Clarifying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing: Strickland’s Application and the Limits of Cronic’s Presumption

Introduction

This commentary examines Baker v. Conway, a summary order issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on April 3, 2025. Petitioner‐appellant Sean Baker, convicted of second-degree murder under New York’s felony-murder statute at age seventeen, challenged his sentence on habeas corpus grounds. He alleged that his court‐appointed attorney, Patrick Bruno, rendered constitutionally deficient assistance at the sentencing stage by failing to review the presentence report (PSR) with him, prepare mitigating evidence, or advise him on making a personal statement. After exhausting state postconviction remedies, Baker sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied his petition; the Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of Baker’s habeas petition. It held:

Baker’s counsel performed below professional norms by not consulting the client or PSR before sentencing and by making no mitigating argument when the prosecutor sought the maximum term.
Under Strickland v. Washington, although Counsel’s performance was deficient, Baker failed to demonstrate “a substantial likelihood” that a different sentence would have been imposed (“prejudice” prong).
Baker was not entitled to a presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic, because his counsel did not entirely fail to subject the prosecution’s case to adversarial testing at any critical stage.
The state courts’ application of Strickland was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent under AEDPA.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Strickland v. Washington (1984): Established the two‐pronged test for ineffective assistance—deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
United States v. Cronic (1984): Identified rare circumstances warranting a presumption of prejudice when counsel entirely fails a critical adversarial role.
Gonzalez v. United States (2d Cir. 2013): Found counsel deficient where no sentencing preparation took place and no motion for downward departure was pursued.
Bell v. Cone (2002): Clarified Cronic’s limited reach and reaffirmed Strickland’s centrality.
Additional authority on habeas deference under AEDPA: Harrington v. Richter (2011), Cullen v. Pinholster (2011), Burt v. Titlow (2013).

Legal Reasoning

Deficient Performance: Under the “doubly deferential” AEDPA standard, the Court held that no fairminded jurist could justify counsel’s complete lack of sentencing preparation—no review of the PSR, no investigation of mitigating evidence, and no counter‐argument to the prosecutor’s maximum‐term request.
Prejudice: Baker could not show a “substantial likelihood” of a lesser sentence. The sentencing judge had already imposed below‐maximum term (20-to-life), noted Baker’s non‐responsiveness and lack of remorse, and later reaffirmed on collateral review that no mitigating facts would have changed the outcome.
Cronic Inquiry: The Court rejected Baker’s request for a presumption of prejudice. Counsel did not abandon the case entirely—he appeared, lodged no conflicts, and participated in plea negotiations for a related charge—so Cronic was inapplicable.
AEDPA Deference: The Court found that the state courts reasonably applied Strickland and did not unreasonably credit or discount evidence under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Impact

This decision underscores the following developments:

Duty of Counsel at Sentencing: Attorneys must conduct meaningful PSR review and develop mitigating evidence where available, lest they risk a finding of deficient performance.
Limits of Cronic Presumption: Clients cannot obtain automatic relief under Cronic without showing total absence of adversarial testing at a critical stage.
Habeas Deference: Under AEDPA, state courts’ reasoned Strickland applications command significant deference absent a clear conflict with Supreme Court precedent.
Strategic Decision Scrutiny: Post‐hoc explanations for failing to investigate or advocate will be scrutinized for reasonableness in light of what counsel actually did.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Strickland Test: Two steps—(1) Is counsel’s performance objectively unreasonable? (2) If so, is there a reasonable probability the outcome would differ?
Cronic Presumption: In rare cases of total counsel breakdown, prejudice is presumed; but mere lack of advocacy at one stage is not enough.
AEDPA Standard: Federal habeas relief is available only if a state court decision is “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court law.
PSR (Presentence Report): A document by probation officers summarizing a defendant’s background—counsel must review it to spot inaccuracies and gather mitigation.

Conclusion

Baker v. Conway reaffirms that competent sentencing advocacy requires more than mere courtroom presence. Attorneys must engage the client, analyze the PSR, develop mitigation, and make affirmative arguments for leniency. Where counsel fails those duties, Strickland’s deficiency prong is met. Yet, without a substantial likelihood of a different sentence, prejudice cannot be presumed, and the narrow Cronic presumption does not extend. The decision thus sharpens the boundary between ineffective assistance claims subject to Strickland’s rigorous two‐pronged test and the exceptional situations warranting Cronic’s relaxed prejudice analysis.