Clarifying DCYF’s Duty to Inform Parents of Specific Abuse or Neglect Allegations Under RSA 169‑C:34, VI: Commentary on In re G.W.

Clarifying DCYF’s Duty to Inform Parents of Specific Abuse or Neglect Allegations Under RSA 169‑C:34, VI: Commentary on In re G.W.

I. Introduction

The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in In re G.W., 2025 N.H. 53 (Dec. 10, 2025), addresses two important and recurring issues in child protection law:

  • The line between “abuse” and “neglect” under RSA chapter 169‑C, particularly where a parent fails to protect a child from another adult’s harmful conduct and delays medical care; and
  • The scope and effect of the statutory notice requirement in RSA 169‑C:34, VI, which obliges Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) workers, at first in-person contact, to inform parents of the “specific nature of the charges” and of their right not to permit entry or interviews absent a court order.

The mother of infant G.W. appealed from a Circuit Court (Goffstown Family Division) order adjudicating her son both abused and neglected. She challenged:

  1. The sufficiency of the evidence to support findings that she abused and neglected G.W.; and
  2. DCYF’s compliance with RSA 169‑C:34, VI, arguing that social workers violated the statute by failing to advise her of the specific allegations, and that her statements (and derivative evidence) should therefore have been excluded.

Justice Countway, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the abuse finding but affirmed the neglect finding. The court also held that DCYF violated RSA 169‑C:34, VI by using only the vague terminology “report of concern” at first contact instead of describing the specific abuse/neglect allegations. However, it declined to prescribe a concrete remedy, holding that any error was harmless on the facts presented.

The opinion is significant for three principal reasons:

  • It sharpens the distinction between “abuse” and “neglect” under RSA 169‑C:3, reinforcing that the two findings rest on different factual showings.
  • It authoritatively interprets “charges” in RSA 169‑C:34, VI to mean investigatory “accusations,” not formal filed petitions, and requires DCYF to give parents specific notice of the nature of those accusations at first in-person contact.
  • It signals that even when DCYF violates that statutory notice obligation, relief will turn on a harmless-error analysis, leaving the precise remedial framework for another day.

II. Factual Background

A. Living arrangements and prior DCYF involvement

After G.W.’s birth, he lived with his mother at her parents’ home; the father frequently stayed there. In April 2024, DCYF investigated a prior incident in which G.W. rolled off a couch but determined the report was unfounded and closed the case ([¶2]).

B. Medical issues and the night of May 8

On May 8, at approximately five weeks of age, G.W. had a routine pediatric appointment. The parents reported prior episodes of oral bleeding, but the pediatrician saw no active bleeding and did not determine the cause ([¶3]).

That evening, the parents argued, during which the mother saw the father throw the child onto the bed “in anger” ([¶3]). Despite this, she left G.W. in the father’s care overnight.

C. Discovery of the arm injury and delayed ER visit

The next morning, the mother noticed that G.W.’s left arm was not moving. After about 4.5 hours with no improvement, she called the pediatrician’s office. A nurse, concerned about a possible neurological problem, advised immediate evaluation at the emergency room ([¶4]).

However, the mother did not promptly go to the ER. By 5:00 p.m., the hospital social worker noticed that the child had not arrived and called the mother. The mother said she would prefer to wait until the pediatrician could see the child the next day, expressing concern that an ER visit might trigger DCYF involvement ([¶5]). The social worker warned that if the child were not brought in, she would contact DCYF and the police. Only after this warning did the parents arrive with G.W. at the ER around 6:00 p.m. ([¶5]–[¶6]).

D. Medical findings

At the ER, G.W. cried when his left arm was touched; the upper arm (humeral) area was visibly deformed. An x‑ray showed a broken left humerus. The parents could not provide a plausible explanation for the injury ([¶6]).

Further evaluation revealed:

  • A displaced humerus fracture;
  • Healed tears of the sublingual and inferior frenula (small bands of tissue under the tongue and between the lower lip and gum); and
  • A small subconjunctival hemorrhage in the right eye ([¶8]).

