Clarifying MDLEA Statelessness: “Captain” Inquiry Plus Opportunity to Claim Nationality Suffices; EEZ Counts as “High Seas” Under the Felonies Clause

Introduction

This consolidated, unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision affirms the MDLEA convictions of Jeifry Antonio Vasquez and Jesus Alexander Guerrero‑Rosario and upholds Vasquez’s 78‑month sentence. The case addresses two recurring questions in maritime drug prosecutions: (1) what constitutes adequate proof that a vessel is “without nationality” under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–08, and (2) whether prosecution in a foreign state’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) exceeds Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause or violates due process. On sentencing, the panel also applies the minor‑role framework for maritime couriers under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 in the context of a two‑man crew transporting nearly one metric ton of cocaine.

The opinion reaffirms and clarifies several points:

• Coast Guard questioning that identifies no “captain,” elicits denials of any claim of nationality, and reveals no flag or papers is sufficient to establish statelessness under § 70502(d)(1)(B), even when the officer used the word “captain” rather than “individual in charge.”
• Under binding circuit precedent, the EEZ is part of the “high Seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, and the MDLEA requires no nexus to the United States for stateless vessels on the high seas.
• Couriers on small crews transporting very large quantities of narcotics will rarely qualify for a minor‑role reduction where the relevant conduct is limited to transport and participants are similarly situated.

Case Background

In March 2023, the U.S. Coast Guard encountered a small, unmarked boat approximately 115 nautical miles off Aruba. Two individuals—Vasquez and Guerrero‑Rosario—were aboard. A Spanish‑speaking boarding officer, Petty Officer Nicholas Muzo, questioned them individually:

• Each denied being the boat’s “captain.”
• Each, when asked, declined to claim any nationality for the vessel and stated he had no registration documents.
• No flag was flown; no documentation or markings indicated nationality.

The Coast Guard recovered approximately 941 kilograms of cocaine. A grand jury charged both men with conspiracy and substantive possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, under the MDLEA. The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting lack of MDLEA jurisdiction (statelessness not proven) and constitutional defects (application in Venezuela’s EEZ and lack of nexus to the United States). After an evidentiary hearing at which Muzo testified, the district court denied the motions. Both defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy (Count One), with the government dismissing the substantive count (Count Two). The court sentenced each to 78 months; Vasquez appealed both his conviction and sentence.

Summary of the Opinion

• MDLEA Jurisdiction: The Eleventh Circuit held the government proved the vessel was “without nationality” under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B). The Coast Guard asked both men about command (“captain”) and provided an opportunity to claim nationality; both declined; the vessel flew no flag and carried no papers. This sufficed to establish statelessness.
• Constitutional Challenges: The court rejected arguments that the Felonies Clause does not reach conduct in a foreign EEZ and that due process requires a nexus to the United States. These issues are foreclosed by binding precedent holding that foreign EEZs are part of the “high seas” (United States v. Alfonso) and that no nexus is required for stateless vessels (United States v. Campbell; United States v. Canario‑Vilomar).
• Sentencing—Minor Role: The court affirmed denial of a minor‑role reduction for Vasquez. Transporting over 900 kilograms of cocaine as one of two crew members was central to the offense; compared to the relevant conduct and the similarly situated co‑participant, Vasquez failed to show he was less culpable.
• Disposition: Convictions and Vasquez’s sentence affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

A. The MDLEA Framework and “Vessel Without Nationality”

The MDLEA criminalizes knowing possession with intent to distribute controlled substances while aboard “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” including a “vessel without nationality,” even when the conduct occurs outside U.S. territorial waters. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), (b), 70506(b), 70502(c)(1)(A).

Two interlocking provisions govern this case:

• 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B): A “vessel without nationality” includes a “vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge fails, on request of an officer of the United States authorized to enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel.”
• 46 U.S.C. § 70502(e): A “claim of nationality or registry” is limited to three forms: (i) producing nationality documents aboard the vessel; (ii) flying the nation’s ensign or flag; or (iii) a verbal claim of nationality or registry by the master or individual in charge.

Applying these provisions, the panel held that the government carried its burden. Each occupant denied being the captain, neither produced documents nor made a verbal claim of nationality when invited, and the vessel bore no flag or markings. That record fits § 70502(d)(1)(B).

The court addressed a defense argument that the Coast Guard did not precisely ask for a “claim of nationality.” The record, however, reflected that Muzo asked each man whether he had “registration documents for the boat for any country” and whether he wanted “to claim any nationality for the boat,” and each declined. Moreover, even though Muzo used the word “captain” rather than “individual in charge,” the panel reiterated that this phrasing does not defeat statelessness when the Coast Guard asks nationality questions of everyone aboard, thereby providing anyone with authority an opportunity to claim nationality. See United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 589 n.14 (11th Cir. 2020).

