Clarifying Continuance Review and Ineffective Assistance in Nebraska Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings: Commentary on In re Interest of Jerel S.

I. Introduction

The Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in In re Interest of Jerel S., 320 Neb. 526 (Dec. 12, 2025), is formally a straightforward affirmance of a juvenile delinquency adjudication for conduct constituting the felony of terroristic threats. Substantively, however, it performs important work in three areas:

It confirms and applies the de novo standard of appellate review in juvenile delinquency cases, while reinforcing the practical deference given to trial courts’ credibility findings.
It expressly adopts for the first time the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing the denial of continuances in juvenile delinquency proceedings, aligning juvenile practice with criminal and civil practice on that point.
It engages in an extended discussion of ineffective assistance of counsel in juvenile delinquency cases, spotlighting:
- the constitutional basis of a juvenile’s right to counsel (due process, not the Sixth Amendment),
- the uncertainty about what doctrinal test (e.g., Strickland prejudice, “best interests,” or minimal “fundamental fairness”) should govern ineffective assistance claims in juvenile adjudications, and
- the structural gap in Nebraska procedure: there is no postconviction remedy or clear statutory vehicle to develop a factual record for such claims after direct appeal.

While the Court resolves Jerel’s specific claims on relatively narrow grounds, the opinion is an important waypoint in the continuing effort to define the contours of due process protections in Nebraska juvenile delinquency proceedings.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties and the Underlying Incident

Jerel S. is a juvenile who was temporarily placed with foster parent Lanslot Pyne. One night, around 2 a.m., events unfolded in Pyne’s apartment that led to a juvenile petition alleging that Jerel committed conduct which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the felony of terroristic threats under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28‑311.01.

Pyne testified that Jerel:

announced he was going to make Pyne’s weekend or night “exciting,”
retrieved a lighter and placed its flame near a tree in the living room,
then returned with a knife, medication, and a flashlight—items that were supposed to be locked in a safe per agency directives,
admitted having broken into the safe to access these items,
told Pyne that he had been thinking about ways to “get rid” of him, researching ways to kill him slowly, and stated he was going to kill and harm him,
and then jumped from a counter and came toward Pyne with the knife.

Pyne testified he believed Jerel was about to attack him. He subdued Jerel, held him on the ground, and called law enforcement.

A responding officer testified Jerel reported that he had obtained a knife, a hammer, and medication, and that Pyne assaulted him because of that conduct. The officer observed Jerel in pain with a scratch on his forearm and bleeding cuts on his face and arranged for Jerel to be taken by ambulance to a hospital.

Jerel testified in his own defense, offering a very different account. He:

claimed he did not like living with Pyne and had previously asked his caseworker for a change in placement,
asserted that Pyne threatened him and jokingly put his hands around Jerel’s throat,
said he found medications, lighters, flashlights, hammers, and other items in an unlocked suitcase, not in a broken safe,
stated he gathered a medication pack, knife, and flashlight and then showed them to Pyne to prompt Pyne to want him removed from the home,
denied going after Pyne or making any verbal threats,
testified that Pyne chased him, he jumped on a counter to avoid Pyne, and then Pyne (with the help of a friend Jerel says was present) took him down, causing bruises and scratches.

Pyne had denied any other person was present during the incident; the officer’s testimony that another man was present partially corroborated Jerel on that collateral detail and on his injuries.

B. Juvenile Court Proceedings

The State filed a petition under § 43‑247(2) alleging Jerel committed an act that would constitute felony terroristic threats. The juvenile court appointed the public defender to represent Jerel and ordered a psychological competency evaluation at counsel’s request. After reviewing the psychologist’s report, the court found Jerel competent to stand trial. Jerel entered a denial, and the matter was set for adjudication.

1. Motion to Disqualify the Judge

On the morning set for adjudication, Jerel’s counsel moved to disqualify the assigned juvenile judge. The asserted basis: the same judge had previously approved an emergency placement in a separate § 43‑247(3)(a) case involving Jerel, based on information about the same underlying incident. Counsel argued that prior exposure to the incident’s facts in another proceeding created an appearance that the judge could not be impartial.

