Clarifying Innkeeper Liability: Duty and Scope in Third-Party Criminal Acts

Introduction

In William Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc. et al., 2024-C-00840 (La. Mar. 21, 2025), the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed for the first time in decades how and when an innkeeper’s legal duty extends to protect guests from the criminal acts of third parties on hotel premises. William Campbell, a frequent guest of the Windsor Court Hotel in New Orleans, was robbed and injured in the hotel’s courtyard on Christmas Day 2008. He sued the hotel entities, ABC Security Company, and XYZ Insurance Company for negligence and strict liability, claiming the hotel failed to provide adequate security and reasonable warning of risk. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants; the Fourth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify two distinct elements in tort law—the duty owed by an innkeeper and the scope of that duty—and to determine whether the facts of this case brought the robbery within that scope.

Summary of the Judgment

Justice McCallum, writing for the majority, reaffirmed that under Kraaz v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc. (1982) an innkeeper “has a duty to take reasonable precautions against the criminal acts of third parties” and must provide “a reasonably safe premises” for guests. After de novo review of the summary‐judgment record—including time‐stamped surveillance videos showing Mr. Campbell approaching an unknown vehicle, voluntarily displaying a large sum of cash, and being dragged by the car— the Court found:

The hotel owed a legal duty to its guests to take reasonable precautions against third-party crime.
The scope of that duty did not encompass the particular risk Mr. Campbell encountered: his own voluntary approach, display of money, and decision to engage with strangers in the courtyard.
Because no genuine issue of material fact remained on the scope-of-duty element, summary judgment was proper. The Fourth Circuit’s reversal was vacated; the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was reinstated.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Kraaz v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc. (1982): Established that an innkeeper is not an insurer of guest safety against violent crime, but owes a duty to take reasonable precautions.
Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (1999): Defined foreseeability and gravity of harm as factors in determining the scope of duty, and cautioned against conflating duty with scope.
Pinsonneault v. Merchants & Farmers Bank & Trust Co. (2002): Applied Posecai in a banking context, holding no duty where no prior similar crimes had occurred at the ATM and the bank’s security plan was otherwise reasonable.
Roberts v. Benoit (1991): Introduced the “ease of association” inquiry—“How easily does one associate the plaintiff’s complained‐of harm with the defendant’s conduct?”
Post-Posecai cases (e.g., Evans v. Abubaker, Inc., 2024; Vail v. Masker, 2002) reinforce that unforeseeable or self-precipitated harms fall outside the scope of duty even when a general duty exists.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied Louisiana’s duty-risk analysis under La. C.C. art. 2315, which separates liability into five elements: duty, breach, cause-in-fact, scope of duty (legal cause), and damages. The threshold issue—whether a duty exists—is a pure question of law; it was undisputed that as an innkeeper, Windsor Court owed its guests a duty to take reasonable precautions against criminal attack.

The decisive inquiry was the scope of duty: Did Windsor Court’s duty extend to protecting a guest who voluntarily approached an unknown car, twice displayed large sums of cash, and was dragged when the vehicle sped away? Citing Roberts and Posecai, the Court stressed a fact-sensitive examination of:

Foreseeability—the existence, frequency, and similarity of prior criminal incidents on the premises (none in 20 years), and the condition, location, and nature of the property (a secure wall, normal staffing and lighting, and routine vehicle access).
Ease of Association—whether the Hotel’s duty to provide reasonable security was easily associated with the risk of harm Mr. Campbell suffered. Here, the robbery resulted from Mr. Campbell’s own voluntary conduct, not from any lapse in standard hotel security.

Because the robbery was neither foreseeable nor easily linked to Windsor Court’s duty beyond “ordinary” protection, the scope-of-duty element failed as a matter of law, justifying summary judgment.

Impact

This ruling clarifies longstanding ambiguities in Louisiana’s duty-risk analysis for premises liability:

It reaffirms that while innkeepers are not insurers, they owe guests a duty of reasonable precaution against foreseeable criminal acts.
It reinforces the analytic separation of duty (legal question) and scope of duty (mixed question of law and fact), preventing conflation and ensuring predictable outcomes.
It underscores the importance of concrete evidence—prior incidents on the premises, property conditions, and guest conduct—in determining whether a particular harm falls within an innkeeper’s protective duty.

Lower courts will now apply a clearer framework when adjudicating innkeeper liability for third-party crimes, focusing first on duty, then rigorously on scope before addressing breach, causation, and damages.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Duty: The legal obligation (here, of an innkeeper) to conform to a standard of conduct—providing reasonable security to guests.
Scope of Duty: Whether the duty encompasses a specific risk under the facts; even if a duty exists in general, its scope is not limitless.
Foreseeability: The likelihood, based on prior incidents and property conditions, that a particular harm would occur.
Ease of Association: How directly the harm suffered is connected to the defendant’s duty—stricter when harm arises from defendant’s omission, weaker when plaintiff’s voluntary acts are the proximate cause.
Summary Judgment: A procedure where a defendant moving for judgment shows no genuine factual dispute on an essential element (here, scope of duty), shifting the burden to the plaintiff to produce evidence—failing which the defendant prevails as a matter of law.

Conclusion

Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels crystallizes Louisiana’s approach to innkeeper liability for third-party crimes. It confirms that:

Innkeepers owe a legal duty to take reasonable precautions against criminal acts.
The scope of that duty must be separately analyzed in light of foreseeability and ease of association.
Voluntary guest conduct that precipitates harm—absent prior indications of crime—falls outside the scope of an innkeeper’s protective obligation.

By delineating duty and scope with precision, the Supreme Court provides a durable precedent to guide hoteliers, insurers, and courts in balancing guest protection against practical limits on liability.