear and Convincing Evidence: A heightened proof standard requiring a firm belief in the truth of the allegations, higher than “preponderance” but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• Statutory Presumption of Abandonment: Under NRS 128.012(2), if a parent provides no support or communication for six months, abandonment is presumed—unless a court-ordered custody arrangement exists.
• Unfitness vs. Neglect: “Unfitness” (NRS 128.018) focuses on a parent’s fault or conduct making them unsuitable; “neglect” (NRS 128.014) involves failure to provide care, but both require clear legislative grounding.
• Token Efforts: Minimal, insubstantial gestures of support or communication, insufficient to maintain parental rights under NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6).

Conclusion

IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO G.V. establishes precise boundaries for Nevada’s termination statutes. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that courts must strictly adhere to statutory definitions, place the burden of proof on the moving party, and respect existing custody orders when applying presumptions. This decision will guide lower courts in ensuring fairness and clarity in parental‐rights termination proceedings, protecting both parental due process and the best interests of children.