Clarifying Maintenance Expenditures under §25-13-802: Exclusion of Personal Property Cleanup Costs in Redemption Actions

Introduction

This memorandum opinion arises from a long-running feud over a 20-acre parcel near Columbia Falls, Montana. 360 Reclaim, LLC (a foreclosure purchaser) sued William M. Russell (the prior owner and redemptioner) and Mountain View Investments, L.C. (the mortgagee/lender) to establish the correct redemption price under Montana’s foreclosure redemption statute, § 25-13-802, MCA. Russell defaulted on his loan, the property sold at auction in June 2018, and Russell repeatedly sought to redeem by tendering payment. Over multiple trips to the Montana Supreme Court (KS Ventures; Russell I, II, III), the core dispute crystallized: which “maintenance expenditures” may a purchaser add to the statutory redemption price? On remand, the District Court awarded summary judgment to MVI, finding that, after stipulated credits for the sale of scrap metal and a lawn mower, Russell’s tender fully redeemed the property. 360 Reclaim appeals that ruling.

Summary of the Judgment

On June 3, 2025, the Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the Flathead County District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Mountain View Investments, L.C. The high court held that:

Maintenance expenditures under § 25-13-802(3), MCA, are limited to real-property upkeep; cleanup costs tied to the purchaser’s removal of scrap metal and other personal items cannot be added to the redemption price.
After deducting the stipulated credits ($4,606.75) for sale of scrap metal and a lawn mower from the previously established redemption price ($119,480.51), Russell’s tender of $117,000 satisfied the statutory requirements.
Attempted relitigation of other claimed maintenance costs (e.g., roof repairs, electrical work) was barred by the Supreme Court’s prior holdings in Russell III and by the finality of that determination.
An ancillary question about personal property abandonment remains pending before the District Court and was not ripe for appellate review.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The opinion rests heavily on Russell III (2023 MT 250), where this Court first held that “maintenance expenditures must be for maintenance of the real property, not the redemptioner’s personal property located on the real property.” In Russell III, the Court reversed a District Court that had allowed 360 Reclaim to impose cleanup costs for personal‐property removal. That decision firmly bifurcated real-property expenses (statutorily recoverable) from personal-property cleanup (statutorily excluded).

Earlier decisions (KS Ventures; Russell I & II) established the procedural and factual backdrop but did not definitively interpret the maintenance‐cost provision. By the third iteration, the law was settled, and the case returned on remand solely to apply that principle to the remaining credits Russell claimed.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court applied a de novo standard to the District Court’s summary judgment. It reaffirmed that under § 25-13-802(1)–(3), MCA, a redemptioner must pay:

The foreclosure purchase price plus interest;
Taxes plus interest on delinquent taxes;
“Maintenance expenditures” for the real property “actually made” by the purchaser.

Finding no dispute about the agreed‐upon base calculation ($119,480.51), the only open question was whether Russell’s tender of $117,000 “substantially complied.” Because 360 Reclaim and MVI conceded that Russell was entitled to a $4,606.75 credit (scrap metal & lawn mower sale), the net amount Russell actually owed was $114,873.76. His $117,000 payment thus exceeded that requirement. Attempts to relitigate other maintenance items were barred by res judicata principles and the Supreme Court’s express remand instructions.

Impact

This decision cements a bright‐line rule in Montana foreclosure redemptions:

Only maintenance costs directly tied to real property (e.g., roof repairs, lawn care of land) qualify under § 25-13-802(3).
Expenses associated with removing or disposing of personal items—even if found on the foreclosed premises—do not augment the redemption price.

Practitioners will use this clarity to advise purchasers and redemptioners on the precise scope of recoverable expenses. Lenders and foreclosure purchasers must segregate cleanup budgets into real‐property vs. personal‐property expenses, lest they face estoppel or summary disposition.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Redemption Period: The one-year window after a foreclosure sale when the former owner can “buy back” the property by paying a statutory formula.
Maintenance Expenditures: Under Montana law, these are costs the foreclosure purchaser “actually made” to upkeep the land and structures. They do not include costs to remove abandoned cars, scrap, or household items.
Summary Judgment (M. R. Civ. P. 56): A mechanism to decide claims when no genuine fact dispute exists. This Court reviews those rulings from scratch (“de novo”).
Substantial Compliance: A flexible standard allowing minor variances from statutory numbers so long as the tender “substantially” meets the statute’s demands.

Conclusion

360 Reclaim v. Russell reaffirms that foreclosure redemption in Montana is governed by a narrow, statutory formula. Courts will not entertain cleanup or disposal costs for personal property as part of the redemption price. This case finalizes the parameters of “maintenance expenditures” under § 25-13-802 and underscores the binding effect of remand instructions once the Supreme Court has spoken. Redemptioners now know that, after agreed credits (e.g., sale of scrap metal), a single lump‐sum tender—if it exceeds the reduced statutory figure—will extinguish the foreclosure purchaser’s title.