Clarifying Probable Cause in Counterfeit Currency Arrests and Prompt Arraignment Requirements

Introduction

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff’s Dept. (2nd Cir. Apr. 10, 2025) is a Second Circuit summary order addressing a § 1983 suit by Kelly Glover against Onondaga County, the Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department, and Deputies Albanese and MacDonald. Glover alleged false arrest and imprisonment, unlawful entry and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, due process and equal protection violations, conspiracy, fraud, emotional distress, and municipal liability arising from her arrest for first-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument (counterfeit $20 bills). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and Glover appealed both procedural and substantive rulings.

Key issues:

Did Deputy Albanese have probable cause to arrest Glover for use of counterfeit currency?
Was the warrantless entry and arrest inside Glover’s home lawful under the Fourth Amendment?
Did Glover’s brief custody without arraignment violate her due process rights?
Can Onondaga County be held liable under Monell for a policy or custom related to “unarrest” releases and waiver forms?

Parties: Plaintiff‐Appellant – Kelly Glover; Defendants‐Appellees – Onondaga County, Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Dominick Albanese, Sergeant Sharon MacDonald.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants. On the procedural front, the court found no abuse of discretion in (1) denying Glover’s motion to compel additional discovery after the close of a three-year period, and (2) deeming the defendants’ summary judgment motion unopposed when Glover failed to file any response or a timely Rule 56(d) affidavit showing why further discovery was essential.

Substantively, the panel held:

Probable Cause & False Arrest: Deputy Albanese had probable cause to arrest Glover after viewing surveillance footage of her passing two counterfeit $20 bills at a Wegmans, personally examining the bills and finding them lacking proper watermarks, identifying her via DMV records, and obtaining her admission that she used the bills to purchase groceries.
Warrantless Entry & Seizure: Glover consented to the deputy’s entry into her home and did not ask him to leave until after he announced the arrest. The initial entry and subsequent arrest were therefore lawful.
Due Process / Arraignment Delay: Glover’s roughly four-hour detention without formal charges and without arraignment did not violate her constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has deemed a warrantless arrestee’s custody of up to 48 hours to be “prompt” for purposes of McLaughlin v. County of Riverside.
Monell Liability: There was no injury traceable to the County’s use of a “Certificate of Release and Waiver of Claims” form, nor any policy or custom of wrongful arrest, and thus no basis for municipal liability under Monell.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1995): Elements of false arrest under § 1983 mirror New York common law.
Curry v. City of Syracuse, 316 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2003): Warrantless arrests carry a rebuttable presumption of illegality, overcome by proof of probable cause.
Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006): Defines “probable cause” as reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980): Warrantless home arrests violate the Fourth Amendment absent consent or exigent circumstances.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991): Requires a “prompt” (generally within 48 hours) probable-cause determination after warrantless arrest.
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a policy or custom that causes a constitutional violation.

Legal Reasoning

1. Probable Cause for Counterfeit Instrument Arrest: Deputy Albanese’s investigation—surveillance video, inspection of bills, matching the purchaser’s identity via DMV photo, and Glover’s admission she used two $20 bills at Wegmans—provided “reasonably trustworthy information” under Jaegly. The law does not require officers to accept a suspect’s “innocent” explanation when confronted with strong evidence of a crime. Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1989), and District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018), confirm that probable cause subsists even if intent or knowledge for conviction cannot yet be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Warrantless Entry & Consent: Under Payton, a warrantless home entry to arrest requires either consent or exigent circumstances. Glover’s deposition testimony established that she voluntarily invited Deputy Albanese in when he identified himself as law enforcement. Her request for him to leave came only after he announced the arrest—too late to vitiate her earlier consent.

3. Due Process & Prompt Arraignment: McLaughlin holds that a post‐arrest probable-cause determination must occur “promptly,” usually within 48 hours. Glover’s release four hours after arrest, without formal charges, falls well within constitutional bounds. There is no freestanding private right of action under N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 140.20 independent of a constitutional violation (Watson v. City of New York, 92 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 1996)).

4. Monell Liability: To impose municipal liability, a plaintiff must show both a constitutional deprivation and a municipal policy or custom that caused it. Glover could not establish that signing a generic “Release and Waiver” extended her detention or caused any injury. Nor did she identify any County policy of wrongful arrest—indeed, probable cause existed. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2012).

Potential Impact

Reaffirms that an officer’s refusal to credit a suspect’s innocent explanation does not negate probable cause.
Clarifies that brief, warrantless home arrests with consent remain valid Fourth Amendment seizures.
Confirms that detentions under 48 hours without formal arraignment do not, standing alone, violate due process.
Limits Monell claims by requiring a tangible injury and a clearly identified unconstitutional policy or custom.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A reasonable belief, based on trustworthy facts, that a suspect has committed a crime. It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Warrantless Entry: Generally prohibited for home arrests except with the homeowner’s consent or an emergency (exigent circumstances).
Summary Judgment: A court’s decision without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Monell Liability: Municipalities can only be sued under § 1983 if a local policy or custom directly causes a constitutional violation.

Conclusion

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff’s Dept. affirms key Fourth Amendment principles: that officers need only probable cause—not conclusive proof of guilt—to make warrantless arrests, and that a court’s refusal to accept a suspect’s self-serving explanation does not negate that cause. It underscores the permissibility of brief, consensual, warrantless home arrests and confirms that short detentions below the 48-hour threshold without arraignment pose no due process problem. Finally, it reinforces the stringent requirements for municipal liability under Monell—injury plus a specific policy or custom causing the deprivation. This decision will guide officers, litigants, and courts in evaluating the sufficiency of probable cause and the scope of municipal § 1983 liability.