The juvenile judge:

denied the motion,
stated he would not rely on information from other proceedings in deciding the adjudication,
asserted that such exposure did not impair his ability to be impartial, and
noted the timing: counsel had been appointed months earlier but filed the motion only on the morning of trial.

2. Motion to Continue

Immediately after denial of disqualification, counsel orally moved to continue. She:

explained that this was her first in‑person meeting with Jerel,
said Jerel had not had a full opportunity to review discovery with her,
asserted that she needed certain documentation from the related § 43‑247(3)(a) case and possibly from the competency evaluation, and
appeared to allude to Brady v. Maryland obligations concerning potentially exculpatory information.

When asked why this material had not been sought earlier, counsel said she had only recently discovered the existence of the related § 43‑247(3)(a) matter. The juvenile court found that Jerel had not shown good cause and denied the continuance. The adjudication hearing proceeded.

3. Adjudication and Appeal

The juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Jerel committed an act constituting terroristic threats and adjudicated him under § 43‑247(2). The court explicitly found Pyne “highly credible” and Jerel “not believable.”

Jerel, represented by new counsel on appeal, raised three core issues:

Sufficiency of the evidence to prove conduct amounting to terroristic threats.
Error in denying the motion to continue.
Ineffective assistance of trial counsel (broadly alleged: “throughout the proceedings, including at trial”).

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication in all respects.

Sufficiency of the Evidence: The Court held that, on de novo review, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Jerel threatened to commit a crime of violence with the intent to terrorize Pyne, satisfying § 28‑311.01(1)(a). The Court deferred to the juvenile court’s credibility assessment favoring Pyne’s account.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Court:
- assumed, without formally deciding, that juveniles have a constitutional right to effective counsel in delinquency adjudications,
- acknowledged uncertainty over what legal standard should govern such claims (Strickland, an Indiana “best interests” standard, or a minimal “fundamental fairness” test), but
- held that Jerel’s claims failed under any of these possible standards, because:
  - failing to earlier move to disqualify the judge was not deficient (motion would have been meritless), and
  - Jerel showed no prejudice—or unfairness—from counsel’s alleged failures to seek additional documentation, meet earlier in person, or pursue additional defenses.
Denial of Continuance: Explicitly adopting the same standard applicable in criminal and civil cases, the Court held that the denial of a continuance in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is reviewed for abuse of discretion and that reversal requires a showing of prejudice. Jerel failed to show how additional time or records would reasonably have changed the outcome.

In short, the Court found the record sufficient to support the adjudication, saw no constitutional inadequacy in the representation Jerel received, and concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to delay the proceedings.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review and Burden of Proof

1. De Novo Review in Juvenile Delinquency Appeals

The Court reiterates that appellate review in juvenile delinquency cases is de novo on the record, citing In re Interest of Gunner B., 312 Neb. 697, 980 N.W.2d 863 (2022). That means the Supreme Court:

independently reads the entire record,
reaches its own conclusions about the facts and law,
is not formally bound by the juvenile court’s findings.

Yet the Court immediately follows this with the important practical qualification: when “the evidence is in conflict,” the appellate court may give weight to the fact that the juvenile court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over another. This is crucial in a case like Jerel’s, where the crux is whose story is believed.

Thus, while juvenile delinquency appeals are not reviewed under the more deferential “clearly erroneous” standard that often applies to factual findings in civil or criminal appeals, in practice the appellate court still respects trial-level credibility determinations, especially where, as here, the juvenile court explicitly found one witness highly credible and another not believable.

2. Burden of Proof in § 43‑247(2) Adjudications

Citing In re Interest of Zoie H., 304 Neb. 868, 937 N.W.2d 801 (2020), the Court reaffirms that when the State proceeds under § 43‑247(2), it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed an act that would constitute a felony (or misdemeanor) under Nebraska law.

Here, the alleged felony was terroristic threats under § 28‑311.01. Accordingly, the question on appeal is functionally the same as in an adult criminal appeal: did the State prove all elements of that offense, with the required intent, beyond a reasonable doubt?

