Clarifying Railway Labor Act Preemption and Validating Union Member Claim Assignments: Commentary on The Boeing Company v. SWAPA

Clarifying Railway Labor Act Preemption and Validating Union Member Claim Assignments:
A Commentary on The Boeing Company v. Southwest Airlines Pilots Association

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in The Boeing Company v. Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA), No. 22‑0631 (opinion delivered June 20, 2025), arises from the fallout of the Boeing 737 MAX crashes and subsequent grounding of the aircraft. The case sits at the intersection of federal labor law, state tort law, and procedural rules governing standing and assignments of claims.

SWAPA, the certified bargaining representative for approximately 11,000 Southwest Airlines pilots, sued Boeing in Texas state court. It alleged that Boeing misrepresented the safety and training characteristics of the 737 MAX and thereby:

  • fraudulently and negligently induced SWAPA and its pilots to agree in a 2016 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that pilots would fly the MAX, and
  • tortiously interfered with SWAPA’s business relationship and bargaining posture with Southwest Airlines.

Boeing responded on two principal jurisdictional fronts:

  1. Preemption – arguing that the federal Railway Labor Act (RLA) preempted SWAPA’s state-law claims because their resolution would require interpretation of the 2006 and 2016 CBAs between SWAPA and Southwest.
  2. Standing – arguing that SWAPA lacked “associational standing” to pursue damages claims on behalf of individual pilots and that later‑executed assignments of pilots’ claims to SWAPA were void as against public policy.

The Texas Supreme Court largely sides with SWAPA on these threshold issues. It holds that:

  • the RLA does not preempt SWAPA’s tort claims against Boeing because those claims can be resolved without interpreting the CBAs, and
  • pilot assignments of their claims to SWAPA are valid and not void as a matter of public policy, giving SWAPA standing as an assignee (even though SWAPA waived any argument that it had associational standing in this particular suit).

The Court affirms the court of appeals’ judgment, which:

  • remands SWAPA’s own claims (for loss of dues and legal fees) for further proceedings, and
  • leaves the pilots’ assigned claims to proceed in a separate lawsuit, after dismissing the representative claims in this suit without prejudice.

This commentary examines the opinion’s main holdings, its use of precedent, the Court’s legal reasoning, and the decision’s likely impact on future labor, aviation, and aggregate litigation in Texas and beyond.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background in Brief

  • SWAPA is the collective bargaining representative for Southwest pilots under the RLA.
  • Southwest and SWAPA operated under a 2006 CBA that listed aircraft types Southwest pilots would fly; the list pre‑dated the 737 MAX.
  • After Boeing introduced the 737 MAX in 2011, Southwest purchased 150 MAX aircraft. Southwest believed the 2006 CBA’s aircraft list encompassed the MAX; SWAPA disagreed and its pilots refused to fly the MAX.
  • The 2006 CBA became “amendable” in 2012. Under the RLA, the parties had to renegotiate while maintaining the status quo.
  • In 2016, SWAPA sued Southwest in federal court, contending that the status quo under the 2006 CBA did not obligate pilots to fly the MAX.
  • SWAPA alleged that, during these negotiations, Boeing directly engaged with SWAPA and falsely represented that the MAX was essentially a more fuel‑efficient version of the 737 that pilots could fly without additional training—representations central to SWAPA’s acceptance of the MAX in a new 2016 CBA.
  • SWAPA then agreed in the 2016 CBA that pilots would fly the MAX and dismissed its federal lawsuit against Southwest.
  • After two fatal crashes (Indonesia, 2018; Ethiopia, 2019) and FAA grounding of the MAX, Southwest cancelled hundreds of flights; pilots allegedly lost wages due to lack of flying opportunities.
  • SWAPA sued Boeing in Texas state court, asserting:
    • fraudulent misrepresentation,
    • negligent misrepresentation,
    • tortious interference with a prospective business relationship (the 2016 CBA),
    • negligence, and
    • fraud by nondisclosure.
  • Boeing removed to federal court, invoking “complete preemption” under the RLA; the federal court remanded, holding the RLA does not completely preempt state-law claims.
  • Back in state court, Boeing filed a plea to the jurisdiction:
    • arguing ordinary RLA preemption and
    • contesting SWAPA’s associational standing to sue for individual pilots’ damages.
  • In response, 8,794 pilots assigned their claims to SWAPA; SWAPA filed those assignments. Boeing then argued the assignments were void as against public policy.
  • The trial court granted Boeing’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed SWAPA’s claims with prejudice.
  • The Dallas Court of Appeals:
    • held the RLA does not preempt SWAPA’s claims,
    • held SWAPA lacked associational standing for pilot claims,
    • held SWAPA has standing for its own organizational claims,
    • held the assignments valid but ineffective to retroactively cure standing in this case, and
    • modified the judgment to:
      • dismiss pilot‑representative claims without prejudice, and
      • remand SWAPA’s own claims.
  • Boeing petitioned to the Texas Supreme Court, challenging:
    • the no‑preemption holding, and
    • the validity of the assignments and consequent dismissal without prejudice.