The pediatric emergency/abuse expert concluded:

  • The fracture was acutely painful and inconsistent with “routine infant-led activity” or “routine handling by a reasonable caregiver” ([¶16]–[¶17]).
  • The oral injuries were traumatic in origin, often seen with forced feeding, and would have been “abundantly clear” to a parent because of obvious bleeding ([¶17]).
  • The combination of injuries was “highly concerning for physical abuse” ([¶8]).

E. DCYF and police involvement

An on-call child protective services worker (CPSW) met the parents at the hospital and created a safety plan, requiring G.W. to be admitted and directing the parents to leave until the assigned CPSW could meet with them the next day ([¶6]).

The next day, the assigned CPSW and a police officer made an unannounced visit to the mother’s home. The parents still professed ignorance of how the fracture occurred. Both parents later admitted during police interviews that the father could be “aggressive” with G.W. ([¶7]).

III. Procedural History

DCYF filed separate abuse and neglect petitions against each parent under:

  • RSA 169‑C:3, II(d) (abuse – child “[p]hysically injured by other than accidental means”); and
  • RSA 169‑C:3, XIX(b) (neglect – child “without proper parental care or control … necessary for the child’s … health, when it is established that the child’s health has suffered or is likely to suffer serious impairment”).

At the adjudicatory hearing, the court heard testimony from:

  • Two CPSWs (on‑call and assigned);
  • The hospital social worker;
  • The responding police officer;
  • Both parents;
  • The State’s pediatric expert; and
  • The mother’s expert physician ([¶9]).

The parents moved to suppress their statements to the CPSWs, arguing that RSA 169‑C:34, VI had been violated because the CPSWs did not tell them the “specific nature of the charges” at first contact. The trial court denied the suppression motions, and ultimately found it “more likely than not” that G.W. was both abused and neglected ([¶9]). The mother alone appealed. The father did not participate in the appeal ([¶1], n.1).

IV. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court:

  1. Abuse – Reversed the trial court’s finding that the mother abused G.W. under RSA 169‑C:3, II(d). While the evidence established that G.W. was physically injured by non-accidental means, the record did not show that the mother committed an “abusive act” in circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare as required by prior case law ([¶13]–[¶14]). Her conduct supported a finding of neglect, not abuse.
  2. Neglect – Affirmed the trial court’s finding that the mother neglected G.W. under RSA 169‑C:3, XIX(b). The combination of serious, non-accidental injuries, coupled with the mother’s failure to seek timely medical care despite clear advice to go to the ER, showed both “serious impairment” to G.W.’s health and a lack of “proper parental care or control” ([¶16]–[¶20]).
  3. RSA 169‑C:34, VI violation – Held that DCYF violated RSA 169‑C:34, VI because the CPSWs did not inform the parents of the “specific nature of the charges” and used the vague phrase “report of concern” instead ([¶24]–[¶26]). The court interpreted “charges” to mean “accusations” at the investigatory stage, not formal filed petitions ([¶25]). However, since the statute specifies no remedy and the evidence of neglect was overwhelming without the challenged statements, any assumed error in failing to suppress was harmless ([¶27]–[¶29]).

The court therefore “affirmed in part and reversed in part” ([¶30]).

V. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Standard of review and statutory framework

The court reiterated the established standard for reviewing abuse and neglect findings:

  • It will sustain trial court findings unless unsupported by the evidence or tainted by legal error.
  • It defers to the trial court’s assessment of the evidence and views the facts in the light most favorable to the decision. In re J.H., 176 N.H. 238, 241–42 (2023) ([¶10]).

The State (through DCYF) bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning it must show that it is more likely than not that abuse or neglect occurred. See RSA 169‑C:13 ([¶11]).

B. Abuse under RSA 169‑C:3, II(d)

1. Statutory definition and prior case law

RSA 169‑C:3, II(d) defines an “[a]bused child” as a child “[p]hysically injured by other than accidental means.” The Supreme Court, in earlier decisions, has read into this definition an additional requirement:

As summarized in In re N.T., 175 N.H. 300 (2022), the statute requires proof that:

“the alleged abusive act was committed under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare.” ([¶12], citing N.T. at 312 (quotation omitted)).

