Clarifying Pleading Standards for Age Discrimination, Breach of Contract, and Trespass to Chattels Claims in the Third Circuit

Introduction

This commentary examines the Third Circuit’s May 15, 2025 decision in Robert Harvey, III v. Technimark Inc., No. 24-2893, in which a three-judge panel affirmed the dismissal of pro se appellant Robert Harvey’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Harvey, a 68-year-old tool‐and‐die mold maker, sued his former employer (Technimark Inc.) and an HR manager (Scott Irvine) for age discrimination (ADEA and PHRA), breach of contract, and trespass to chattels after a relocation‐assistance dispute led to his abrupt departure and the alleged retention of his personal tools.

Summary of the Judgment

The District Court dismissed Harvey’s third amended complaint for failure to state a claim, and the Third Circuit affirmed. Key rulings:

Age discrimination (ADEA/PHRA): No plausible inference of age bias—Harvey’s shift‐length comparison to younger co-workers lacked allegations of similarly situated status or adverse action.
Breach of contract: Offer letter did not specify payment timing for relocation assistance nor require an exit interview; no enforceable promise supported by pleaded facts.
Trespass to chattels: Harvey alleged loss of tools but did not plead that defendants intentionally dispossessed him after he was told to take them and made no follow-up retrieval attempt.
Futility of further amendment: Having had three opportunities, Harvey could not cure defects, so dismissal with prejudice was appropriate.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp. (517 U.S. 308, 1996): Established that a plaintiff must show an adverse employment action under the ADEA.
Fasold v. Justice (409 F.3d 178, 2005): Confirmed that Pennsylvania’s Human Relations Act follows federal ADEA standards for age claims.
Kelly v. Carman Corp. (229 A.3d 634, 2020): Enumerated elements of a breach‐of‐contract claim under Pennsylvania law (contract formation, breach, damages).
Pestco, Inc. v. Associated Prods., Inc. (880 A.2d 700, 2005): Defined trespass to chattels as requiring intentional dispossession or interference with personal property.
Twombly/Iqbal standard: Under Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside (578 F.3d 203, 2009) and Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc. (643 F.3d 77, 2011), a complaint must plead facts to make claims facially plausible.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility test and viewed all well-pleaded allegations in the light most favorable to Harvey. In the age discrimination context, it held that mere allegations of different shift assignments do not establish an “adverse employment action” or that co-workers were comparators. For breach of contract, the panel noted that the offer letter’s relocation clause lacked timing or process terms and that Harvey could not bootstrap an exit-interview requirement. On trespass to chattels, the court stressed the need to plead an intentional withholding of property after receipt of a demand, which was absent here. Having given Harvey multiple chances to amend, the court found any further amendment futile.

Impact

This decision reinforces several points in Third Circuit pleading law:

Plaintiffs must plead specific facts that satisfy each element of their claims, particularly in pro se cases.
Employment‐discrimination complaints must demonstrate an adverse act and a plausible inference of discriminatory intent.
Contract claims must cite specific contractual terms allegedly breached.
Property‐tort claims require allegations of intentional dispossession or interference.

Future litigants in this circuit should carefully draft complaints to include these essential factual predicates or risk early dismissal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prima facie case: The minimum facts required to raise a presumption of wrongdoing—in age claims, a showing that the plaintiff was within the protected class, suffered an adverse action, and was treated less favorably than similarly situated younger employees.
Adverse employment action: A materially negative change in employment status (e.g., termination, demotion, pay cut); mere scheduling differences do not qualify.
Facial plausibility (Twombly/Iqbal): A complaint must contain enough factual content to allow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable.
Trespass to chattels: A tort involving wrongful interference or withholding of personal property, requiring proof of intentional dispossession or deprivation.
Pro se plaintiff: A litigant who represents himself without a lawyer, held to the same pleading standards as attorneys but often granted some leeway in interpreting allegations.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in Harvey v. Technimark underscores the rigor of federal pleading standards in employment discrimination, contract, and property tort contexts. It clarifies that plaintiffs—particularly pro se litigants—must articulate all elements of their claims with factual specificity and that courts will not infer missing terms or wrongful intent. As a practical matter, the ruling guides future litigants on how to draft complaints that survive motions to dismiss and highlights the importance of early litigation planning and factual development.