Clarifying Pretermination Due Process Standards for Public Employees: Notice, Evidence Disclosure, and Meaningful Opportunity to Respond

Introduction

In David Hieber v. Oakland County, Mich., 25a0110p (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2025), the Sixth Circuit addressed the procedures a public employer must afford a merit‐systems employee before termination. Plaintiff‐appellant David Hieber, for nearly two decades the Director of Oakland County’s Equalization Department, was placed on paid administrative leave and ultimately terminated following an internal investigation into allegations of bullying, age discrimination, and hostility toward workplace diversity initiatives. Hieber sued the County and his supervisor (in individual and official capacities) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of pretermination and post‐termination due process, political‐affiliation retaliation, and age discrimination, as well as common‐law defamation and state‐law age‐discrimination claims under Michigan’s Elliott–Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA). The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all counts. This appellate decision reverses summary judgment on Hieber’s claim for deprivation of pretermination due process (against the County and the supervisor in his official capacity), while affirming the district court on all other claims.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Sixth Circuit held that Hieber had a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued employment and was therefore entitled to constitutionally adequate pretermination procedures.
• The court found genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Oakland County’s investigatory interview and the ensuing six‐minute pretermination hearing satisfied the minimal Loudermill standard: notice of charges, explanation of the evidence, and a meaningful opportunity to respond.
• The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on pretermination due process in favor of the County and the supervisor in his official capacity, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim.
• All other claims were affirmed: post‐termination due process was waived by Hieber’s abandonment of the Personnel Appeal Board (PAB) hearing; the political‐affiliation retaliation, age discrimination (federal and state), and defamation claims failed as a matter of law; and the supervisor in his individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity on due‐process questions.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The court’s due‐process analysis heavily relies on Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedents governing public‐employee terminations:

• Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985): Established that a public employee who can be discharged only for cause has a property interest in continued employment and is entitled to a pretermination hearing supplying notice of charges, an explanation of evidence, and an opportunity to respond.
• Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): Articulated the flexible balancing test for determining what process is due in any particular context.
• Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997): Held that an “initial check against mistaken decisions” suffices as a pretermination hearing when followed by a more comprehensive post‐termination hearing.
• Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491 (6th Cir. 1990): Recognized that an investigation or interrogatory can satisfy Loudermill where “the gist of the allegations” and the employer’s evidence are presented and the employee has a real chance to respond.
• Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 844 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1988): Applied Loudermill to public‐school employees, underscoring the need for supervisors to identify charges, present evidence, and allow responses.
• Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023): Reinforced that procedural due process requires (1) a deprivation of life, liberty, or property by state action and (2) inadequate state process.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit applied Loudermill’s three minimal requirements to the facts:

1. Notice of the Charges: Although Hieber received a formal termination notice before the six‐minute hearing, the underlying investigatory interview gave him only general topics (union negotiations, DEI survey, prior complaint) rather than the specific grounds later endorsed in the termination letter (undermining morale; violating the nondiscrimination policy). A jury could find this insufficient.
2. Explanation of the Evidence: The investigatory interview did not allow Hieber to review or understand all evidence the County would rely upon, and new allegations appeared for the first time in the termination notice. Under Buckner, the employee must grasp “the gist” of the allegations—which here is disputed.
3. Opportunity to Respond: Both an HR administrator and the hearing officer expressly told Hieber that the pretermination meeting was not his time to “plead his case” but merely to acknowledge the County’s decision. Loudermill mandates a meaningful opportunity to respond before deprivation. No amount of post‐termination process can cure a hollow pretermination hearing.

Because the employer’s investigatory interview fell short of conveying precise charges and evidence, and the formal hearing was script‐driven with no real chance to dispute the allegations, summary judgment was improper on the pretermination due‐process claim.

3. Impact on Future Cases and the Area of Law

This decision sharpens the contours of Loudermill in the Sixth Circuit by emphasizing:

• Employers must disclose to employees the specific charges and the evidence to be used against them, not merely general investigatory themes.
• Pretermination meetings cannot serve as mere formalities; employees must have a real opportunity to challenge the employer’s evidence before termination.
• Pretermination due process is distinct from post‐termination remedies, and failure to afford meaningful pretermination process cannot be obviated by subsequent appeal procedures.

Public‐sector employers in this circuit will now need to review their disciplinary protocols to ensure Loudermill’s requirements are met in both interview and hearing formats. Failure to do so risks reversal of summary judgment—or verdicts—in favor of terminated employees with property‐interest protections.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Property Interest in Employment

When civil servants can be fired only “for cause,” the Constitution treats their continued employment as a sort of property right—meaning the government cannot take it away without due process.

Pretermination (Loudermill) Hearing

A minimal, often informal meeting before firing, where the employer must:

1. Inform the employee of the specific charges;
2. Explain the evidence;
3. Allow the employee to present her side of the story.

It is not a full trial, but it must be more than a formality.

Qualified Immunity

A doctrine protecting government officials in their personal capacities unless they violate “clearly established” rights that a reasonable official would have known.

McDonnell Douglas Burden‐Shifting

In discrimination cases, the plaintiff first shows a prima facie case. Then the employer gives a legitimate reason. The plaintiff must then show that reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Conclusion

Key Takeaways:

• Public‐sector employees with-for-cause protections have a constitutionally protected property interest in their jobs.
• Employers must provide clear notice of the precise charges and evidence, and a genuine opportunity to respond, before termination.
• Insufficient pretermination procedures cannot be cured by post‐termination appeals.
• Other claims—political‐affiliation retaliation, age discrimination, defamation—require distinct elements and failed here; qualified privilege or honest‐belief rules may shield an employer against related tort claims.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hieber v. Oakland County thus establishes a tougher Loudermill standard in this jurisdiction, ensuring that pretermination hearings remain an effective check on mistaken or unfair employment decisions in the public sector.