Clarifying Prejudice Under Rule 11: The Fourth Circuit Re-Defines When a Mis-Stated Maximum Penalty Warrants Vacatur of a Guilty Plea

Introduction

In United States v. Edin Solis-Rodriguez, No. 22-4654 (4th Cir. July 23, 2025), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted two recurring questions in federal criminal practice:

• When does a trial court’s failure during the Rule 11 plea colloquy to describe each count’s maximum penalty justify vacating a guilty plea?
• How detailed must a sentencing court’s explanation be when rejecting mitigating arguments and imposing a within-Guidelines sentence?

Writing for the court, Judge Quattlebaum (joined by Judge Heytens; Senior Judge Traxler concurring in the judgment) affirmed both the conviction and the 180-month sentence of Edin Anael Solis-Rodriguez, an undocumented Honduran national who pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by an illegal alien under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).

Parties

• Appellant / Defendant: Edin Anael Solis-Rodriguez
• Appellee / Plaintiff: United States of America
• Lower Court: U.S. District Court, W.D.N.C. (Senior District Judge Frank D. Whitney)

Summary of the Judgment

1. Plea-Colloquy Error: Although the magistrate judge failed to specify that each § 922(g)(5) count carried a separate 10-year maximum (for a cumulative 20-year exposure), the Fourth Circuit assumed this omission was “plain error” but held that it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because the record provided no reasonable probability that he would have insisted on trial had he known of the additional exposure.

2. Sentencing Challenge: The 180-month sentence (120 + 60 consecutive) was procedurally reasonable. The district court’s statement that it had considered all § 3553(a) factors, coupled with a focused explanation of the factors it found “particularly important,” sufficed even though the court did not expressly analyze the defendant’s age and minimal criminal history.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Dominguez-Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004)
  – Established that on plain-error review of a Rule 11 violation, defendant must show a “reasonable probability” that but for the error he would not have pled guilty.
• United States v. Hairston, 522 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 2008)
  – Plea vacated where defendant did attempt to withdraw his plea after learning of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) exposure.
• United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2009)
  – No vacatur; defendant gained significant benefit from plea and never tried to withdraw it.
• United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc)
  – Vacatur where ACCA error plus intervening Rehaif change of law made prejudice probable.
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740 (4th Cir. 2019)
  – Set baseline for individualized sentencing explanations.

The panel synthesized these authorities to craft a two-step template for future Rule 11 challenges: (1) assume or establish “plain error,” then (2) scrutinize the record for concrete signs—such as an attempted withdrawal, weak government case, or new favorable precedent—that the defendant would have opted for trial. Absent such signs, vacatur is unwarranted.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Rule 11 Colloquy

• Error was assumed. The magistrate told Solis-Rodriguez the “maximum” was 10 years without clarifying it applied to each count.
• No prejudice. Key factual points:

• Defendant made no objection during the colloquy or at sentencing.
• He enjoyed a 59–52-month guideline reduction by pleading guilty (210–240 → 151–188).
• The government had overwhelming evidence: recovered firearms, admissions, surveillance video.
• No intervening legal development (unlike Lockhart/Rehaif).

Collectively those factors meant there was not a reasonable probability of a different plea decision.

b. Sentencing Explanation

• Preservation. The majority treated the mitigating factors (age, minimal criminal record) as adequately raised; Judge Traxler’s concurrence would have applied plain-error review because counsel remained silent when the court invited objections.
• Sufficiency. The sentencing judge twice stated he had considered “all” § 3553(a) factors, then highlighted public-safety-oriented factors (seriousness, deterrence, respect for law) that outweighed youth and history. Under Fowler and Arbaugh, such a focused but contextual explanation suffices for a within-Guidelines sentence.

3. Impact of the Decision

• Narrows Successful Rule 11 Appeals. After Solis-Rodriguez, defendants must marshal concrete evidence—beyond mere under-advisement—to show they would have rejected a plea. Blanket assertions of “I might have gone to trial” are unlikely to prevail.
• Encourages District Courts to Invite Objections. Both the majority and concurrence encourage sentencing judges to ask expressly, before finalizing a sentence, whether any arguments remain unaddressed. This may become a best practice throughout the circuit.
• Clarifies Explanation Threshold. For within-Guidelines sentences, reiterating consideration of all § 3553(a) factors and highlighting the weightiest ones generally insulates the sentence from procedural attack.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 11 Colloquy – A required dialogue in which the court ensures a guilty plea is voluntary and informed. The judge must state each charge, the rights waived, and the exact statutory penalties.
• Plain Error Review – A four-prong appellate standard (error, plainness, prejudice, and effect on judicial integrity). It applies when no objection was made below.
• § 922(g)(5) – Federal offense for firearm possession by an “alien unlawfully in the United States.” Until 2022 the max penalty was 10 years; now it is 15.
• U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) – Requires consecutive sentences on multiple counts when the combined statutory maxima are lower than the guideline range, to “stack” imprisonment until the guideline minimum is reached.
• § 3553(a) Factors – The statutory list of considerations (nature of offense, defendant’s history, deterrence, etc.) that guide every federal sentence.

Conclusion

United States v. Solis-Rodriguez reinforces two doctrinal points with practical importance:

1. A mis-description of cumulative maximum penalties is not, by itself, fatal to a plea; demonstrable prejudice remains the linchpin.
2. A sentencing court need not produce a rote transcript of every mitigating argument. A succinct statement that all § 3553(a) factors were considered, coupled with an explanation of the factors driving the sentence, will generally pass muster—especially when counsel fails to object after an explicit invitation.

Practitioners should heed the court’s implicit message: object early, object clearly, and build a record. District judges, meanwhile, are encouraged to adopt the “Bostic inquiry” endorsed by the concurrence—explicitly asking whether any argument or objection remains unaddressed—thereby fortifying their sentences against collateral attack and promoting judicial economy throughout the Fourth Circuit.