3. New Rule: Abuse-of-Discretion Review for Denial of Continuance

One doctrinally significant statement appears in the Court’s discussion of continuances:

“This court has not directly addressed what standard of review applies to the denial of a continuance in a juvenile delinquency case. In criminal and civil cases, however, the decision of whether to grant a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. … We apply that same standard here.”

This is the clearest new rule announced in the opinion: henceforth, in Nebraska juvenile delinquency cases, appellate courts will review denials of continuances under the abuse of discretion standard, just as in criminal and civil litigation. Combined with precedent such as State v. Ramos, 319 Neb. 511, 23 N.W.3d 640 (2025), that means a juvenile must show:

that the trial court’s decision to deny a continuance was unreasonable or untenable, and
that the denial caused prejudice, i.e., some concrete harm to the juvenile’s ability to defend the case.

As discussed below, Jerel could not meet this standard.

B. Terroristic Threats: Elements, Evidence, and Intent

1. Elements and Mens Rea

Under § 28‑311.01(1), a person commits terroristic threats if he or she:

“threatens to commit any crime of violence”
“with the intent to terrorize another” (or to cause evacuation, etc.).

The opinion reiterates the definition from State v. Clark, 315 Neb. 736, 1 N.W.3d 487 (2024):

“For purposes of the crime of terroristic threats, the intent to terrorize another is an intent to produce intense fear or anxiety in another.”

The Court also restates a generally applicable principle of criminal law:

“The intent with which an act is committed is a mental process and may be inferred from the words and acts of the defendant and from the circumstances surrounding the incident.”

Thus, the State did not need direct evidence of Jerel’s internal thought process. It could—and did—rely on his reported words and conduct to establish that his purpose (or at least one purpose) was to produce intense fear or anxiety in Pyne.

2. Conflicting Testimony and the Role of Credibility

Jerel’s sufficiency challenge hinged primarily on credibility. He argued:

that his own version of events created reasonable doubt that he ever threatened to kill or harm Pyne, and
that his account should be credited over Pyne’s because it was corroborated on some points (presence of a third person, existence of injuries) where Pyne’s was not.

The Court acknowledged these conflicts but emphasized two points:

The corroborated points (presence of another man, injuries to Jerel) were collateral to the central issue: did Jerel utter threats of violence with intent to terrorize?
Under de novo review with deference to live credibility determinations, the appellate court was not in a position to overturn the juvenile court’s choice to believe Pyne over Jerel on the crucial question of whether threats were made.

The Court noted that the juvenile court had observed the witnesses and explicitly found Pyne “highly credible” and Jerel “not believable.” That resolved the factual dispute about whether threats were made. The Supreme Court declined to reweigh that determination on a cold record.

3. Inferring Intent to Terrorize

Jerel also disputed whether there was adequate proof of the specific intent “to terrorize.” The opinion straightforwardly applies the inferential approach to intent:

Jerel was in possession of a knife (and other potentially dangerous items) taken from a broken safe that was supposed to secure weapons and medication from him.
While armed, he reportedly:
- told Pyne that he had been thinking of ways to “get rid” of him,
- stated he had been researching ways to kill Pyne slowly, and
- affirmatively told Pyne he was going to kill and harm him.
He then physically advanced toward Pyne with the knife after jumping down from the counter.

From these facts, the Court concluded that one could reasonably infer an intent to produce intense fear or anxiety in Pyne, satisfying the “intent to terrorize” requirement. As the Court put it:

“Pyne’s testimony that Jerel discussed killing him while holding a knife would certainly allow one to infer that Jerel intended to terrorize Pyne. That testimony, found credible by the juvenile court, leaves us unable to conclude that the State failed to prove Jerel acted with the requisite intent.”

In other words, once Pyne’s testimony is accepted as truthful, the legal conclusion that Jerel committed conduct constituting terroristic threats follows quite naturally.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings

The most conceptually rich part of the opinion is its treatment of Jerel’s claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. The Court uses the case to explore—though not definitively resolve—several important systemic questions.