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• United States v. De La Cruz, 443 F.3d 830 (11th Cir. 2006): Upheld statelessness where the vessel flew no flag, had no papers or markings, the captain hid among crew, and no one claimed nationality when asked. The panel treats this case as factually analogous and supportive of statelessness here.
• United States v. Nunez, 1 F.4th 976 (11th Cir. 2021): Recognized the MDLEA’s list of statelessness circumstances as non‑exhaustive; reinforces flexible application consistent with § 70502(d).
• United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020), n.14: Clarifies that the Coast Guard’s failure to use the exact phrase “individual in charge” is not fatal if all aboard are asked about nationality, giving the person with authority the opportunity to assert nationality. The panel explicitly relies on this clarification in addressing the “captain” phrasing here.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps:

1. Factual sufficiency: The Coast Guard made the requisite inquiries (both about command and nationality), received negative responses, and observed the absence of any flag or documentation. Under § 70502(d)(1)(B) and (e), this proves a failure by any “master or individual in charge” to make a claim when requested.
2. Doctrinal fit: Consistent with De La Cruz and Cabezas‑Montano, the court treats the precise wording of the command inquiry as non‑dispositive where the officers provided a clear opportunity to claim nationality, and no one did so.

Impact

• Operational guidance: Coast Guard boarding teams can satisfy § 70502(d)(1)(B) by (i) asking who is in command (terms like “captain” suffice) and (ii) expressly inviting a claim of nationality; documenting negative answers; and noting the absence of flags/papers.
• Litigation posture: Defense arguments premised on semantic distinctions (“captain” vs. “individual in charge”) will carry little weight when all occupants are questioned and given a chance to assert nationality.
• Evidentiary focus: The panel underscores that a combination of objective indicia (no flag, no documents, no markings) and explicit denials of nationality ordinarily establishes statelessness.

B. Constitutional Challenges: EEZ as “High Seas” and No Nexus Requirement

Defendants argued that Venezuela’s EEZ is not the “high Seas,” limiting Congress’s Felonies Clause authority, and separately that due process requires a nexus to the United States. The panel rejects both, as squarely foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 823–27 (11th Cir. 2024): Holds that foreign EEZs are part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes; Congress’s authority is not limited by customary international law in this context. The court applies Alfonso directly to the EEZ argument.
• United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 809–12 (11th Cir. 2014): Rejects nexus and due process challenges to MDLEA prosecutions involving stateless vessels on the high seas; the MDLEA gives clear notice that drug trafficking on stateless vessels is universally condemned.
• United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374, 1382–83 (11th Cir. 2025): Confirms that similar nexus challenges are foreclosed and clarifies standards of review for post‑plea constitutional challenges.
• United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008): Articulates the rule of prior‑panel precedent binding later panels absent en banc or Supreme Court abrogation.

Legal Reasoning

The panel applies the prior‑panel precedent rule: Alfonso expressly treats foreign EEZs as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, thereby validating MDLEA application in EEZ waters; Campbell (and Canario‑Vilomar) dispose of the nexus/due process arguments for stateless vessels. Because these precedents control and have not been overruled, the court affirms the convictions on constitutional grounds.

Impact

• Geographic certainty: Prosecutions in foreign EEZs remain constitutionally sound in the Eleventh Circuit, avoiding threshold disputes over offshore locations within 200 nautical miles of foreign coasts.
• No nexus hurdle: For stateless vessels on the high seas, the government need not prove a U.S. nexus to satisfy due process or the Felonies Clause.
• Plea posture: The panel reiterates that a guilty plea does not waive constitutional challenges to the statute itself, but where precedent forecloses the challenge, relief will be denied—sometimes under plain‑error review where first raised on appeal.

C. Sentencing: Minor‑Role Reduction for Maritime Couriers

Vasquez sought a two‑level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) as a “minor participant.” The district court denied the request but awarded a two‑level “zero‑point offender” reduction under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 and imposed a significant downward variance to 78 months (from a post‑adjustment guideline range of 108–135 months). The panel affirms the denial of minor‑role relief.

Precedents and Guideline Framework

• United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc): Establishes a two‑step minor‑role analysis: (i) compare the defendant’s role to the relevant conduct for which he is held accountable, and (ii) compare his role to that of other identifiable participants in that relevant conduct. Emphasizes district court discretion and fact‑bound judgments.
• U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C), n.5: Lists factors (knowledge of scope/structure, planning/organization, decision‑making authority, nature/extent of participation, expected benefit) and defines “minor participant” as less culpable than most, but not minimal.
• United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717, 732–33 (11th Cir. 2019): Affirms denial of minor‑role reductions for defendants aboard a stateless vessel, noting that it is possible no participant is minor given the facts.
• Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016): Reinforces deferential clear‑error review of role determinations.