B. Key Holdings

  1. No Railway Labor Act Preemption: The RLA does not preempt SWAPA’s state‑law tort claims against Boeing because resolving those claims does not “substantially depend” on interpreting any CBA between SWAPA and Southwest.
  2. Assignments Are Valid and Not Contrary to Public Policy:
    • Pilots’ assignments of their claims against Boeing to SWAPA are not void as against public policy under Texas law.
    • SWAPA, as assignee, “steps into the shoes” of the pilots and may sue on those claims in a separate lawsuit, but must prove each individual pilot’s injury and damages.
  3. Associational Standing Waived in This Case:
    • SWAPA did not file its own petition for review to challenge the court of appeals’ rejection of associational standing.
    • Thus, SWAPA’s argument that it had associational standing is waived; SWAPA can proceed only on:
      • its own organizational claims in this suit, and
      • the pilots’ assigned claims in the separate suit.
  4. Procedural Management Left to Trial Courts:
    • The Court expressly does not decide how thousands of assigned claims must be joined, consolidated, severed, or tried.
    • Those questions fall within the trial court’s discretion under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, subject to considerations of prejudice, justice, and convenience.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. The Railway Labor Act and the 737 MAX Context

The RLA, originally enacted for railroads in 1926 and later extended to airlines, establishes a framework to:

  • encourage collective bargaining,
  • prevent disruptions to interstate commerce, and
  • require arbitration of certain labor disputes through “adjustment boards.”

The Act distinguishes between:

  • Major disputes: involving the formation or alteration of CBAs (negotiating new terms), and
  • Minor disputes: involving grievances about the interpretation or application of existing CBAs.

Minor disputes must be resolved exclusively through the RLA machinery—internal grievance processes and adjustment boards—rather than in court. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that state‑law claims are “preempted” by the RLA when they are, in substance, minor disputes requiring interpretation of a CBA.

Against this legal background, the SWAPA–Boeing dispute focuses on whether Boeing’s alleged misrepresentations about the 737 MAX’s safety and training characteristics, made during negotiation of the 2016 CBA, create state‑law tort claims that are independent of the CBA or are instead inextricably bound up with interpreting CBA terms.

B. Precedents on RLA/LMRA Preemption

1. Core U.S. Supreme Court Precedents

The Texas Supreme Court’s preemption analysis is tightly anchored to U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting both the RLA and the analogous Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA):

  • Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994):
    • Held: The RLA preempts state‑law claims that require interpretation of a CBA (typically minor disputes) but does not preempt claims based on rights and obligations that exist independently of the CBA.
    • The Court equated the RLA’s preemptive scope with that of the LMRA.
  • Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988):
    • LMRA case establishing the now‑canonical test: A state‑law claim is preempted if its resolution is “substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of a collective‑bargaining agreement.”
    • However, “purely factual questions” about conduct and motives—even if the same facts are relevant to a potential CBA grievance—are not preempted if they can be resolved without interpreting the CBA.
  • Allis‑Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985):
    • Emphasized that “not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective‑bargaining agreement, is pre‑empted.”
    • But if a state‑law claim is “substantially dependent” on CBA interpretation, preemption applies.
  • Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962):
    • Articulated one key policy behind preemption: preventing divergent state‑law interpretations of identical CBA provisions that could destabilize national labor relations.

These cases are repeatedly cited in the Boeing opinion and provide the controlling framework: the RLA (like the LMRA) displaces state‑law causes of action only when their adjudication requires interpretation (or application) of a CBA.

