Clarifying District Court Discretion to Deny First Step Act Relief Sought Solely to “Bank Time” — Commentary on United States v. Mahatha (4th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

In United States v. Mahatha, No. 23-4273 (4th Cir. Aug. 19, 2025), the Fourth Circuit tackled a recurring question arising in post-conviction practice under the First Step Act of 2018: may a district court refuse to retroactively reduce a sentence where the defendant’s only articulated purpose is to “bank” overserved time for use against a future supervised-release-revocation sentence?

The panel (Judges Agee, Rushing, and Senior Judge Keenan) affirmed the Middle District of North Carolina’s denial of Keith Delpree Mahatha’s motion to reduce his original 2007 crack-cocaine sentence. Although eligible for relief under §404(b) of the First Step Act, Mahatha—who had already completed that sentence—sought resentencing solely to generate credit toward the revocation term imposed the same day. The district court refused, finding such relief would “destroy any effectiveness of supervised release.”

On appeal, Mahatha alleged (1) the district court misunderstood its authority and (2) its refusal was substantively unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the court recognized its power but permissibly exercised its discretion to deny relief, particularly in light of the “banked-time” concern.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: A district court does not abuse its discretion by denying a First Step Act motion when the defendant seeks a reduction solely to create banked time that would offset an anticipated supervised-release-revocation sentence.
• Key Findings:
  • The district court explicitly acknowledged its statutory authority under §404(b).
  • Consideration of potential banked time is a legitimate factor tied to the §3553(a) goals of deterrence and protection of the public (United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492).
  • The resulting 161-month sentence remained below the recalculated Fair-Sentencing-adjusted Guidelines range (188–235 months) and was therefore presumptively reasonable.
• Disposition: District court’s order affirmed; no abuse of discretion, no substantive unreasonableness.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Venable, 943 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2019) – Established that defendants who have completed their custodial sentences may still seek First Step Act relief. Mahatha relied on Venable, but the panel distinguished it: there the district court mistakenly believed it lacked authority; here the court recognized authority but declined to act.
• United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 2020) – Sanctioned consideration of “banked time.” The panel leaned heavily on Jackson to validate the district court’s reasoning that awarding credit could undercut deterrence and public-protection goals.
• United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2020)
• Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022) – Clarified scope of district-court discretion and the “benchmark” concept adopted in Troy.
• United States v. Swain, 49 F.4th 398 (4th Cir. 2022) – Addressed substantive reasonableness review in the First Step Act context; contrasted to show why Mahatha’s sentence was reasonable.
• United States v. Troy, 64 F.4th 177 (4th Cir. 2023) – Reinforced that the “impact on the Guidelines range” is the proper benchmark.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Fourth Circuit

1. Standard of review – Abuse of discretion for denial of §404(b) relief.
2. Authority vs. Exercise – The panel parsed the record to show the district court knew it had statutory power, eliminating any Venable-type error.
3. Permissible considerations – Potential banked time directly implicates two §3553(a)(2) factors: (B) adequate deterrence and (C) protection of the public.
4. Benchmark Guidelines – A sentence already below the recalculated range receives a presumption of substantive reasonableness; defendant failed to rebut.
5. Proportionality argument rejected – The First Step Act does not entitle a movant to the same percentage variance previously afforded.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation and Sentencing Practice

• Banked-Time Doctrine Strengthened – While Jackson introduced the principle, Mahatha reinforces that courts may outright refuse relief when the sole benefit would be banked time, even if the defendant is otherwise eligible.
• Strategic Effect on Defense Counsel – Counsel must now articulate benefits beyond banking credit (e.g., collateral consequences, supervised-release conditions) or risk denial.
• Clarification of Discretion Post-Concepcion – Affirms wide berth for district courts to weigh §3553(a) factors uniquely in resentencing situations.
• Supervised-Release Policy Considerations – Decision underscores judicial concern that retroactive reductions should not undermine the deterrent function of supervised release.
• Unpublished—but Persuasive – Though non-precedential, the opinion will likely be cited for its clear analytic framework on banked time and First Step Act discretion.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• First Step Act §404(b): A 2018 statute allowing certain crack-cocaine offenders sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to seek reduced sentences under the newer, lower statutory penalties.
• Fair Sentencing Act of 2010: Raised crack-cocaine quantity thresholds, thereby lowering statutory minimums and Guidelines ranges.
• Banked Time: Extra months a prisoner served beyond a later-reduced sentence. BOP policy can credit that surplus toward a future sentence (e.g., after revocation of supervised release).
• Supervised Release Revocation: When a defendant violates release conditions, the court may revoke supervision and impose additional imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. §3583(e)(3).
• Abuse-of-Discretion Review: Appellate courts overturn only if the lower court acted irrationally, ignored relevant factors, or misapplied the law.
• §3553(a) Factors: Statutory criteria guiding sentencing, including seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, and consistency.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Mahatha crystallizes a pragmatic limitation on First Step Act resentencing: district courts remain free to deny relief when the request functions only to stockpile credit for future revocation sentences, particularly where the original sentence is already below the recalculated Guidelines range. The Fourth Circuit’s careful distinction between recognition and exercise of authority, its reaffirmation of banked-time considerations under §3553(a), and its reliance on the recalculated Guidelines benchmark together furnish a formidable roadmap for both courts and litigants navigating post-conviction sentencing modifications. The decision thus fortifies judicial discretion and preserves the integrity of supervised release as a meaningful sentencing component.