Legal Reasoning

The relevant conduct was limited to the transportation of the cocaine aboard the vessel. Vasquez and his co‑defendant were the only two persons aboard and had comparable roles in delivering nearly one ton of cocaine. Transporting this quantity is central to the offense and supports the inference that the role was not minor (De Varon). While Vasquez argued others above him arranged logistics, the court correctly focused on the charged relevant conduct (transport), not the broader conspiracy. On this record, denying the adjustment was not clear error.

Impact

• Role reductions remain difficult in two‑person maritime transport cases involving large quantities of drugs, especially where culpability among the crew is symmetrical and the relevant conduct is limited to transport.
• Courts continue to recognize that “nobody may be minor” in small, discrete transport cells, notwithstanding a larger conspiracy elsewhere.
• The opinion also reflects post‑2023 guideline practice: the zero‑point offender reduction under § 4C1.1 can materially reduce the advisory range even when minor‑role is denied, and district courts retain discretion to vary downward substantially.

D. Standards of Review and Procedural Notes

• Subject‑matter jurisdiction under the MDLEA: de novo for legal questions; clear error for jurisdictional fact findings (Canario‑Vilomar; Cruickshank).
• Constitutionality of a statute: de novo; plain‑error review if raised for the first time on appeal (Alfonso). A guilty plea does not waive a challenge to the statute’s constitutionality (Canario‑Vilomar).
• Minor‑role determinations: clear‑error review, highly deferential to the district court’s fact‑intensive assessment (Cruickshank; De Varon).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• MDLEA’s “vessel without nationality”: A boat is “stateless” if, when a U.S. officer asks, the person in charge does not claim nationality (or produce papers/flag). Statelessness places the vessel within U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA regardless of where on the high seas it is found.
• “Claim of nationality or registry”: Only three ways count—showing nationality documents aboard, flying a national flag, or a verbal claim by the master/individual in charge; anything else is legally insufficient.
• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): Waters beyond a coastal state’s territorial sea (up to 200 nautical miles) where the coastal state has special resource rights, but not full sovereignty. In the Eleventh Circuit, EEZ waters are part of the “high Seas” for Felonies Clause purposes.
• Felonies Clause: The Constitution gives Congress power to define and punish “Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The Eleventh Circuit reads this to include crimes in foreign EEZs and to permit application of the MDLEA to stateless vessels without a U.S. nexus.
• Nexus requirement: A due‑process concept sometimes invoked by defendants to argue the offense must be connected to the United States. For stateless vessels on the high seas, the Eleventh Circuit does not require any such nexus.
• Minor‑role reduction: A two‑level guideline reduction for defendants who are less culpable than most participants in the relevant conduct. For small crews moving large drug loads, courts often find each participant’s role central, making the reduction uncommon.
• Zero‑point offender reduction (U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1): A two‑level reduction for defendants with no criminal history points who satisfy certain criteria, reflecting recent guideline reforms to reduce sentences for first‑time offenders.

Broader Impact and Practical Guidance

• For maritime enforcement: This opinion reinforces that standard Coast Guard boarding protocols—asking who is in charge, inviting a claim of nationality, and recording the absence of flags and papers—create a robust record for MDLEA jurisdiction. Officers need not use talismanic phrases; substance controls.
• For prosecutors: Expect constitutional challenges premised on the EEZ and nexus arguments to continue to be denied under Alfonso, Campbell, and Canario‑Vilomar. Preserve a clear, detailed record of the nationality inquiry and vessel indicia.
• For defense counsel: To contest statelessness, focus on gaps in the Coast Guard’s inquiry (e.g., failure to provide an opportunity to claim nationality) or contradictory evidence of registry. Arguments hinging on “captain” versus “individual in charge” phrasing are unlikely to prevail when all occupants were questioned about nationality.
• For sentencing advocacy: In two‑person transport cases involving very large quantities, minor‑role relief is difficult. Mitigation may more fruitfully emphasize safety‑valve eligibility, the zero‑point offender reduction, acceptance of responsibility, and § 3553(a) factors supporting variances (e.g., duress, family circumstances, lack of profit, or coercion), while acknowledging the central transport role.

Conclusion

United States v. Vasquez confirms three settled but practically important propositions in Eleventh Circuit maritime drug enforcement. First, a Coast Guard boarding that elicits denials of command and nationality, coupled with the absence of flags and papers, suffices to prove statelessness under § 70502(d)(1)(B)—even when the officer asks for the “captain” rather than the “individual in charge”—so long as all occupants are given an opportunity to claim nationality. Second, prosecutions in foreign EEZs rest on secure constitutional footing because the EEZ is treated as part of the “high Seas,” and no U.S. nexus is required for stateless vessels. Third, minor‑role reductions remain uncommon for small crews transporting massive drug loads where participants are equally central to the transport. While unpublished, the decision provides clear operational guidance for maritime interdictions and offers a faithful application of binding precedent that will continue to shape MDLEA litigation and sentencing in the Eleventh Circuit.