2. Texas Preemption Framing

The court also references its own recent precedent, such as Horton v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 692 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2024), for general preemption principles: preemption hinges on congressional intent, with statutory text typically providing the best evidence of that intent.

To that end, the opinion quotes the RLA’s statement of purposes in 45 U.S.C. § 151a, emphasizing the goals of:

  • preserving the status quo during negotiations,
  • promptly and orderly settling disputes over “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions,” and
  • settling grievances involving interpretation or application of agreements through adjustment boards.

C. The Court’s Preemption Reasoning Applied to SWAPA’s Claims

1. Boeing’s Preemption Argument

Boeing’s theory was straightforward: SWAPA’s misrepresentation and tortious interference claims supposedly could not be evaluated without deciding what the 2006 CBA and 2016 CBA required of pilots with respect to the 737 MAX—especially whether the 2006 CBA already obligated pilots to fly the MAX before the explicit MAX language in the 2016 CBA.

In Boeing’s view:

  • if the 2006 CBA already required pilots to fly the MAX, then SWAPA’s alleged reliance on Boeing’s statements and any causal link to pilots’ damages would be undermined, and
  • figuring out whether the 2006 CBA required pilots to fly the MAX necessarily involves interpreting that CBA, triggering RLA preemption.

2. The Court’s Focus on Elements of the State-Law Claims

Following Lingle, the Court looks at the elements of SWAPA’s claims—specifically fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious interference with a prospective business relationship—and asks: Can these elements be proven or disproven without interpreting any provision of the CBAs?

  • Fraudulent Misrepresentation (per Formosa Plastics): requires proof of a material false representation, knowledge or recklessness, intent to induce reliance, actual and justifiable reliance, and resulting injury.
  • Negligent Misrepresentation (per JPMorgan Chase v. Orca Assets): requires proof that the defendant, in its business, supplied false information without reasonable care, that the plaintiff justifiably relied on this information, and that the plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss.
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relationship (per Coinmach v. Aspenwood): requires a reasonable probability of entering a business relationship (here, a new CBA), intentional and independently tortious interference, and resulting damages.

The Court concludes that these elements center on Boeing’s conduct and SWAPA’s and the pilots’ reliance and motives, not on the meaning of CBA terms:

  • Did Boeing misrepresent material facts about the 737 MAX’s equivalence to existing 737s and the need (or lack thereof) for additional pilot training?
  • Did SWAPA and the pilots actually rely on those statements when agreeing in 2016 that pilots would fly the MAX?
  • Would SWAPA have agreed to include the MAX in the 2016 CBA absent those misrepresentations?
  • Did SWAPA and its members suffer economic losses as a result (e.g., lost wages when the MAX was grounded)?

These are, in the Court’s words, “purely factual questions” about conduct, reliance, and causation that do not “require a court to interpret any term of a collective‑bargaining agreement.”

3. The 2006 vs. 2016 CBA: Why Interpretation Is Not Required

The Court carefully addresses Boeing’s contention that causation depends on construing the 2006 CBA:

  • It is undisputed that pilots never actually flew the MAX under the 2006 CBA.
  • SWAPA consistently maintained that the 2006 CBA did not require them to fly the MAX and even sued Southwest in federal court to enforce that position.
  • In 2012, the 2006 CBA became “amendable,” and the RLA required the parties to renegotiate; SWAPA had no legal duty to agree in the 2016 CBA to fly the MAX, even if the 2006 CBA might be construed to cover it.

The key allegation is that SWAPA would not have agreed to fly the MAX in the 2016 CBA but for Boeing’s misrepresentations. That assertion can be evaluated by asking:

  • what SWAPA’s bargaining stance would have been in 2016 had it known the true facts, and
  • whether Boeing’s statements materially influenced SWAPA’s decision-making.

Crucially, this inquiry does not require a legal determination of what the 2006 CBA actually meant about MAX flying obligations; it asks, as a matter of fact, how SWAPA believed the 2006 CBA operated and how Boeing’s statements affected SWAPA’s later decision to enter the 2016 CBA.

Under Lingle and Norris, factual overlap with a potential CBA dispute is not enough to trigger preemption. As long as the rights at issue derive from state tort law and their adjudication does not turn on construing the CBA, state courts remain free to adjudicate them.

