Clarifying Esteras in the Sixth Circuit: Sentencing Courts May Weigh the Seriousness of the Supervised‑Release Violation—Not the Original Offense—at Revocation

Case: United States v. Damon Allen Patterson, No. 24-1571 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2025) (Nalbandian, J.) (Recommended for Publication)

Introduction

In United States v. Patterson, the Sixth Circuit addressed how district courts may reason through a supervised-release revocation sentence after the Supreme Court’s decision in Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025). Patterson, who committed a murder while on federal supervised release, challenged his 60-month revocation sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The panel affirmed, clarifying that after Esteras, district courts may not consider the “seriousness of the offense” (meaning the original federal crime of conviction) under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release, but they may consider the seriousness of the supervised‑release violation itself as a breach of trust. The court also reiterated the importance of preserving objections to alleged procedural errors and upheld a within‑Guidelines, statutorily capped, and consecutive sentence as substantively reasonable.

The decision offers important guidance for judges and practitioners navigating sentencing after Esteras: it draws a firm line between forbidden reliance on the seriousness of the original offense and permissible reliance on the gravity of the violation conduct, and it confirms that plain-error review applies where the defendant fails to preserve a procedural challenge.

Summary of the Opinion

The district court revoked Patterson’s supervised release after he pleaded guilty in state court to murder committed during his term of supervision. The advisory policy-statement range was 51–63 months, but the statutory maximum capped the sentence at 60 months; the court imposed 60 months and ordered it to run consecutively to the state sentence, consistent with the Guidelines’ recommendation. On appeal, Patterson argued:

• Procedural error: The district court treated the seriousness of his violation as a mandatory factor; and
• Substantive unreasonableness: The court over‑weighted the seriousness of the violation relative to other § 3553(a) considerations.

The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments and affirmed:

• No procedural error (plain-error review): The court did not misunderstand its discretion or treat seriousness as a mandatory consideration; it permissibly discussed the seriousness of the supervised‑release violation (murder) as a breach of trust and also addressed deterrence and protection of the public. Esteras does not forbid considering the seriousness of the violation; it forbids considering the seriousness of the original offense under § 3553(a)(2)(A).
• No substantive error (abuse-of-discretion review): The within‑Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable. The district court considered deterrence and public protection alongside the violation’s seriousness. Sixty months (the statutory max) for a homicide committed on supervision is not “too long.”

Detailed Analysis

Statutory Framework and Post‑Esteras Landscape

Revocation sentences are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), which directs courts to consider most—but not all—of the § 3553(a) factors. Notably, § 3553(a)(2)(A) (the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment) is not incorporated. In Esteras, the Supreme Court held that a revocation court may not rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) because Congress omitted it from § 3583(e). Critically, Esteras clarified that “offense” in § 3553(a)(2)(A) refers to the underlying crime of conviction, not the violation conduct. It did not decide whether courts may weigh the seriousness of the violation conduct; the Sixth Circuit’s longstanding approach permits considering violation conduct as a breach of trust.

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

• Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025):
  • Holding: At revocation, courts may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s “seriousness of the offense.”
  • Definition: “Offense” means the underlying federal crime of conviction, not the supervised‑release violation.
  • Reserved issue: Esteras did not decide whether courts may weigh the seriousness of the violation conduct; the Sixth Circuit notes its caselaw remains controlling on that point.
  • Review standard: Reinforces that unpreserved procedural claims are reviewed for plain error.
• United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195 (6th Cir. 2011):
  • Revocation sanctions the breach of trust inherent in violating supervision, not the original offense. This supports considering the gravity of violation conduct.
• United States v. Morris, 71 F.4th 475 (6th Cir. 2023):
  • Confirms the breach‑of‑trust framework and recognizes district court discretion to consider violation seriousness.
• United States v. Kamper, 748 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2014):
  • A court’s misunderstanding of its discretion can constitute procedural error. Patterson distinguishes this—no misunderstanding occurred.
• United States v. Hoyle, 148 F.4th 396 (6th Cir. 2025):
  • When sentencing for a new offense and revocation at the same time, the record must clearly separate permissible § 3583(e) considerations from barred § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors. Ambiguity triggered a remand in Hoyle. Patterson involved only revocation, with no ambiguity.
• United States v. Simpson, No. 23-3961, 2025 LX 347612 (6th Cir. July 31, 2025) (order), and United States v. Milton, Nos. 24-4066, 24-4067, 2025 WL 2965822 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2025):
  • Post‑Esteras Sixth Circuit orders reiterating that courts may still rely on the seriousness of the supervised‑release violation as breach of trust.
• United States v. Johns, 65 F.4th 891 (6th Cir. 2023):
  • Standards of review: abuse of discretion for reasonableness; plain error for unpreserved procedural claims.
• United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018), and United States v. Sears, 32 F.4th 569 (6th Cir. 2022):
  • Substantive reasonableness is highly deferential; within‑Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable.
• United States v. Fields, 306 F. App’x 950 (6th Cir. 2009) (per curiam):
  • Affirmed a 60‑month revocation sentence for a defendant who committed second‑degree murder while on supervision, even though it exceeded the policy‑statement range—illustrating that lengthy revocation terms can be reasonable in homicide contexts.
• United States v. Ramirez Gomez, 129 F.4th 954 (6th Cir. 2025):
  • If a party wants a more detailed explanation from the district court, it must ask; failure to object undercuts later procedural complaints.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s analysis proceeds in two tracks—procedural and substantive—with careful attention to the Esteras constraint and Sixth Circuit revocation doctrine.

