Clarifying District Courts’ Duty in Plea Negotiations and Acceptance: United States v. Ramel Drew

Introduction

United States v. Ramel Drew, decided by the Sixth Circuit on April 18, 2025 (Case Nos. 23-3931/3932), addresses a host of procedural and substantive challenges raised by a defendant convicted in a large‐scale fentanyl distribution conspiracy. Through wiretaps, controlled purchases, confidential informants, and video surveillance, federal and state agents tied Drew to two “drug houses” in East Cleveland. After declining a pretrial plea offer, Drew was tried on conspiracy and distribution charges, consolidated with a later indictment charging additional offenses including firearm possession. A jury convicted him on all counts but one, and the district court imposed a 327-month sentence. On appeal, Drew contended that the plea process was defective, his counsel was ineffective, the trial court abused discretion in denying a continuance and in certain evidentiary rulings, the jury instructions and sufficiency findings were flawed, and several sentencing enhancements and variances were improper. The Sixth Circuit rejected each argument and affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in full, holding:

No affirmative duty arises under Missouri v. Frye or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for a district court to inquire on the record whether a defendant has accepted or rejected a plea offer. That responsibility lies with defense counsel, and best practices recommendations do not carry constitutional weight.
Ineffective‐assistance‐of‐counsel claims stemming from plea negotiations were not ripe for direct appeal and must await a habeas corpus proceeding.
The denial of Drew’s motion for a forty-day continuance was not an abuse of discretion because the evidence was “straightforward,” prior counsel’s work was available to new counsel, and logistical considerations weighed against delay.
A Pinkerton instruction on co-conspirator liability was proper: Drew was charged with conspiracy and there was ample evidence tying him and his co-conspirators to the distribution scheme.
Expert and lay portions of an FBI wiretap expert’s testimony were admissible under Barron where the jury received a clear cautionary instruction.
Sufficient evidence supported convictions for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute under a Pinkerton theory.
The base offense level, drug-premises enhancement, and firearms enhancement under the Guidelines were correctly applied based on jury findings and preponderant evidence of de facto control of the premises and foreseeable co-conspirator weapon possession.
Two prior state convictions imposed on the same day were properly scored separately under § 4A1.2(a)(2) because an intervening arrest existed.
The district court complied with Rule 32’s notice requirements before an upward variance and gave valid § 3553(a) reasons for increasing Drew’s criminal history category and sentencing above the Guidelines range.

Analysis

1. Plea‐Offer Inquiry and the Role of the District Court

The Sixth Circuit held that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure impose on district courts an affirmative obligation to inquire on the record whether a defendant has accepted or rejected a plea offer. The court relied principally on:

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) – mandates that defense counsel communicate formal plea offers to clients, but does not impose duties on judges.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) – prohibits judges from engaging in plea negotiations, thus underscoring counsel’s responsibility.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) – provides for plain‐error review of unpreserved challenges, but no “plain error” arose because no rule required the district court inquiry.

In departing from best‐practice recommendations that judges record plea offers to avoid ineffectiveness claims, the panel stressed that procedural advice in Frye is not binding law.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Negotiations

Drew’s argument that his lawyer failed to notify the court of his acceptance of the plea offer was deemed premature. Under Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003), ineffective‐assistance claims are ordinarily pursued via collateral review so that the record can be fully developed. The panel declined to entertain the claim on direct appeal.

3. Denial of Continuance

Reviewing for abuse of discretion under United States v. Lewis, 605 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2010), the court found no arbitrary insistence on expediency. The district judge reasonably concluded that the discovery—though voluminous—was not so complex as to require more than forty days, that new counsel could lean on prior preparation, and that logistical factors (juror summons, a co-defendant ready for trial) weighed against delay.

4. Pinkerton Instruction and Conspiracy Liability

The court applied Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) and Sixth Circuit precedent (e.g., United States v. Hamm, 952 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2020)) to uphold a jury instruction that Drew could be held responsible for co-conspirators’ possession with intent to distribute. It rejected the claim that no conspiracy was charged, pointing to the first indictment under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and consolidation under Rule 13.

5. Expert and Lay Testimony of the FBI Wiretap Agent

The court approved a dual‐capacity witness under Barron v. United States, 940 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 2019), where the jury was explicitly instructed to distinguish factual testimony from expert opinion. Challenges to voice identification and drug-slang interpretation were forfeited or unsupported by the record.

6. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Under the familiar Jackson v. Virginia standard (i.e., “any rational trier of fact…”), the Sixth Circuit found ample proof of Drew’s membership in the drug‐distribution conspiracy, his control and sales at the 89th Street house, and the foreseeability of co-conspirator conduct supporting both the Pinkerton theory and the § 841 possession-with-intent offense.

7. Sentencing Guidelines Calculations

Base Offense Level: Properly set at 30 based on the jury’s finding of 400 grams or more of fentanyl (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5)).
Drug-Premises Enhancement: +2 under § 2D1.1(b)(12), as Drew exercised de facto control (key access, repeated visits, sales from the driveway).
Firearms Enhancement: +2 under § 2D1.1(b)(1) via co-conspirator possession; large-scale drug operations made firearms possession foreseeable.
Criminal History Points: Drew’s two state‐court sentences imposed the same day were scored separately under § 4A1.2(a)(2) because a March 2001 arrest report demonstrated intervening police custody.

8. Rule 32 Notice and Upward Variance

The district court had fully disclosed the probation office’s recommendation for an upward variance in the presentence report, Drew objected, and Rule 32(i)(1)(B) was satisfied. The court gave “reasoned” § 3553(a) findings—Drew’s prodigious criminal record, violent history, and recidivism—and did not abuse its wide discretion in varying his sentence to 327 months.

Impact and Future Implications

United States v. Drew clarifies the boundary between defense counsel’s duty to convey plea offers (under Frye) and any supposed judicial duty to memorialize or confirm plea acceptance or rejection. District courts may rely on record best practices but cannot be faulted for a defendant’s failure to act on a plea offer. The decision also reaffirms established standards for continuances, co-conspirator liability, expert testimony, and sentencing guidelines applications—providing practitioners and judges with a blueprint for litigating related challenges in controlled-substance and conspiracy prosecutions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Plain‐Error Review: A very deferential standard used when a defendant did not raise an issue at trial; the court asks if there was an obvious error that affected substantial rights.
Pinkerton Liability: A defendant can be held responsible for a co-conspirator’s criminal acts if they are in furtherance of the conspiracy, within its scope, and reasonably foreseeable.
Base Offense Level & Specific Offense Characteristics: Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s offense level rises with the drug quantity and specific factors like firearm possession or maintenance of drug premises.
Rule 32 Notice Requirement: If a sentencing court relies on information not in the presentence report, the defendant must be told and allowed to comment.
Upward Departure vs. Upward Variance: A departure follows the Guidelines’ own provisions; a variance is based on the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and may occur even when the Guidelines are properly calculated.

Conclusion

United States v. Ramel Drew is a comprehensive reaffirmation of the Sixth Circuit’s plea-process, evidentiary, and sentencing jurisprudence. It establishes that courts are not constitutionally mandated to police plea‐offer acceptances, reserves ineffective‐assistance claims for collateral review, and underscores the broad discretion trial courts enjoy on continuances, jury instructions, and sentence variances. For defense counsel, the lesson is clear: track and document plea offers diligently, prepare thoroughly for trial, and be ready to litigate sentencing factors aggressively. For district judges, the decision endorses adherence to best‐practice procedures without fear of constitutional duty to conduct plea negotiations. Together, these principles will guide future cases at the intersection of criminal procedure and substantive drug‐trafficking law.