4. Federal District Court’s Earlier Statement

Boeing pointed to the federal district court’s remark that resolving SWAPA’s claims would “require interpretation of the CBA.” The Texas Supreme Court rightly notes that:

  • that statement was not central to the federal court’s ruling, and
  • the federal court explicitly recognized that, for complete preemption and removal jurisdiction, it did not matter whether the claims required CBA interpretation, because the RLA is not a statute that “completely preempts” state law for removal purposes.

Thus, the federal court’s observation has no binding force in the state court’s analysis of ordinary preemption as a defense.

5. Scope of the Holding

The Court is careful to narrow the decision:

  • It does not decide whether the RLA’s preemptive reach extends to disputes that do not formally involve an “employee” versus a “carrier,” although it acknowledges textual arguments suggesting the Act’s mechanisms are limited to those parties.
  • It does not decide whether a “remedial gap” exists in the RLA for third‑party claims that require CBA interpretation yet cannot be arbitrated before an adjustment board. That issue is avoided because the Court concludes this case simply does not require CBA interpretation.

The central holding on preemption is therefore:

Because the resolution of SWAPA’s claims against Boeing is not “substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of” the CBAs, the Railway Labor Act does not preempt SWAPA’s state‑law causes of action.

D. Standing, Associational Standing, and Assignments of Claims

1. Associational Standing Under Texas Law

Texas has codified the three‑part federal test for associational standing in Texas Business Organizations Code § 252.007(b), mirroring Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission and Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control Board:

  1. Members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;
  2. The interests the association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose; and
  3. Neither the claim nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members.

The third prong is often the sticking point when damages claims predominate; individualized proof of injury and damages typically necessitates member participation.

Here:

  • The court of appeals held that SWAPA lacked associational standing to assert individual pilots’ damages claims.
  • SWAPA did not file its own petition for review seeking to overturn that holding.
  • Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53.1 and cases like First Bank v. Brumitt, a party must file a petition for review to seek any change in the court of appeals’ judgment.
  • Therefore, SWAPA’s belated argument in the Supreme Court that it actually did have associational standing is treated as waived, because accepting it would require altering the court of appeals’ judgment on that point.

As a result, associational standing is off the table in this case. The only live question is whether SWAPA can proceed as an assignee of the pilots’ claims.

2. Assignments as an Alternate Basis for Standing

In response to Boeing’s associational‑standing challenge, 8,794 pilots executed assignments transferring to SWAPA:

  • “all rights, title, and interest” in any claims they had or might have against Boeing arising from the “MAX Crisis,” and
  • authority for SWAPA to “prosecute, settle, and/or compromise” those claims and to “collect, receive, and distribute” damages.

Critically, the assignments:

  • acknowledge that pilots are waiving their right to pursue those claims individually, and
  • contemplate that any recovery will be distributed among pilots in proportion to W‑2 earnings.

SWAPA then filed a separate lawsuit in the same trial court based on these assignments. In the present case, SWAPA asked that any dismissal of its representative claims be without prejudice so it could proceed as assignee in the new case.

3. Texas Law on Assignability and the Gandy Line of Cases

Texas generally allows assignment of causes of action, except where assignments violate public policy. Key precedents include:

  • State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996):
    • Invalidated certain assignments in the liability‑insurance context where arrangements “tend to increase and distort litigation,” mislead juries, promote collusion, and unfairly shift liability.
    • Gandy and subsequent decisions reflect skepticism toward assignments that:
      • are intertwined with “Mary Carter”‑type agreements,
      • are mainly punitive or personal in nature, or
      • threaten to distort the adversarial process.
  • PPG Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners, 146 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2004) and Texas Medical Resources, LLP v. Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc., 659 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. 2023):
    • Identify “personal and punitive” claims (e.g., certain DTPA and unfair‑settlement claims) as generally non‑assignable.
  • Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Marketing on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2010):
    • Approved assignments of claims to a third party where the assignee was not a mere “stranger/entrepreneur,” and the assignments did not fall within the Gandy concerns.

In BMW’s view (echoed by the partial dissent), the SWAPA pilot assignments should be void under Gandy because their “sole purpose” is to bypass the Legislature’s associational‑standing and class‑action requirements. Boeing characterizes them as “pass‑through” arrangements with SWAPA functioning as a conduit for pilot damages.