1. Source and Scope of the Right to Counsel in Juvenile Proceedings

The opinion begins by noting that the Court has not previously held that a juvenile has a right to effective assistance of counsel in a delinquency proceeding. However:

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees a juvenile the right to counsel in delinquency adjudications where the juvenile’s liberty may be curtailed.
In re Interest of Jordan B., 300 Neb. 355, 913 N.W.2d 477 (2018), recognized this Gault-based right to counsel in Nebraska juvenile law.

The Court notes that numerous other state courts have held that this due process right to counsel includes a right to effective counsel, citing decisions from Illinois, Wyoming, Missouri, Maryland, and Texas.

For purposes of this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court follows that trend in practice but stops short of an express holding:

“For purposes of this opinion, we assume that Jerel had such a right to effective counsel in this adjudication proceeding.”

Thus, the Court does not finally settle the question as a matter of Nebraska constitutional law, but it proceeds as if such a right exists and evaluates Jerel’s claim accordingly.

2. Procedural Questions Unique to Juvenile Ineffective Assistance Claims

The Court identifies three procedural issues that arise when a juvenile raises ineffective assistance on direct appeal.

a. Specificity of Assignments of Error

In criminal appeals, Nebraska has tightened the requirement that ineffective assistance claims must be specifically assigned as errors. In State v. Rupp, 320 Neb. 502, ___ N.W.3d ___ (2025), the Court held:

the assignment of error itself—not just the argument section—must identify the specific conduct alleged to be deficient, and
a generalized assignment (“counsel was ineffective”) is insufficient.

Jerel’s assignment said only that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance “throughout the proceedings,” with particulars appearing only in the argument section. Under Rupp, that would be inadequate in a criminal case.

But this is a juvenile delinquency proceeding, not a criminal prosecution, and the State did not argue that Rupp’s specificity requirement should apply. The Court therefore:

“assume[s] without deciding that the specificity requirement does not apply” in juvenile delinquency appeals and proceeds to reach the merits of Jerel’s vague assignment.

The opinion thus leaves an open question: will the Rupp rule be extended to juvenile cases in the future, or will juveniles be allowed somewhat more flexibility in framing ineffective assistance assignments?

b. Record-Based Resolution vs. Additional Fact-Finding

In criminal cases, Nebraska routinely declines to resolve certain ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal when the record is insufficient. Defendants can later raise those claims in postconviction proceedings, where an evidentiary hearing can flesh out crucial facts. Cases like State v. Filholm, 287 Neb. 763, 848 N.W.2d 571 (2014), and State v. Nolan, 292 Neb. 118, 870 N.W.2d 806 (2015), reflect this practice.

For juveniles, however, there is a structural problem:

The Court is “aware of no procedure similar to a motion for postconviction relief through which a juvenile could raise a claim” that counsel was ineffective in a delinquency proceeding.
Some other states handle such claims by remanding to the juvenile court for an evidentiary hearing (e.g., Missouri’s D.C.M. decision).
But Nebraska juvenile courts are “statutorily created court[s] of limited jurisdiction” that may only exercise authority conferred by statute. The Court is “not aware of any Nebraska statute … that would authorize” an evidentiary hearing on remand solely for ineffectiveness issues.

The Court thus flags a fundamental structural gap: juveniles may have no clear procedural avenue to develop extra-record evidence of counsel’s deficiency or resulting prejudice.

Nevertheless, because Jerel did not ask for any procedure beyond review of the existing record, the Court resolves his claims on that basis:

“Accordingly, we will resolve Jerel’s claims of ineffective assistance based on the record before us. If that record does not establish ineffective assistance, Jerel will not be entitled to relief.”

The implication is stark: unlike adult defendants who can often defer certain ineffective assistance claims to a later postconviction proceeding, juveniles may have only one shot—on the existing trial record—to establish both deficient performance and prejudice (or unfairness).