In In re Samantha L., 145 N.H. 408 (2000), the court explained that such harm may be shown by:

  • Severe, intentionally inflicted injuries;
  • Recurring or threatened recurrence of injury; or
  • Injury when the caretaker’s profile reflects a history or propensity for abuse ([¶12], quoting Samantha L., 145 N.H. at 413).

Thus, the abuse determination is not satisfied simply by proving a non-accidental injury; the evidence must tie a specific “abusive act” by the particular parent to circumstances that endanger the child’s life, health, or welfare.

2. Application to the mother in In re G.W.

The court agreed with DCYF that G.W. had been injured by non-accidental means. The pediatric expert’s testimony about the fracture and oral/eye injuries was sufficient on that point ([¶13]). However, the question on appeal was whether the record showed that the mother herself committed an abusive act under the N.T./Samantha L. standard.

DCYF relied on three key facts:

  1. The mother witnessed the father angrily throw the child onto the bed and did not meaningfully intervene or restrict his access ([¶14]).
  2. She noticed the child’s arm was not moving the next morning and allowed hours to pass before seeking guidance ([¶4], [¶14]).
  3. She medicated the child and continued manipulating the injured arm while delaying the ER visit ([¶14]).

The Supreme Court accepted that this evidence reflected seriously deficient parenting but concluded it more naturally supported a finding of neglect, not abuse. The court analogized to In re Craig T., 144 N.H. 584 (1999), where a mother’s failure to intervene when the father repeatedly hit the child was held to constitute neglect, not abuse ([¶14]).

Critically, the record did not show:

  • That the mother herself inflicted the fracture or oral/eye injuries;
  • That she encouraged or assisted the father in harming the child; or
  • That she otherwise engaged in a discrete act of inflicted physical harm within the meaning of RSA 169‑C:3, II(d).

Her conduct was one of omission (failure to protect; delay in medical care) rather than commission (direct infliction of injury). The court therefore reversed the trial court’s abuse finding as to the mother ([¶14]).

3. Significance of the abuse holding

This aspect of In re G.W. reinforces several important principles:

  • Parent-specific proof is required. Abuse and neglect findings must be supported by evidence specific to each parent’s conduct. The fact that a child was abused does not automatically make both parents “abusers.”
  • Omissions vs. commissions. Parental omissions, such as failing to protect a child from another adult or delaying medical care, are treated primarily as neglect issues unless there is additional evidence that the parent’s conduct rises to an abusive act as previously defined.
  • Abuse vs. neglect remain conceptually distinct. While overlapping, the categories have distinct evidentiary predicates. G.W. discourages the conflation of severe neglect with abuse absent proof of an abusive act by the parent in question.

C. Neglect under RSA 169‑C:3, XIX(b)

1. Statutory definition and “serious impairment”

RSA 169‑C:3, XIX(b) defines a “neglected child” as a child:

“[w]ho is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health, when it is established that the child's health has suffered or is likely to suffer serious impairment; and the deprivation is not due primarily to the lack of financial means….”

“Serious impairment” is separately defined in RSA 169‑C:3, XXVII‑a as:

“a substantial weakening or diminishment of a child's emotional, physical, or mental health or of a child's safety and general well‑being.” ([¶15]).

The court also restated an important conceptual point from In re J.R., 175 N.H. 676 (2023):

Statutory neglect “is not the actions taken or not taken by the parent or parents, but rather it is the likelihood of or actual serious impairment of the child's physical, emotional, and mental well‑being that are the conditions of neglect that must be repaired and corrected….” ([¶15], quoting J.R. at 682).

In other words, in the child protection context, “neglect” is focused on the child’s condition (actual or likely serious impairment) and the lack of adequate care, not on moral condemnation of particular parental acts as such.

