Clarifying Employer Thresholds and Direct-Evidence Requirements Under Title VII, FCRA, and § 1981

Introduction

In Joshua Michaels v. Sasser’s Glass Works, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed three fundamental questions: (1) whether an employer with fewer than 15 employees over 20 calendar weeks falls outside Title VII and FCRA liability; (2) what constitutes direct evidence of discriminatory intent under § 1981; and (3) how pleading requirements and burden-shifting apply to hostile-work-environment, disparate-treatment, and retaliation claims under § 1981. Plaintiff-appellant Joshua Michaels, a Native American glazier employed by Sasser’s Glass Works, Inc. (“SGW”) for one month, sued SGW and two individual employees (Jeff Johnson and Lloyd Pender) after his demotion and eventual termination. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full.

Summary of the Judgment

• Title VII & FCRA Claims: SGW moved for summary judgment on Michaels’s claims of race and national‐origin discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA). The district court held—and the Eleventh Circuit agreed—that SGW was not an “employer” within those statutes because it lacked the required 15+ employees for 20+ calendar weeks.

• § 1981 Disparate Treatment: Michaels alleged that racial slurs by Johnson constituted direct evidence of discriminatory intent behind his demotion or termination. The court held these remarks were neither made by the decisionmaker (Pender) nor contemporaneous with the termination decision, and thus could not qualify as direct evidence.

• § 1981 Retaliation: Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the district court assumed a prima facie case but found SGW’s legitimate reason for termination (Michaels’s profanity-laced tirade and abandonment of the worksite) unrebutted by any evidence of pretext.

• § 1981 Hostile Work Environment: Although alleged in the general factual section, Micheals never pleaded a § 1981 hostile-work-environment count; summary judgment on that theory was thus appropriate.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) – Burden-shifting in discrimination and retaliation cases.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) – Standard for summary judgment.
Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2018) – Definition of “employer” under Title VII.
Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911 (11th Cir. 2018) – Direct vs. circumstantial evidence of intent.
Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998) – Examples of “blatant” remarks as direct evidence.
Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009) – § 1981 retaliation framework.
Tipton v. Canadian Imperial Bank, 872 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1989) – Legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination.

Legal Reasoning

1. Employer Coverage under Title VII & FCRA. Both statutes require “15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks.” SGW submitted an owner’s affidavit showing it never met that threshold. Michaels’s reliance on Johnson’s off‐hand “maybe 15” was insufficient—he provided no evidence covering the requisite 20-week period. Strict proof of the numerical threshold is mandatory.

2. Direct Evidence under § 1981 Disparate Treatment. The Court reaffirmed that “only the most blatant remarks” by a decisionmaker, uttered in the context of the employment action itself, qualify as direct evidence. Here, racial epithets by Johnson were (a) not made by Pender, the alleged decisionmaker, and (b) occurred well before Michaels’s discharge. Consequently, they could not prove discriminatory intent “without inference or presumption.”

3. Pleading & the Hostile-Work-Environment Claim. A plaintiff cannot shoehorn new theories at summary judgment. Although the complaint’s factual portion referenced a “hostile environment,” Michaels never pleaded a standalone § 1981 hostile‐work‐environment count. The court thus had no obligation to analyze that theory.

4. Retaliation under § 1981. Even assuming Michaels established a prima facie case, SGW met its burden by articulating a legitimate reason for termination—his profane confrontation and job abandonment. Michaels produced no evidence of pretext (e.g., contradictory contemporaneous statements, suspicious timing, or differential treatment). The Court also rejected any implied “cat’s-paw” theory.

Impact

Reinforces strict proof requirements for establishing Title VII/FCRA employer coverage.
Clarifies that direct evidence must come from the actual decisionmaker and be tied to the contested employment decision.
Emphasizes precise pleading of distinct § 1981 theories—disparate treatment, retaliation, hostile work environment.
Confirms that off-hand racial slurs by non-decisionmakers, unconnected to the termination, cannot stand in for direct evidence.
Reaffirms that summary judgment is appropriate if a plaintiff cannot show pretext under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Employer Threshold: To be liable under Title VII/FCRA, an entity must employ at least 15 people for 20 calendar weeks in a year. One‐month staffing numbers do not suffice.
Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence: “Direct” evidence proves intent on its face (e.g., “I’m firing you because you’re Native American”). Remarks require no inference. Here, slurs by a non‐decisionmaker fall short.
Hostile Work Environment: A separate claim requiring repeated, severe or pervasive harassment tied to protected status. It must be expressly pleaded.
McDonnell Douglas Burden‐Shifting: (1) Employee shows a prima facie case; (2) employer states a legitimate, non‐discriminatory reason; (3) employee must then show that reason is a pretext.

Conclusion

Michaels v. Sasser’s Glass Works delivers three key precedential lessons: (1) Title VII/FCRA counts hinge on strict numerical proof of employer size; (2) direct evidence demands “blatant” decisionmaker remarks contemporaneous with the adverse action; and (3) plaintiffs must plead each § 1981 theory distinctly and carry their burden on pretext to survive summary judgment. By affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit cements these rigorously enforced standards for employment discrimination and retaliation litigation.