C. What Legal Standard Applies? Strickland, “Best Interests,” or “Fundamental Fairness”

The parties disagreed on the governing standard:

The State urged application of the familiar Strickland v. Washington test, developed for Sixth Amendment criminal cases.
Jerel urged adoption of the Indiana Supreme Court’s standard in A.M. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 361 (Ind. 2019), used in a juvenile disposition modification context, asking whether the lawyer’s performance was so defective that the court cannot say with confidence that the disposition was consistent with the child’s best interests.

The Nebraska Supreme Court offers a thoughtful critique:

Most courts apply Strickland to juvenile ineffective assistance claims, but Strickland is a Sixth Amendment doctrine, and juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal prosecutions; the right to counsel comes from due process, not the Sixth Amendment.
The Indiana “best interests” standard arose in a disposition modification context and, as the Court notes, Indiana itself has declined to extend that standard to the adjudicatory phase of juvenile proceedings (J.M. v. State, 264 N.E.3d 1197 (Ind. 2025)).
A concurring justice in A.M. suggested a third approach: a minimal procedural due process standard under which relief is warranted only if counsel “abandoned the case and prevented the client from being heard”—a very narrow conception of ineffective assistance tied to fundamental fairness.

The Nebraska Court ultimately sidesteps the doctrinal choice:

“In the end, we determine it is not necessary to resolve in this case whether Jerel’s claims are appropriately resolved under Strickland, under the alternative proposed by Jerel, or under a minimal procedural due process standard focused solely on fundamental fairness. As we will explain now, under any of those standards, we find no ineffective assistance.”

Thus, the doctrinal question is flagged for future cases, but not answered. Practically, though, the Court’s analysis proceeds largely in Strickland terms—deficiency and prejudice—while also explaining why Jerel would fail even under the more juvenile-friendly “best interests” framing or a minimal fairness test.

4. Application of Ineffective Assistance Framework(s) to Jerel’s Claims

Jerel asserted several specific failures by trial counsel:

Not moving to disqualify the juvenile judge earlier in the case.
Not obtaining documentation from the related § 43‑247(3)(a) case or from materials provided to the competency evaluator.
Not meeting with him in person before the day of adjudication to review the evidence.
Not presenting potential defenses, including a possible lack-of-capacity defense.

a. Failure to Move Earlier to Disqualify the Judge

Under Strickland, the Court found no deficient performance.

To show deficiency, Jerel needed to show that a competent attorney would have filed an earlier motion and that such a motion would have had some merit.
The record showed only that the judge had been exposed, in another case, to information about the same incident.
Under Nebraska law, a party seeking judicial disqualification for bias bears a “heavy burden” in light of the presumption of judicial impartiality (see Buttercase v. Davis, 313 Neb. 1, 982 N.W.2d 240 (2022)).
The Court held that mere prior exposure to information about the incident in a separate proceeding is “hardly sufficient” to overcome that presumption.

Because such a motion would have been meritless no matter when filed, counsel was not deficient in failing to file it earlier:

“Counsel is not deficient for failing to file a meritless motion.” (citing State v. Haas, 317 Neb. 919, 12 N.W.3d 787 (2024))

Even assuming arguendo some deficiency in timing, there is also no prejudice: the same judge presided and expressly stated he would disregard extra-record information; there is no indication that an earlier motion would have led to a different judge or result.

b. Failure to Obtain Additional Documentation

Jerel claimed counsel should have obtained:

documents from the § 43‑247(3)(a) proceeding, and
information provided to the psychologist for his competency evaluation.

The Court did not definitively decide whether failing to seek those materials was deficient but held that prejudice was entirely speculative. Jerel:

did not identify any specific document,
did not describe what those documents would have shown,
did not explain how any content would have undermined Pyne’s testimony or supported a defense.

Without any concrete articulation of how the missing materials would have changed the evidentiary picture, Jerel could not establish a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome sufficient to undermine confidence in the adjudication, as required under Strickland (see State v. Thomas, 311 Neb. 989, 977 N.W.2d 258 (2022)).

c. Limited Pretrial Contact and Failure to Present Additional Defenses

Jerel argued that counsel’s first in-person meeting on the day of trial was inadequate and that counsel failed to present certain defenses, including a “potential” capacity defense.