2. Serious impairment in G.W.

The Supreme Court had little difficulty concluding that G.W.’s health suffered “serious impairment”:

  • At only ~5 weeks old, he had a displaced humerus fracture, torn frenula, and an eye hemorrhage ([¶16]).
  • The pediatric expert testified the fracture was acutely and excruciatingly painful, especially with movement ([¶16]).

These injuries easily fit the statutory definition of “serious impairment” as a substantial weakening or diminishment of physical health and safety.

3. Lack of proper parental care or control

The court identified two distinct ways in which the mother’s conduct reflected a lack of “proper parental care or control”:

  1. The non-accidental injuries themselves – The pediatric expert testified that:
    • The fracture could not have occurred from “routine infant‑led activity” and required force beyond that associated with “routine handling by a reasonable caregiver” ([¶17]).
    • The torn frenula were caused by trauma, commonly seen with forced feeding, which would exceed routine handling and produce obvious bleeding, “abundantly clear” to a parent ([¶17]).
    Even though the court did not assign the role of physical abuser to the mother, it treated the existence of such non-accidental injuries in a non-mobile infant as powerful evidence that the child’s caregivers (including the mother) were failing to provide safe, proper care.
  2. Delay in seeking medical care – The mother’s decision not to follow the nurse’s advice to go immediately to the ER, and her delay of approximately three hours until the hospital social worker threatened DCYF involvement, was deemed unreasonable and inconsistent with proper parental care ([¶19]).

4. The “reasonable parent” standard (accepted arguendo)

The mother urged the court to evaluate her conduct against that of a “reasonable parent…who finds a child in like condition” ([¶18]). The Supreme Court did not explicitly adopt this as the controlling legal standard for neglect in all cases. Instead, it assumed the standard “for the purposes of this analysis only” ([¶18]) and concluded that even under this parent-friendly framing, her conduct was not reasonable:

  • She observed the arm non-functioning for hours before calling;
  • She was told by a medical professional to go to the ER; and
  • She still delayed care until the threat of DCYF and police involvement ([¶19]).

Thus, even granting the mother’s premise, the court found she failed to act as a reasonable parent would under the circumstances. This was sufficient to uphold the neglect finding ([¶20]).

5. Takeaways from the neglect holding

Key doctrinal points:

  • Serious physical injuries in a very young infant strongly support neglect. Where a non-mobile infant presents with unexplained non-accidental injuries, courts may reasonably infer that the caregivers are failing to provide safe, adequate care, satisfying the “without proper parental care or control” element.
  • Failure to seek prompt medical treatment can, by itself, support neglect. Once advised to seek emergency care for a potentially serious condition, a parent’s delay—especially one motivated by a desire to avoid DCYF—can independently support a neglect finding.
  • Neglect is child-focused. The question is whether the child’s health has suffered or is likely to suffer serious impairment due to inadequate care, not whether the parent’s conduct meets some criminal or moral threshold.

D. Interpretation and violation of RSA 169‑C:34, VI

1. The statute: text and structure

RSA 169‑C:34, VI provides that at the first in-person contact, any person investigating a report of abuse or neglect on behalf of DCYF must:

  1. Verbally inform the parents of:
    • “the specific nature of the charges”; and
    • their right not to allow a social worker or state employee on their premises or to surrender their children to interviews absent a court order.
  2. Obtain a written acknowledgment signed by the parent confirming that this information was given ([¶22]).

The statute uses the word “shall,” which the Supreme Court treats as a mandatory command: “we regard the use of ‘shall’ as a command which requires mandatory enforcement.” In re N.T., 175 N.H. at 305 ([¶23]).

2. The meaning of “charges”

DCYF argued that at the time of the CPSWs’ contacts there were no “charges” pending because no petitions had yet been filed, and thus referring generally to a “report of concern” was sufficient ([¶25]).

The Supreme Court rejected this reading. It noted that:

  • Child protection proceedings under RSA chapter 169‑C are civil, not criminal. They do not involve “charges” in the criminal sense but are initiated by petitions alleging abuse or neglect. See In re Samantha L., 145 N.H. at 411; RSA 169‑C:7 ([¶25]).
  • The statute applies “[a]t the first contact in person” and explicitly refers to “parents of a child suspected of being a victim of abuse or neglect” ([¶25], emphasis added). This shows the legislature intended the notice obligation to attach at the investigatory stage—before formal petitions are filed.