4. The Court’s Reasons for Upholding the Assignments

The majority rejects Boeing’s Gandy‑based argument and upholds the assignments as valid, emphasizing several points:

  1. No inherent distortion or collusion:
    • Unlike the assignment scenarios in Gandy and similar cases, these assignments do not involve an insurer‑insured settlement dynamic or collusive allocation of fault.
    • Rather than making litigation “more protracted and complex,” the assignments may actually reduce litigation complexity in comparison to thousands of separate pilot lawsuits.
  2. Claims are remedial, not personal/punitive:
    • The pilots’ claims for lost wages and economic losses are “property‑based and remedial,” not the sort of highly personal or punitive claims Texas deems non‑assignable.
  3. SWAPA is not a “stranger” to the dispute:
    • SWAPA negotiated the 2016 CBA, interacted directly with Boeing, and allegedly relied on Boeing’s misrepresentations.
    • It is thus a natural party to litigate both its own injuries and those stemming from the same alleged misconduct as assignee of pilots’ claims.
  4. Pass-through arrangements are not disfavored per se:
    • The Court references Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that assignees have standing even if they must remit all recoveries back to assignors.
    • The mere fact that SWAPA will distribute any recovery back to pilots does not make the assignments invalid.
  5. No statutory bar to assignments:
    • The Texas Legislature has specifically limited associational standing in § 252.007(b) when individual member participation is required, but it has not prohibited members from assigning claims to associations.
    • As in Southwestern Bell, the Court declines to infer a bar where the Legislature did not expressly adopt one.
  6. Assignments are an alternative, not a circumvention, to associational or class procedures:
    • The Court emphasizes that associational standing, class actions, and assignments are “alternative means” of securing standing.
    • Because assignment has distinct requirements—principally, that the assignee must prove the assignor’s underlying claim—it does not “circumvent” associational‑standing or class‑action rules; it simply takes a different route.

Thus, the Court holds:

The pilots’ assignments are not void as against public policy and give SWAPA standing to pursue the pilots’ claims as assignee in a separate lawsuit.

5. A Critical Limitation: SWAPA Must Litigate as Assignee, Not as Representative

The majority draws a bright line: assignments confer standing, but they do not allow SWAPA to morph back into a de facto representative association in violation of § 252.007(b) or class‑action standards.

Key consequences:

  • SWAPA “steps into the shoes” of each pilot and “is considered under the law to have suffered the same injury” as the pilot for standing purposes.
  • However, SWAPA must prove, for each pilot whose claim it asserts:
    • Boeing’s liability as to that pilot, and
    • the specific damages that pilot sustained.
  • Assignments do not relieve SWAPA of the burden that each pilot (as a plaintiff) would have borne.

The Court underscores that SWAPA cannot use assignments as a backdoor to aggregate claims in a way that sidesteps the individualized proof that associational‑standing doctrine deemed incompatible with representative litigation.

6. Procedural Management: Joinder, Severance, and Separate Trials

The Court expressly refrains from dictating how the thousands of assigned claims should be procedurally handled in the separate lawsuit. Instead, it points to existing procedural tools under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure:

  • Rule 39: Joinder of necessary parties.
  • Rule 40: Permissive joinder of parties and authority to order separate trials to avoid embarrassment, delay, or undue expense.
  • Rule 41: Consolidation and severance of claims “on such terms as are just.”
  • Rule 174: Consolidation to avoid unnecessary costs or delays, and separate trials “in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice.”

The trial court must exercise its discretion—“within limits created by the circumstances of the particular case”—to manage:

  • how many claims are tried together,
  • whether there should be bellwether or representative trials on overlapping factual issues, and
  • how to prevent prejudice to Boeing while still giving SWAPA a fair opportunity to prove each assigned claim.

The takeaway is that Texas procedure already contains the flexibility needed to address the complexity created by mass assignments, without needing to invalidate the assignments on public‑policy grounds.

7. The Dissent’s Concern (Inferred)

Although the dissenting opinion (by Justice Bland, joined by Justice Huddle) is not reproduced in the excerpt, the majority refers to it as expressing the view that the assignments allow SWAPA to “circumvent” associational‑standing and class‑action requirements.

On that view, one can infer the dissent likely would:

  • treat these mass assignments as functionally equivalent to a representative or class action,
  • extend the Gandy public‑policy rationale to bar assignments whose primary purpose is to avoid statutory or rule‑based procedural safeguards (e.g., adequacy of representation, class certification standards), and
  • emphasize the risk that such assignments aggregate enormous liability against a defendant without the structural protections of class‑action procedure.

