Clarifying Probable Cause and Seizure Elements in §1983 Malicious Prosecution Claims

Introduction

In Theresa Maria Laws v. Borough of Lansdale, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed critical questions concerning the elements of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the derivative municipal liability under Monell. Appellant Theresa Laws, embroiled for over a decade in acrimonious disputes with her neighbor Scott Gribling, was charged with criminal harassment after displaying signs in her car accusing Gribling of violent offenses. Although the charge was later dismissed, Laws sued the Borough of Lansdale, its police personnel, and Gribling, alleging malicious prosecution, First Amendment retaliation, Equal Protection and Fourth Amendment violations, as well as Monell claims. The District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, and Laws appealed only her § 1983 malicious prosecution and municipal liability claims.

Key issues:

• Whether the existence of probable cause to charge Laws with harassment defeats a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim;
• Whether the procedural requirements Laws faced—fingerprinting, photography, a preliminary hearing summons—constituted a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment;
• Whether, in the absence of a constitutional violation, Monell municipal liability can lie.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Roth, affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. It held:

1. The harassment charges against Laws—based on signs in her vehicle accusing her neighbor of criminal conduct—were supported by probable cause. Probable cause existed because Sgt. North’s affidavit of probable cause demonstrated a “fair probability” that Laws committed the harassment offenses under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2709(a)(3) and (a)(7), given Laws’ prior similar conduct and the alarming content of the signs.
2. Laws did not suffer a Fourth Amendment “seizure” sufficient to support malicious prosecution. A brief fingerprinting and photography session plus a preliminary hearing summons do not rise to the level of detention or onerous pretrial restrictions.
3. In the absence of a constitutional violation, Laws’ derivative municipal liability claims under Monell v. Department of Social Services fail as a matter of law.
4. Alternatively, Laws forfeited any substantive appellate arguments by failing to develop them in her opening brief.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Est. of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003): Established the five elements of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, including the requirement of a post-resolution seizure.
• DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599 (3d Cir. 2005): Held that noncustodial summonses and brief procedural tasks do not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.
• Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000): Explained the “fair probability” standard for probable cause in criminal cases.
• Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): Holds that municipal liability under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation by a policy or custom.
• Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2020): Reaffirmed the elements of malicious prosecution and the necessity of a post-resolution liberty deprivation.

2. Legal Reasoning

Probable Cause Defeats Malicious Prosecution
The Court emphasized that probable cause for a criminal charge exists whenever there is a “fair probability” that the accused violated the statute. Sgt. North’s affidavit, supported by factual allegations in Laws’ own filings, recounted Laws’ history of displaying derogatory signs, prior citation for similar conduct, and Gribling’s contemporaneous report. These facts satisfied probable cause to charge harassment under the Pennsylvania statute (§ 2709(a)(3), (a)(7)).

No Seizure, No Malicious Prosecution
Under the Third Circuit’s precedents, only post-charge restraints on liberty rise to a Fourth Amendment seizure. Laws underwent fingerprinting and photography—procedures attendant to summons service—and attended a preliminary hearing by videoconference. The Court held these steps insufficient to constitute a meaningful restraint on her freedom.

Monell Claims Collapse Without a Violation
Since no constitutional violation occurred, the Court found no basis to impose municipal liability on the Borough of Lansdale or its police department. A Monell claim must derive from an underlying constitutional wrong caused by a policy, practice or custom; here, nothing survived the probability or seizure hurdles.

Forfeiture of Arguments
The panel noted that Laws’ brief contained only conclusory assertions and a list of dates, without developing legal arguments or citing authority—resulting in waiver of any additional issues.

3. Impact

This decision reinforces two important guardrails in § 1983 malicious prosecution litigation:

• Probable Cause Threshold: Defendants need only a “fair probability” of wrongdoing to justify charges, even when those charges are later dismissed.
• Limited Conception of Seizure: Routine procedural steps—fingerprinting, photography, appearances pursuant to summons—do not establish a Fourth Amendment seizure for malicious prosecution purposes.

Future plaintiffs will need to plead facts undermining a defendant officer’s probable cause or show substantial pretrial restraints akin to detention to sustain a malicious prosecution claim. Municipal liability plaintiffs must first clear these hurdles before invoking Monell.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Probable Cause: Not certainty of guilt, but a reasonable belief—“fair probability”—that a crime occurred based on facts known to the officer.
• Seizure under the Fourth Amendment: A “seizure” means the government significantly restricts a person’s freedom of movement. Getting fingerprinted or photographed after being summoned is not a “seizure.”
• Monell Liability: Municipalities can be sued under § 1983 only if a municipal policy or custom causes a constitutional violation by an employee. No violation, no Monell claim.

Conclusion

Theresa Laws v. Borough of Lansdale delivers clear guidance on the contours of Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims under § 1983. It confirms that: (1) probable cause—even if charges are eventually dismissed—precludes malicious prosecution; (2) minor procedural requirements do not constitute a “seizure”; and (3) without an underlying constitutional violation, municipal liability under Monell cannot stand. This opinion will serve as a touchstone for both plaintiffs and defense counsel navigating § 1983 claims in the Third Circuit and beyond.