Relying on ordinary-language definitions, the court construed “charges” here to mean mere “accusations,” not formal criminal charges ([¶25]). In doing so, it cited:

  • Black’s Law Dictionary (rejecting the formal criminal-definitional sense); and
  • The Oxford English Dictionary (defining “charge” as “[a]n act of accusing someone of wrongdoing; an accusation”) ([¶25]).

Thus, “the specific nature of the charges” means the specific nature of the allegations giving rise to DCYF’s investigation.

3. The “specific nature” requirement and DCYF’s violation

The record showed that at first contact:

  • Both CPSWs told the parents only that they were responding to a “report of concern.”
  • They did not inform the parents that DCYF was investigating allegations of abuse or neglect, nor did they describe what the “concern” actually was (e.g., a suspected non-accidental fracture) ([¶24], [¶26]).

The trial court had held that DCYF complied with RSA 169‑C:34, VI. The Supreme Court disagreed:

  • The statute requires informing parents of the “specific nature of the charges” ([¶23]–[¶24]).
  • Using the generic label “report of concern” without identifying that the allegations related to abuse or neglect, or the specific type of harm suspected, was too vague to satisfy the statute ([¶26]).

Accordingly, the court held that DCYF violated the statutory mandate ([¶26]). It emphasized that if the legislature disagrees with this interpretation, it is free to amend the statute, citing In re D.O., 173 N.H. 48, 58 (2020) ([¶26]).

4. The missing remedy and harmless error

The statute does not specify any remedy for violations, a point neither party disputed ([¶27]). The mother urged the court to adopt suppression (exclusion of her statements to CPSWs and derivative evidence) as the appropriate remedy.

The Supreme Court explicitly declined to decide what the “proper remedy” for such a violation should be:

“We need not define the contours of the proper remedy here because it would not impact the result of this case.” ([¶27]).

Instead, the court:

  1. Assumed for the sake of analysis that:
    • Exclusion could be the correct remedy; and
    • The trial court erred by failing to suppress the “tainted” statements and derivative evidence ([¶27]).
  2. Held that any such error was harmless, because:
    • Even without the challenged statements, “the other evidence presented at the hearing amply supports the trial court’s finding of neglect,” similar to In re Antonio W., 147 N.H. 408, 413–14 (2002) ([¶28]).
    • The mother herself conceded “the evidence about [G.W.’s] injuries was overwhelming” ([¶29]).
    • The trial court’s negative credibility determinations were driven by discrepancies between the parents’ accounts and the expert medical evidence, not by the CPSW statements per se; thus, the case was not a pure credibility contest like State v. Reynolds, 136 N.H. 325 (1992) ([¶29]).

Citing the general rule that errors not affecting the outcome do not justify reversal, see In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 125–26 (1993), the court left the suppression-remedy issue for a future case in which the statements might be outcome-determinative ([¶27]–[¶29]).

E. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court’s reasoning draws heavily on prior New Hampshire precedent:

