Clarifying Sovereign Immunity and the Takings Clause:
Ngambo v. Social Security Administration (2d Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In Ngambo v. Social Security Administration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted two recurring problems in federal litigation against government agencies: (1) when the United States has waived sovereign immunity for constitutional claims seeking monetary relief, and (2) what distinguishes a compensable “taking” from mere negligence or loss of property. The case arose after Jules Ngambo, acting pro se, alleged that the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) took his Certificate of Naturalization without due process or just compensation. The District Court (Magistrate Judge Krause, S.D.N.Y.) dismissed the complaint, and the Second Circuit affirmed in a non-precedential summary order dated 9 May 2025.

Although the order lacks precedential force under Local Rule 32.1.1, it distills and re-emphasises two important principles:

1. The Little Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)) does not supply jurisdiction for damages claims predicated on a stand-alone due process violation; sovereign immunity remains intact.
2. An accidental loss or misplacement of personal property by the Government, without an intent to appropriate it for public use, is not a Fifth Amendment taking.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court on all grounds:

• Due Process Claim: Dismissal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction because the United States has not unequivocally waived sovereign immunity for damages actions alleging procedural due process violations.
• Takings Clause Claim: Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the alleged loss of Ngambo’s naturalisation certificate, even if caused by the SSA, was not an intentional taking for public use.
• Motions to Disqualify / Withdraw Consent: The magistrate judge’s denial of recusal and of withdrawal of consent was affirmed; no abuse of discretion or “extraordinary circumstances” was shown.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2004) & United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) – reiterated the “axiomatic” rule that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that waivers must be “unequivocally expressed.” The panel relied on this foundation to reject jurisdiction over due-process damages claims.
2. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) – emphasised the need for unambiguous statutory waiver; referenced to underscore that no text in the Social Security Act or elsewhere extends to due-process damages.
3. Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2005) – clarified that sovereign immunity protects federal agencies eo nomine. That principle blocked Ngambo from circumventing immunity by naming the SSA instead of the United States.
4. United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6 (2012) – distinguished between statutes that create duties and statutes that waive immunity. The Little Tucker Act is only a “gap-filler,” not a blanket waiver.
5. Duarte v. United States, 532 F.2d 850 (2d Cir. 1976) – squarely held that due-process claims are not cognisable for money damages under the Tucker Act; the panel treated Duarte as binding Circuit precedent.
6. Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952) – required explicit “sue and be sued” language for agency amenability, thwarting Ngambo’s argument that the SSA’s administrative scheme implied such amenability.
7. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) – distinguished unconstitutional governmental action (which cannot be cured by compensation) from lawful takings (which require compensation). This case guided the panel’s dismissal of the Takings Clause claim.
8. Maine Community Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296 (2020) – recognized that a Takings claim for money damages is within the Tucker Act’s waiver, thereby acknowledging jurisdiction over that portion of the complaint.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Sovereign Immunity and the Due Process Count

The critical analytic step was separating jurisdiction from merits. The court:

• Observed that sovereign immunity is jurisdictional; without a waiver, federal courts lack power to entertain the suit.
• Examined the Little Tucker Act, concluding—following Duarte—that it contains no waiver for damages premised solely on due-process violations.
• Rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on SSA’s capacity to administer benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), because that statute only authorises judicial review of benefits decisions, not independent damages actions.

2. Takings Clause Analysis

The Takings Clause provides a cause of action for compensation when private property is taken for public use. The panel’s reasoning unfolded in two stages:

1. Jurisdiction. Relying on Maine Community Health Options, the court accepted that a properly pleaded Takings claim seeking ≤ $10,000 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of district courts under § 1346(a)(2).
2. Pleading Standard / Merits. The complaint, construed liberally, alleged that the SSA lost the certificate—an act sounding in negligence, not in intentional appropriation. Following Lingle, an arbitrary, negligent, or accidental deprivation does not transform into a constitutional taking; rather, it may sound in tort (under the Federal Tort Claims Act) but is not covered by the Fifth Amendment’s compensation guarantee.

3. Ancillary Rulings

• Disqualification. Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard (LoCascio), the court found no objective basis for questioning the magistrate judge’s impartiality.
• Withdrawal of Consent. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4), a party must show “extraordinary circumstances.” None were present.

C. Potential Impact

Although labelled a “Summary Order,” the decision will nonetheless influence practice within the Second Circuit:

1. Limits on Creativity in Pleading. Litigants cannot evade sovereign-immunity barriers by repackaging due-process allegations as Little Tucker Act claims.
2. Clarification of Takings Jurisprudence. The case reinforces the requirement of intentional governmental appropriation for public use. Mere administrative mishandling or negligence falls outside Takings Clause coverage.
3. Agency-Specific Consequences. For the SSA and similar agencies, the ruling underscores that only congressionally prescribed judicial-review pathways (§ 405(g) in particular) are available; damages claims remain foreclosed absent express waiver.
4. Pro Se Litigation Guidance. The decision signals how courts should construe pro se complaints liberally yet enforce jurisdictional and pleading rules rigorously.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Sovereign Immunity: A rule that the United States (and its agencies) cannot be sued unless Congress explicitly says so.
• Little Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)): Gives district courts (and the Court of Federal Claims) power to hear certain money-damages suits against the United States, but only when another law allows the suit.
• Takings Clause: Part of the Fifth Amendment that says the Government must pay “just compensation” when it intentionally takes private property for public use.
• Due Process Clause: Part of the Fifth Amendment that requires fair procedures before the Federal Government deprives a person of “life, liberty, or property.” It does not automatically entitle a person to monetary damages.
• “Sue and be sued” Clause: When Congress adds this phrase to an agency’s organic statute, it waives immunity for that agency; the SSA’s statute lacks such language for damages suits.
• Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal: A court may dismiss a claim when, even assuming all alleged facts are true, the plaintiff’s legal theory fails.

Conclusion

Ngambo v. Social Security Administration reaffirms two central doctrines. First, the Little Tucker Act is not a catch-all vehicle for suing the United States when a plaintiff invokes constitutional rhetoric; absent an unambiguous waiver, sovereign immunity bars damages for due-process violations. Second, the Takings Clause demands an intentional, public-use-oriented appropriation — administrative loss or negligence does not suffice. While the order is non-precedential, its clear articulation of these doctrines will guide district courts, agency counsel, and litigants within the Second Circuit and beyond. Understanding the boundary lines it draws is vital for anyone contemplating monetary suits against federal agencies.