• Procedural reasonableness (plain-error review):
  • No legal error in factor selection: The district court explicitly considered permissible § 3583(e) factors such as protecting the public and deterring others and discussed the violation as a breach of trust. It did not invoke § 3553(a)(2)(A)—the seriousness of the original offense—or treat violation seriousness as a mandatory factor. The court’s extended discussion of the homicide responded to defense mitigation arguments (guilty plea to second-degree murder and self‑defense), which the court was entitled—and arguably obliged—to address.
  • Esteras applied correctly: The court did not weigh the seriousness of the underlying drug-conspiracy offense; it focused on the supervised‑release violation—committing murder—consistent with Johnson and Morris. Esteras expressly left the violation‑seriousness question open; Sixth Circuit precedent fills the gap and permits considering it as breach of trust.
  • No misunderstanding of discretion: Unlike Kamper, nothing in the record suggests the court believed it was legally required to consider violation seriousness. The court described it as part of the breach-of-trust analysis, a discretionary consideration.
• Substantive reasonableness (abuse-of-discretion review):
  • Weighting of factors: The district court emphasized that homicide is gravely serious but also discussed deterrence and the need to protect the public—both expressly incorporated by § 3583(e). It did not base the sentence “entirely” on violation seriousness.
  • Within‑Guidelines and capped: The 60‑month sentence is within the advisory range (subject to a 60‑month statutory cap) and therefore presumptively reasonable. Given Fields and the nature of the violation, the term is not “too long.”
  • Consecutive term: Running the revocation sentence consecutive to the state sentence accords with the Guidelines’ recommendation and is a routine exercise of discretion in revocation cases.

Impact and Practical Implications

Patterson provides timely, practical guidance for the post‑Esteras sentencing landscape in the Sixth Circuit:

• Permissible focus at revocation: District courts may not consider the seriousness of the original federal offense (barred by Esteras) but may consider the seriousness of the supervised‑release violation as part of the breach‑of‑trust analysis recognized by Johnson and Morris.
• Record clarity matters: When a court is sentencing for both a new offense and a revocation (as in Hoyle), it must delineate which factors apply to which sentence. Patterson shows that when revocation is considered alone and the court speaks in breach‑of‑trust and violation‑conduct terms, the sentence is more likely to withstand appeal.
• Preservation is critical: Esteras confirms, and Patterson emphasizes, that unpreserved procedural challenges are reviewed only for plain error. Defense counsel should object contemporaneously if they believe the court is invoking § 3553(a)(2)(A) or otherwise misapplying § 3583(e).
• Weighting and “too long” claims: Within‑Guidelines revocation sentences—especially at the statutory maximum for grave violation conduct—will be difficult to disturb on substantive‑reasonableness grounds when the court links its reasoning to deterrence and public protection.
• Consecutive revocation terms: Expect courts to continue following the Guidelines’ recommendation for consecutive revocation sentences when the violation involves a separate criminal conviction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised release vs. parole: Supervised release follows a federal prison term and imposes conditions. Violations can lead to revocation and reimprisonment. It is distinct from parole (which the federal system largely abolished for post‑1987 offenses).
• Revocation sentencing factors: Section 3583(e) incorporates many, but not all, § 3553(a) factors. Crucially, it excludes § 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness of the offense, respect for law, just punishment).
• “Seriousness of the offense” vs. “seriousness of the violation”: After Esteras, a court cannot rely on the seriousness of the original crime of conviction to set a revocation sentence. But Sixth Circuit law permits consideration of how serious the violation conduct is (e.g., committing murder while on supervision) as part of sanctioning a breach of trust.
• Breach of trust: The organizing principle of revocation sentencing in the Sixth Circuit: revocation punishes the fact that the individual violated the court’s trust by reoffending or breaking conditions, not the original offense for which the person already served a sentence.
• Standards of review:
  • Procedural reasonableness: Did the court follow correct procedures and consider proper factors? Unpreserved objections are reviewed for plain error (a demanding standard).
  • Substantive reasonableness: Is the sentence “too long” given the factors and record? Reviewed for abuse of discretion; within‑Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable.
• Statutory cap: Section 3583(e)(3) sets maximum terms of reimprisonment on revocation based on the class of the original offense; here, the cap was 60 months.
• Consecutive vs. concurrent: The Guidelines recommend that revocation sentences run consecutively to sentences imposed for new criminal conduct that forms the basis of the violation, reflecting distinct punitive aims (breach of trust vs. punishment for the new crime).

Conclusion

Patterson solidifies the Sixth Circuit’s post‑Esteras approach to revocation sentencing. It draws a bright line between forbidden reliance on the seriousness of the underlying offense and permissible reliance on the seriousness of the violation conduct as evidence of a breach of trust. The panel’s analysis—anchored in Johnson, Morris, and now in harmony with Esteras—confirms that district courts may emphasize the gravity of violation conduct, so long as they also tether their reasoning to the § 3583(e) factors (notably deterrence and public protection).

The decision also underscores two practice points: parties must preserve procedural objections to avoid plain‑error review, and within‑Guidelines revocation sentences—especially at the statutory maximum in cases involving violent violation conduct—will be hard to overturn as substantively unreasonable. For judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, Patterson provides a clear roadmap for revocation sentencing in the Sixth Circuit’s post‑Esteras environment.