  • In re J.H., 176 N.H. 238 (2023) – Reiterated the deferential standard of review for trial court findings and the requirement to view evidence in the light most favorable to the decision ([¶10]).
  • In re N.T., 175 N.H. 300 (2022) – Provided the gloss on RSA 169‑C:3, II(d), requiring that an abusive act occur under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare ([¶12]). This standard underpinned the court’s conclusion that the mother’s conduct, while harmful, fit better under neglect.
  • In re J.R., 175 N.H. 676 (2023) – Emphasized that “neglect” is defined by the condition of the child—actual or likely serious impairment—rather than merely by parental acts ([¶15]). This child-focused perspective guided the court’s neglect analysis.
  • In re Samantha L., 145 N.H. 408 (2000) – Further elaborated the abuse standard and confirmed that child protection proceedings are civil, not criminal ([¶12], [¶25]).
  • In re Craig T., 144 N.H. 584 (1999) – Held that a mother who witnessed but failed to stop the father from repeatedly hitting the child neglected the child. G.W. extends that logic to the mother who fails to protect or delay medical treatment, treating such omissions as neglect, not abuse ([¶14]).
  • In re Antonio W., 147 N.H. 408 (2002) – Applied harmless-error analysis where abundant untainted evidence existed, a framework mirrored in G.W.’s treatment of the alleged RSA 169‑C:34, VI violation ([¶28]).
  • In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119 (1993) – Articulated the general harmless-error principle for civil proceedings: if an error did not affect the outcome, the judgment stands ([¶27]).
  • State v. Reynolds, 136 N.H. 325 (1992) – Used to contrast cases where improper evidence is non-harmless because the trial is essentially a credibility contest, highlighting why the error here was harmless ([¶29]).
  • In re D.O., 173 N.H. 48 (2020) – Cited for the principle that if the legislature disapproves of the court’s statutory interpretation, it may amend the statute ([¶26]).
  • State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47 (2003) – Applied at the end to deem any unbriefed issues waived ([¶30]).

These precedents collectively:

  • Provide the doctrinal framework for distinguishing abuse from neglect;
  • Confirm the civil nature of RSA 169‑C proceedings;
  • Support a strict, text-based interpretation of procedural safeguards like RSA 169‑C:34, VI; and
  • Justify the application of harmless-error review to statutory violations in the child protection context.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. “Preponderance of the evidence”

This is the standard of proof in abuse and neglect adjudications under RSA 169‑C:13. It means that DCYF must show it is more likely than not (greater than 50% likelihood) that the alleged abuse or neglect occurred. It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt” used in criminal prosecutions.

B. “Abused child” vs. “neglected child”

  • Abused child (RSA 169‑C:3, II(d)):
    • A child physically injured by non-accidental means; and
    • The parent’s abusive act must be under circumstances that indicate harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare, as construed in N.T. and Samantha L.
  • Neglected child (RSA 169‑C:3, XIX(b)):
    • A child without proper parental care or control necessary for physical, mental, or emotional health;
    • Where the child’s health has suffered, or is likely to suffer, “serious impairment”; and
    • The deprivation is not primarily due to poverty.

Abuse generally refers to active harm (e.g., hitting, shaking), while neglect typically involves failure to provide adequate care or protection (e.g., not intervening when another adult is abusive, or delaying essential medical care).

C. “Serious impairment”

Defined in RSA 169‑C:3, XXVII‑a as a “substantial weakening or diminishment” of a child’s health, safety, or general well-being. In G.W., a broken bone in a 5‑week-old infant, combined with oral and eye injuries, clearly met this threshold.

D. “Harmless error”

A legal error is “harmless” if it did not affect the outcome of the case. Even if a court or agency violated a statute or admitted improper evidence, an appellate court will not order reversal if:

  • The remaining, properly-admitted evidence independently supports the decision; and
  • There is no reasonable probability that the error changed the result.

In G.W., the Supreme Court said that even if the mother’s CPSW statements should have been excluded, the abundant medical and contextual evidence was enough to support the neglect finding.

E. RSA 169‑C:34, VI notice requirement

This provision operates somewhat like a statutory “rights warning” in the child protection context:

  • At first in-person contact, DCYF investigators must:
    • Tell parents what they are specifically accused of (e.g., suspected physical abuse causing a fracture; neglect due to failure to seek medical care); and
    • Inform parents they do not have to let social workers into their home or permit interviews with their children unless there is a court order.
  • Parents must sign a written acknowledgment that they received this information.

It is not a constitutional Miranda warning, but a statutory protection designed to ensure parents understand the nature of the investigation and their rights during it.

VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impacts

A. Implications for DCYF practice

In re G.W. has direct operational consequences for DCYF:

  • Mandatory specificity at first contact. Workers can no longer satisfy RSA 169‑C:34, VI by saying they are investigating a “report of concern” without explaining that:
    • The concern involves suspected child abuse and/or neglect; and
    • The general nature of the alleged harm (e.g., unexplained fracture, unsafe supervision, exposure to domestic violence).
  • Documentation of compliance. Given the requirement for a written acknowledgment, DCYF will likely need:
    • Standardized forms that clearly state the specific allegations; and
    • Stricter training and oversight to ensure that CPSWs give the full statutory advisory verbatim and obtain signatures.
  • Risk of evidentiary challenges. While the court did not adopt an automatic suppression rule, G.W. invites future litigants to seek exclusion of statements or other remedies where the missing advisory plausibly affected the outcome.

B. Implications for parents’ counsel and family defense

Defense counsel can use G.W. to:

  • Challenge DCYF’s compliance with RSA 169‑C:34, VI in motions practice, particularly in close cases where parental statements are central to the adjudication.
  • Press for a remedy beyond harmless error in a case where:
    • The statements are the only or critical evidence supporting abuse/neglect; and
    • The lack of proper advisement arguably affected the parent’s decision to speak or cooperate.
  • Clarify the abuse/neglect distinction. Where the parent did not personally inflict the injuries but failed to protect or delayed treatment, counsel can argue that the conduct, if proven, supports neglect rather than abuse, affecting both the stigma and potential downstream consequences (e.g., in later termination of parental rights proceedings).

C. Guidance for trial courts

Trial courts can draw several lessons:

  • Separate abuse findings by parent. A finding that the child is an “abused child” does not automatically imply that every caregiver is an “abusive parent.” Evidence must be parent-specific.
  • Carefully analyze the nature of the parental conduct. Omissions (failure to intervene, failure to seek timely care) should primarily be addressed as neglect. Abuse findings should rest on proof of an abusive act by the parent in question.
  • Fact-finding on RSA 169‑C:34, VI compliance. If compliance is disputed, trial courts should make explicit findings as to:
    • What exactly the CPSW told the parents at first contact; and
    • Whether the required written acknowledgment was obtained.
    Such findings will be crucial to appellate review.

D. Possible legislative response

By flagging that RSA 169‑C:34, VI contains no remedial provision, the court effectively invites the legislature to consider:

  • Whether to specify a default remedy (e.g., exclusion of statements, civil penalties, or other sanctions) for non-compliance;
  • Whether to clarify what level of “specificity” is required in describing “the specific nature of the charges”; and
  • Whether any exceptions (e.g., exigent circumstances) should apply.

Until such amendments occur, trial and appellate courts will develop the remedial framework case by case.

VIII. Conclusion

In re G.W. refines New Hampshire child protection law on several fronts. The Supreme Court:

  • Reaffirmed that an abuse finding under RSA 169‑C:3, II(d) requires proof that the specific parent committed an abusive act under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare. Absent such proof, a parent’s failures to protect or to seek timely medical care are more properly analyzed as neglect.
  • Confirmed that serious, non-accidental injuries in a very young infant, together with unreasonable delay in seeking medical attention, constitute compelling evidence of neglect under RSA 169‑C:3, XIX(b), satisfying both the “serious impairment” and “without proper parental care or control” elements.
  • Gave a clear, text-based interpretation of RSA 169‑C:34, VI: DCYF must, at first in-person contact, inform parents of the specific nature of the abuse or neglect allegations being investigated and of their right to refuse entry or interviews absent a court order. Vague references to a “report of concern” are insufficient.
  • Recognized DCYF’s violation of this statutory mandate but, in the absence of an express remedial provision, treated the error as subject to harmless-error review. Because the neglect evidence was overwhelming without the contested statements, the court left the contours of the appropriate remedy for another, closer case.

As a result, In re G.W. both protects children—by upholding the neglect finding based on serious injuries and unreasonable delay in medical care—and strengthens procedural safeguards for parents—by enforcing the plain language of RSA 169‑C:34, VI. It stands as an important precedent in balancing the State’s child-protective responsibilities with parents’ statutory rights during DCYF investigations.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire

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