Again, even assuming some deficiency, the Court found no prejudice:

Jerel did not show what would have been different about his trial testimony or strategy had counsel met with him earlier.
He did not point to any specific factual or expert evidence supporting a lack-of-capacity defense, nor explain what the capacity defense would have looked like in light of the psychologist’s finding of competence.
He did, in fact, testify in detail and present his version of events; counsel cross-examined witnesses and argued that Pyne’s account was not credible.

On this factual record, the Court concluded Jerel failed to show any reasonable probability that more preparation or an alternative defense theory would have persuaded the juvenile court to reject Pyne’s testimony or find reasonable doubt.

d. Failure Under Non‑Strickland Standards

The Court then explains that Jerel’s claims would also fail under:

the Indiana “best interests/fundamental fairness” standard from A.M., and
a minimal procedural due process standard focusing on whether counsel abandoned the client or prevented the client from being heard.

Under A.M.’s general approach:

the focus is not on every missed opportunity or imperfect strategic choice,
but on whether the hearing was fundamentally fair and whether the outcome was consistent with the child’s best interests.

Here:

Jerel had a contested hearing with representation.
Counsel cross-examined the State’s witnesses, elicited corroborative details for Jerel’s account from the officer, and presented Jerel’s testimony at length.
The juvenile court considered the competing accounts and explained its reasoning.

The Supreme Court found no indication that:

the process was fundamentally unfair, or
the outcome was inconsistent with Jerel’s best interests (particularly given the seriousness inherent in threatened lethal violence against a caregiver with a knife).

Under the minimal “fundamental fairness” conception (counsel must not abandon the case or prevent the client from being heard), Jerel’s claim also fails: counsel plainly did not abandon him and facilitated his full testimony.

D. The Motion to Continue: Discretion and Prejudice

Jerel’s argument for a continuance was closely tied to his ineffective assistance claims: counsel needed more time to meet with him, review discovery, and obtain additional documents.

The Supreme Court’s legal framework is two-fold:

Standard of review is abuse of discretion (newly confirmed for juvenile delinquency cases).
Reversal requires a showing that the party seeking the continuance was prejudiced by its denial.

From the record:

Counsel stated she had not met Jerel in person before that day and had not fully gone through discovery with him.
She referenced unspecified documents in the related case and materials for the competency evaluation as potentially important.
She could not explain, even generally, what those documents were likely to show.

The Supreme Court held that this showing was insufficient to establish prejudice:

The Court could not identify anything in the record suggesting that additional time would have yielded any concrete defense evidence.
Jerel did receive an adversarial hearing at which counsel:
- cross-examined the State’s witnesses,
- elicited evidence corroborating aspects of Jerel’s story,
- and presented Jerel’s full testimony.

Because Jerel could not show that a continuance would likely have changed the outcome, the Court found no abuse of discretion in denying the continuance.

E. Judicial Disqualification: Presumption of Impartiality and Counsel’s Strategy

While the appellate opinion primarily analyzes the disqualification issue in the context of ineffective assistance, it implicitly underscores Nebraska’s demanding standard for judicial recusal:

Judges are presumed impartial.
Prior exposure to evidence about the same incident in another proceeding—particularly within the same court’s jurisdiction—is not, by itself, enough to show bias or prejudice.
Absent more concrete evidence of partiality, a motion to disqualify is considered meritless.

Thus, even if counsel had filed an earlier motion to disqualify, it would have failed on the merits. The case reinforces that litigants must make a substantial showing to recuse a judge; simply having presided over related matters is not enough.

F. Relationship to Precedents Cited in the Opinion

The Court’s reasoning is firmly anchored in prior Nebraska and federal precedents, as well as persuasive authority from other states.