The majority explicitly rejects the premise that the mere purpose of simplifying or aggregating claims, absent collusion or distortion of the adversarial process, is itself contrary to public policy.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Railway Labor Act (RLA) and Major vs. Minor Disputes

  • RLA: A federal law that governs labor relations in the railroad and airline industries. It aims to avoid strikes and disruptions to commerce by encouraging collective bargaining and requiring certain disputes to be arbitrated.
  • Major disputes: Fights over making or changing a labor contract (e.g., negotiating a new CBA or changing work rules). These involve creating new rights.
  • Minor disputes: Fights over how to apply or interpret an existing contract (e.g., “Does this clause already cover the 737 MAX?”). These involve enforcing existing rights and must go to an adjustment board, not to court.

2. Preemption: Complete vs. Ordinary

  • Ordinary preemption: A defense raised in court. A defendant says: “Federal law trumps this state‑law claim.” The state court decides whether Congress intended to displace that state claim.
  • Complete preemption: A jurisdictional doctrine. In rare situations, a federal statute is so powerful that any claim in that area is automatically treated as a federal claim for purposes of removal to federal court. The RLA is not such a statute, as the federal district court held.
  • Here, the Texas Supreme Court is addressing ordinary preemption: whether the RLA bars SWAPA from pursuing its state tort claims in state court.

3. Associational Standing

  • Standing is the legal right to bring a lawsuit. Associational standing lets an organization sue on behalf of its members.
  • Texas allows associational standing if:
    1. members would have standing on their own,
    2. the interests asserted are related to the association’s purpose, and
    3. neither the claim nor requested relief requires individual members to actively participate in the suit.
  • When the lawsuit mainly seeks individualized money damages—like each pilot’s lost wages—courts often find that member participation is necessary, defeating associational standing for that part of the case.

4. Assignments of Claims

  • An assignment is when a person (the assignor) transfers their legal claim to someone else (the assignee). The assignee then “steps into the shoes” of the assignor and can sue in its own name.
  • Assignments are generally allowed for economic‑loss claims, but courts sometimes ban them when they undermine the fairness of litigation—e.g., collusive assignments against liability insurers.
  • Here, pilots assigned their economic‑damage claims (lost wages, etc.) to SWAPA, which the Court views as permissible and not collusive.

5. “Without Prejudice” vs. “With Prejudice”

  • A dismissal “with prejudice” ends the claim for good; it cannot be refiled.
  • A dismissal “without prejudice” leaves the claimant free to bring the claim again, usually in a different procedural posture or case.
  • In this case, dismissing SWAPA’s representative pilot claims without prejudice allows those same claims to go forward in the separate lawsuit where SWAPA sues as assignee.

6. “Substantially Dependent” on CBA Interpretation

  • For RLA (and LMRA) preemption, courts ask:
    • Is the state‑law claim so bound up with interpreting a CBA that you cannot decide it without construing CBA terms?
    • Or can you decide it based on independent state‑law standards and factual findings?
  • If the claim can be decided on factual questions—what was said, what was relied on, what damages followed—without decoding what a CBA provision legally means, it is not preempted.

V. Impact and Significance

A. For Airline Labor Disputes and Manufacturer Liability

The decision clarifies that unions and employees in Texas may bring state‑law tort claims against third‑party manufacturers (like Boeing) even when those claims arise in the shadow of labor negotiations, so long as:

  • the rights and duties at issue stem from state law (e.g., fraud, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference), and
  • the court does not need to interpret the CBA to resolve those claims.

This is particularly significant for:

  • Manufacturers: They cannot rely on the RLA to automatically shield them from state tort liability whenever a union’s bargaining decision is at issue. Their representations to unions during CBA negotiations can give rise to state‑law claims.
  • Unions and employees: They have a clearer path to holding non‑carrier entities liable for fraudulent or negligent conduct that affects bargaining outcomes and working conditions.

In high‑stakes contexts like the 737 MAX, this ruling ensures that state‑law remedies remain available for catastrophic economic and safety‑related harms that flow from alleged misrepresentations by third parties.

