Clarifying Intent in Attempted First Degree Murder: Intent to Kill Without Lawful Justification

Introduction

In People v. Guy, 2025 IL 129967, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed a fundamental question in criminal law: when charging attempted first degree murder, must the State prove merely an intent to kill, or must it prove an intent to kill without lawful justification? The defendant, Travaris T. Guy, was convicted of attempted first degree murder under a jury instruction that required only a finding of intent to kill. The same jury, however, acquitted him of first degree murder and convicted him of second degree murder—finding that he believed, albeit unreasonably, that he was acting in self-defense. On post-conviction review, the appellate court reversed the attempted murder conviction, and the Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to consider the mental‐state requirement for attempt. The Court held that “attempted first degree murder” requires the defendant to intend to kill without lawful justification, and that a finding of subjective self‐defense belief precludes such intent.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed in part and reversed in part the appellate court’s decision. It held that:

Under section 8-4(a) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 2002)), an attempt crime requires “intent to commit a specific offense.” First degree murder is defined as killing “without lawful justification” (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2002)). Therefore, attempted first degree murder requires the intent to kill without lawful justification.
The jury instruction in Guy’s trial misstated the law by requiring only an intent to kill, without reference to the absence of lawful justification.
The jury’s finding that Guy subjectively believed he acted in self-defense (a mitigating factor reducing first degree murder to second degree murder) was irreconcilable with an intent to kill without lawful justification.
Trial counsel, appellate counsel, and post-conviction counsel all failed to challenge the faulty instruction or to preserve the inconsistent-verdict issue in the proper form. Their performance was constitutionally deficient.
Because the evidence supported the lesser included offense—and the jury had been instructed on it at defense request—the Court entered a conviction for aggravated battery with a firearm and remanded for sentencing.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The Court carefully charted the development of Illinois attempt and homicide law through several landmark decisions:

People v. Trinkle (1977): Held that attempted first degree murder requires an “intent to kill,” rejecting instructions that allowed conviction on “knowledge of a strong probability of death.”
People v. Harris (1978): Reiterated that only the criminal intent to kill suffices for attempted murder.
People v. Barker (1980): Upheld an indictment alleging attempt to commit murder even though it did not repeat the words “intent to kill,” explaining that one cannot intend to commit murder without intending to kill, and that self-defense is not criminal.
People v. Reagan (1983): Declared that “attempted voluntary manslaughter” did not exist, because a defendant who believes he is justified in self‐defense lacks any intent to commit a crime.
People v. Lopez (1995): Held that Illinois does not recognize “attempted second degree murder.” Attempt liability sticks to the specific statutory offense—first degree murder—so “intent to kill” alone would include killings in self-defense, which is lawful.

Together these decisions underscored that attempt law demands intent to commit the statutory offense, not merely the physical act or result. Since first degree murder requires killing without lawful justification, attempted first degree murder must likewise be without lawful justification.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court began with the plain language of the attempt statute:

720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 2002): “A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.”

And the definition of first degree murder:

720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2002): “A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if … he intends to kill … or knows such acts will cause death ….”

Because the statute requires intent to commit a “specific offense,” the relevant mental state must match the elements of that offense. First degree murder contains an element—lack of lawful justification—that goes to the lawfulness of the killing. A defendant who mistakenly believes he is justified in self-defense does not intend to commit a crime at all. Thus, the Court held that attempted first degree murder requires intent to kill without lawful justification.

The Court further noted that the Criminal Law Edit, Alignment, and Reform Initiative (CLEAR) Commission—whose proposals the legislature adopted in 2009—expressly endorsed the Lopez-Reagan line of reasoning. The legislature added a sentencing mitigation for “serious provocation,” but declined to add a mitigation for “imperfect self-defense,” confirming that the law treats a defendant who thought he had justification as having no criminal intent.

3. Impact

This decision has several far-reaching effects:

Jury instructions for attempted first degree murder must now track the new holding: they must require proof of intent to kill without lawful justification. Trial courts will need to revise the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions accordingly.
Defendants may raise new inconsistent-verdict or instruction-error claims if juries find subjective self-defense beliefs but nonetheless convict of attempted murder.
The ruling reconciles the anomaly—identified by commentators and the CLEAR Commission—where killing a victim to death could result in second degree murder (mitigated) but wounding the victim precluded mitigation.
Appellate counsel must be vigilant in challenging uncorrected jury instructions that omit essential elements of statutory offenses, even when no prior appellate decision squarely raises the point.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Specific Intent vs. General Intent: A specific intent crime requires the defendant’s conscious objective to bring about a certain result (e.g., intending to kill). A general intent crime only requires awareness of the act (e.g., battery). Illinois attempt law demands the specific intent to commit the defined statutory offense, not merely the act or result.

2. Attempted Offenses and “Substantial Step”: Under 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), an attempt requires a “substantial step” toward the crime. Here, firing a gun at a person is plainly a substantial step toward murder.

3. Imperfect Self-Defense (Second Degree Murder): If a defendant genuinely—and unreasonably—believes he needs to use deadly force, the killing is not justified but is mitigated to second degree murder. That belief, however, means he never intended to commit a crime, so he cannot be guilty of attempted first degree murder.

Conclusion

People v. Guy establishes a clear, uniform rule: attempted first degree murder requires intent to kill without lawful justification. The decision aligns statutory text, decades of precedent, and legislative intent, and it resolves an enduring sentencing anomaly. It imposes an affirmative duty on trial courts to instruct juries accurately on the lack-of-justification element and on defense and appellate counsel to challenge any deviation. This ruling will guide future attempted homicide prosecutions, ensure consistency in Illinois criminal law, and prevent convictions that contradict a jury’s finding of subjective self-defense.