Clarifying Marital Status Under NYCHRL: Exclusion of Spousal-Identity Discrimination

Introduction

In Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC, 24-1229 (2d Cir. Apr. 8, 2025), the Second Circuit addressed for the first time whether the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) bars an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of his marital status with a particular person. The plaintiff, Kelvin Hunter, had served as Executive Producer of The Wendy Williams Show while married to its host, Wendy Williams. Upon learning of Williams’s divorce filing in April 2019, Hunter’s employer, Debmar-Mercury LLC, terminated him. Hunter sued under the NYCHRL for purported “marital-status discrimination.” The district court denied Debmar-Mercury’s motion to dismiss, certified the question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and this panel granted review. Ultimately, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded, relying on a contemporaneous New York Court of Appeals decision—McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp.—which definitively holds that “marital status” under the NYCHRL refers only to the legal condition of being single, married, separated, divorced or widowed, and not to discrimination based on the identity of one’s spouse.

Summary of the Judgment

The key issue was whether the NYCHRL’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of “marital status” extends to adverse employment actions undertaken because of an employee’s relationship to a particular person. The district court had followed an intermediate state appellate decision, Morse v. Fidessa Corp., which held that two amendments to the NYCHRL broadened “marital status” to cover spousal-identity discrimination. The Second Circuit reversed. It held that the New York Court of Appeals in McCabe had squarely rejected the Morse construction and reaffirmed that “marital status” contemplates only the condition of being married or not. Because Hunter alleged that he was fired specifically for divorcing Wendy Williams—and not simply for his status as married or divorced—the claim fails as a matter of law. The appellate court vacated the district-court order denying the motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings consistent with McCabe.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. NY State Human Rights Appeal Board, 51 N.Y.2d 506 (1980): Holding under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) that “marital status” means the status of being married or not, not the identity of one’s spouse.
Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 59 N.Y.2d 733 (1983): Extending the same interpretation to the NYCHRL in the housing context, refusing to treat spousal-identity discrimination as marital-status discrimination.
Levin v. Yeshiva University, 96 N.Y.2d 484 (2001): Reaffirming the distinction between a person’s legal status and the existence of a disqualifying relationship under both NYCHRL and NYSHRL.
Morse v. Fidessa Corp., 165 A.D.3d 61 (1st Dep’t 2018): An intermediate appellate decision that interpreted two NYCHRL amendments (2005 and 2016) as expanding “marital status” to cover spousal identity—but which the New York Court of Appeals later disavowed.
McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp., — N.Y.3d —, 2024 WL 5126078 (Dec. 17, 2024): The pivotal state-court decision holding that “marital status” under the NYCHRL denotes only the legal condition of being married, single, separated, divorced or widowed, and does not include discrimination based on who one’s spouse is.
Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739 (2d Cir. 2013): Establishing the motion-to-dismiss standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the Second Circuit applied here.

Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit applied a two-step framework. First, it gave full effect to the New York Court of Appeals’ binding interpretation in McCabe, which resolved any doubt left by Morse. In McCabe, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the legislature’s repeated use of the phrase “marital status” across multiple contexts manifests an intent to preserve its original meaning as a condition, not a spousal-identity category. The court observed that legislative amendments reaffirmed the NYCHRL’s “broad and remedial” purpose but did not explicitly alter the definition of marital status.

Second, the panel tested Hunter’s complaint against that definition. Hunter alleged termination “solely because of his marital status to Williams.” But under McCabe, a viable NYCHRL claim would require showing he was fired because he was married (or divorced), not because of the particular person to whom he was married. His theory therefore fell outside the statutory prohibition.

Impact

This decision has immediate and far-reaching effects in New York employment law:

Employers may confidently limit marital-status policies to the legal condition—married, single, separated, divorced or widowed—without fear of liability for actions based on a spouse’s identity.
Litigants can no longer pursue spousal-identity discrimination claims under the NYCHRL; they must seek alternative theories such as gender, sexual orientation or relation-based discrimination if applicable.
The ruling clarifies the boundary between personal relationship disputes and protected status classes, providing much-needed predictability in a statute known for its liberal construction mandate.
In remanding the case, the Second Circuit ensures that lower courts will apply McCabe uniformly, thereby resolving a split between state intermediate appellate decisions and aligning municipal law with state-supreme authority.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Order: A decision issued without a full published opinion, not binding precedent but persuasive.
Interlocutory Appeal (28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)): A limited appeal of a non-final order that the district court certifies, allowing appellate review before final judgment.
NYCHRL vs. NYSHRL: The New York City Human Rights Law often affords broader protections than the New York State Human Rights Law, but both define “marital status” identically.
Liberal Construction Mandate: A legislative directive that NYCHRL provisions be interpreted broadly to advance civil-rights protections.

Conclusion

Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC reaffirms that “marital status” under the NYCHRL refers only to the legal condition of being married, single, separated, divorced or widowed—and not to discrimination based on the identity of one’s spouse. By vacating the district court’s denial of dismissal and remanding the case, the Second Circuit aligned federal court practice with the New York Court of Appeals’ definitive ruling in McCabe. Employers, practitioners and litigants now have clear guidance: challenges to employment actions tied to whom an employee marries must be re-framed under different legal theories, leaving “marital status” discrimination claims to their narrow, original scope.