Clarifying Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Standards for Investigative Misconduct and Pre-Indictment Delay: Crothers v. Carr

Introduction

Crothers v. Carr (10th Cir. 2025) addresses a pair of lawsuits by William Michael Crothers and Robert Charles Rosen against Teton County law enforcement officers and prosecutors. Both men were accused of sexual assault in 2019—Rosen as a minor just before turning eighteen, Crothers as a 52-year-old—and ultimately prevailed when charges against Rosen were dropped and Crothers was partly acquitted. They then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, Monell municipal liability, and state-law torts. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. This ruling clarifies key constitutional thresholds for claims of investigative misconduct, malicious prosecution, pre-indictment delay, equal protection “class-of-one” claims, and alleged interference with a fair trial.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo and upheld summary judgment on every claim:

Rosen’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution and Franks (false-statement) claims failed for lack of a knowing or reckless disregard for truth and because victim statements alone supplied probable cause.
Rosen’s Fourteenth Amendment tactical-delay claim (waiting to charge until after his 18th birthday) failed for want of actual prejudice—he had no enforceable right to juvenile confidentiality because Wyoming law allows adult charges for first-degree sexual assault regardless of age.
Rosen’s equal protection “class-of-one” claim (unequal treatment compared to another suspect) failed because no irrational basis existed when Rosen’s accusers were willing to prosecute him but declined to pursue charges against the other individual.
Crothers’s Fourteenth Amendment “right to a fair trial” claim (alleged prosecutorial coordination with media that created a “zoo” atmosphere) did not warrant a presumption of prejudice, particularly since the jury acquitted him on half the charges.
Crothers’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim failed because he could not show a Fourth Amendment “seizure” (arrest or imprisonment) and the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Clark requires such a showing.
Both plaintiffs’ Monell claims against Teton County officials failed because no underlying constitutional violation occurred to trigger municipal liability.
The district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims once all federal claims were dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Franks v. Delaware (1978): false-statement claims require proof of knowing or reckless omissions/material misstatements.
Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978): municipalities only liable for their own unconstitutional policy or custom.
United States v. Marion (1971) & Lovasco v. United States (1977): due process prohibits pre-indictment delay intended for tactical advantage, but only when accompanied by actual prejudice.
Irvin v. Dowd (1961), Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966), Skilling v. United States (2010): standards for presumed or actual prejudice from pre-trial publicity or courtroom atmosphere.
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (2000): “class-of-one” equal protection requires irrational or abusive discrimination against similarly situated persons.
Thompson v. Clark (2022): Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims require proof of a “seizure.”

Legal Reasoning

The court applied rigorous Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standards:

Probable cause may rest on a victim’s sworn interview absent “obvious reasons” to doubt its truth. Merely failing to interview every witness or pursue every lead does not demonstrate reckless indifference.
Under Franks, omissions or misstatements must be material—so significant that inclusion would vitiate probable cause—and made with knowing falsity or reckless disregard.
“Tactical delay” due process claims require proof of both intentional delay and actual prejudice. Speculative loss of juvenile confidentiality alone is insufficient.
“Class-of-one” equal protection demands a genuinely irrational difference in treatment. Here, Rosen’s accusers cooperated, whereas another suspect’s alleged victim did not, supplying a rational basis.
Due process and Sixth Amendment fair-trial claims based on media publicity must show either actual juror bias or, for a presumption, an “extreme case” where a “carnival atmosphere” infects the proceeding. Split verdicts—half acquittals—militate against presumed prejudice.
Every Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim must demonstrate a formal “seizure” (arrest or physical detention). Court appearances or indictments alone do not suffice.
Absent any constitutional violation by officers or prosecutors, Monell municipal liability cannot attach.

Impact

Crothers v. Carr provides important guidance to civil-rights plaintiffs and defense counsel:

Investigative shortcuts, interview omissions, or allegedly harsh prosecutorial zeal will not alone sustain § 1983 claims. Plaintiffs must identify actual constitutional breaches: no-probable-cause, reckless dishonesty, prejudicial delay, or seizure without lawful basis.
Franks challenges face a high bar: substantial omitted facts must be clearly material, and officers must have entertained serious doubts about witness statements.
Due process claims for delayed prosecution hinge on proof of real, tangible prejudice—mere speculation about lost procedural benefits (e.g., juvenile confidentiality) is inadequate.
Malicious prosecution claims must show wrongful detention or arrest under the Fourth Amendment; otherwise, they cannot survive summary judgment.
“Class-of-one” claims remain narrow: plaintiffs must identify irrational, baseless distinctions among similarly situated individuals.
Courts will not lightly presume prejudice from media coverage; carefully documented evidence of jury bias or an unrestrained trial environment is needed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A reasonable officer’s belief—based on trustworthy facts—that a crime was committed. A victim’s direct statement can suffice unless there are glaring reasons to doubt it.
Franks Hearing: A court process to test whether an arrest warrant affidavit contained knowingly false statements or omitted material facts. Plaintiffs must prove both fault and materiality.
Pre-indictment Delay: Delay between a crime and formal charges. To win on due process grounds, a plaintiff must show both deliberate government delay and concrete injury caused by that delay.
Class-of-One Equal Protection: A challenge when an individual claims irrational government discrimination against them alone. One must show no conceivable rational basis for the different treatment.
Presumed Prejudice vs. Actual Prejudice: Courts require proof of either juror bias (“I already decided he was guilty”) or an “extreme case” where uncontrolled publicity turned the courtroom into a circus.
Monell Liability: Cities and counties are not automatically liable for their officers’ wrongful acts. Plaintiffs must link an unconstitutional policy or custom—and deliberate indifference—to their injury.
Seizure (Fourth Amendment): Traditional forms of detention—arrest, handcuffs, or jail—are required to sustain a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983. Mere court subpoenas do not count.

Conclusion

Crothers v. Carr reaffirms that constitutional torts under § 1983 demand clear, tangible proof of misconduct. Inadequate investigation, prosecutorial zeal, or negative publicity, without more, cannot overcome summary judgment. Plaintiffs must identify specific Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment breaches—reckless dishonesty, lack of probable cause, unlawful seizure, prejudicial delay, or irrational discrimination. By enforcing these thresholds, the Tenth Circuit balances citizens’ rights to fair process against the practical demands of law-enforcement and prosecutorial discretion. Civil-rights litigants and government officials alike should note these clarified standards when evaluating claims of investigative misconduct, pre-indictment delay, or malicious prosecution.