B. For RLA/LMRA Preemption Doctrine in Texas Courts

The opinion strengthens a key limiting principle on federal labor‑law preemption:

  • Merely being “tangentially” related to a CBA or occurring during CBA negotiations is insufficient for preemption.
  • Courts must dissect the elements of the state claim and ask whether adjudicating those elements necessarily requires interpreting the CBA.
  • Factual overlap with a CBA dispute does not equal legal dependence on CBA interpretation.

Texas courts are thus reminded to apply Lingle and Norris narrowly and to preserve state‑law remedies where possible, avoiding unnecessary expansion of preemption that would create “remedial gaps.”

C. For Collective Litigation: Assignments as an Aggregation Tool

On the assignments front, the Court’s decision is likely to have far‑reaching implications in Texas:

  • Unions and trade associations:
    • Now have clear confirmation that members may assign economic‑loss claims to the organization, even in large numbers, without automatically running afoul of public policy.
    • Assignments provide an alternative to (not a substitute for) class actions or associational‑standing suits, particularly where individualized damages defeat the third prong of associational standing.
  • Defendants in mass‑claim scenarios:
    • Face potential exposure to large aggregations of assigned claims, all prosecuted by a single institutional plaintiff.
    • However, they retain all substantive defenses, and the assignee must still prove each individual claim and damages.
  • Trial courts:
    • Will likely see more creative use of assignments in complex litigation.
    • Must actively manage such cases through joinder, consolidation, severance, and separate trials to balance efficiency and fairness.

At the same time, the Court’s insistence that SWAPA litigate as assignee (not representative) of each pilot’s claim may substantially limit the practical efficiencies of assignments. Proving reliance and damages for thousands of individuals remains a formidable challenge and may incentivize innovative trial‑management tools (such as issue‑class‑like structures, bellwether trials, or phased proceedings) within the constraints of Texas procedure.

D. For Statutory Design and Legislative Choices

The opinion underscores an important separation‑of‑powers theme:

  • The Texas Legislature chose to:
    • allow associational standing only when individual member participation is not required, and
    • permit class actions subject to Rule 42 safeguards.
  • But the Legislature did not outlaw assignments of claims to associations, nor did it condition assignments on class‑action‑like procedural protections.

By refusing to judicially extend Gandy to prohibit mass assignments in this context, the Court:

  • leaves the door open for the Legislature to regulate or restrict such assignments if it chooses, and
  • signals reluctance to use broad, judge‑made public‑policy rules to curtail a long‑recognized property right (assignment of claims) in the absence of the specific collusive or distortive conditions found in earlier assignment cases.

VI. Conclusion

The Boeing Company v. SWAPA establishes two significant principles in Texas law, with broader resonances in federal labor‑law and complex‑litigation contexts:

  1. RLA Preemption Is Narrow and Fact‑Sensitive:
    • State‑law tort claims by unions against third‑party manufacturers are not preempted merely because they arise during CBA negotiations or implicate the economic consequences of CBA terms.
    • Preemption under the RLA (as under the LMRA) attaches only where resolving the state‑law claim is “substantially dependent” on interpreting a CBA.
    • Purely factual disputes over misrepresentation, reliance, and damages, grounded in independent state‑law duties, remain within the jurisdiction of state courts.
  2. Assignments of Economic‑Loss Claims to Associations Are Valid, But Not a Shortcut Around Individualized Proof:
    • Mass assignments of members’ economic claims to an association are not void per se as against public policy, even when intended to facilitate aggregated litigation.
    • Associational standing, class actions, and assignments are distinct pathways to standing, each with its own requirements; using one is not an improper circumvention of the others.
    • However, an assignee must still carry the full burden of proving each assignor’s claim—liability and damages—and cannot rely on assignments to avoid the individualized proof that would have been required had each member sued separately.

In practical terms, the ruling allows SWAPA’s own claims against Boeing to proceed in Texas courts and paves the way for thousands of pilots’ assigned claims to be adjudicated in a separate lawsuit, subject to the trial court’s management of joinder and trial structure.

More broadly, the decision preserves state‑law fraud and tort remedies in the labor‑relations setting while cautiously endorsing assignments as a permissible, though procedurally demanding, mechanism for aggregating large numbers of related claims. It thereby reinforces both the autonomy of state tort law in the face of federal labor statutes and the traditional flexibility of Texas civil‑procedure tools to handle complex, multi‑party litigation.

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