1. Nebraska Juvenile and Criminal Precedents

In re Interest of Gunner B. (2022) – Cited for the proposition that juvenile delinquency cases are reviewed de novo on the record, with potential weight afforded to the juvenile court’s credibility assessments.
In re Interest of Zoie H. (2020) – Confirmed that in § 43‑247(2) delinquency matters, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt an act that would constitute a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult.
State v. Clark (2024) – Provided the definition of “intent to terrorize” as the intent to produce intense fear or anxiety, and emphasized that intent can be inferred from words, acts, and circumstances.
State v. Rupp (2025) – Established stricter specificity requirements for assigning ineffective assistance as error in criminal appeals; here used to highlight, but not extend, that doctrine to juvenile proceedings.
State v. Filholm, State v. Nolan, State v. Stelly – Illustrate criminal practice in which ineffective assistance claims can often be deferred to postconviction proceedings when the trial record is insufficient. These cases form the contrast with the structural situation in juvenile cases, where no analogous statutory postconviction vehicle exists.
State v. Hagens (2025), State v. Thomas (2022) – Restate the Strickland framework: deficiency plus prejudice, with prejudice defined as a reasonable probability of a different result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
State v. Haas (2024) – For the principle that counsel is not deficient for failing to file a meritless motion, crucial in analyzing the disqualification issue.
State v. Ramos (2025) – Criminal case confirming that denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion and requires a showing of prejudice for reversal; now extended to juvenile delinquency settings.
Noel v. Pathology Med. Servs. (2025) – Civil case cited alongside Ramos to support the abuse-of-discretion standard on continuances.
Buttercase v. Davis (2022) – Reinforces the presumption of judicial impartiality and the heavy burden on parties seeking disqualification for bias.
In re Interest of Jordan B. (2018, 2022) – Recognizes Nebraska juvenile courts as courts of limited statutory jurisdiction and locates juveniles’ right to counsel in due process, not in the Sixth Amendment, which shapes the Court’s scepticism about mechanically importing Strickland into juvenile law.

2. Federal and Out-of-State Authorities

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) – The foundational U.S. Supreme Court case holding that juveniles in delinquency proceedings facing possible confinement have a due process right to counsel, notice of charges, confrontation, and other procedural safeguards.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – The seminal case defining ineffective assistance of counsel in terms of deficient performance plus prejudice in criminal prosecutions; used here as a template but also questioned as to its fit in a non‑Sixth‑Amendment juvenile context.
A.M. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 361 (Ind. 2019) – Indiana case proposing a “best interests/fundamental fairness” standard for effective counsel in juvenile disposition modifications; Jerel urged adoption, but the Nebraska Court notes it is context‑specific and of uncertain relevance to adjudications.
J.M. v. State, 264 N.E.3d 1197 (Ind. 2025) – Indiana case declining to extend the A.M. standard to the adjudicatory phase of juvenile delinquency proceedings, reinforcing the Court’s hesitation to borrow that standard wholesale.
Other state cases – In re Johnathan T. (Illinois), JP v. State (Wyoming), D.C.M. v. Pemiscot County Juvenile Office (Missouri), In re Parris W. (Maryland), and In re K.J.O. (Texas) are cited to show the widespread recognition that juveniles’ due process right to counsel includes a right to effective assistance.

Taken together, these authorities show the Court situating Nebraska’s juvenile delinquency jurisprudence within national patterns while carefully preserving flexibility on key doctrinal questions.

G. Structural and Policy Implications

1. The “One-Shot” Nature of Juvenile Ineffective Assistance Claims

Because there is currently no clear statutory postconviction mechanism for juveniles and no explicit statutory authority for evidentiary hearings on remand, In re Interest of Jerel S. effectively signals that:

juveniles must raise ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal, and
those claims will almost always be resolved on the existing trial record.

This has several practical consequences:

Trial counsel must be keenly aware that their performance is unlikely to be subject to later factual development; contemporaneous record-making (proffers, on‑the‑record objections, descriptions of missing evidence) becomes especially important.
Appellate counsel must scour the record for any support for both deficient performance and prejudice; generalized or speculative allegations will fail.
Legislators and rulemakers may wish to consider whether Nebraska should create a procedural avenue (akin to postconviction or a statutory remand mechanism) to ensure juveniles have a realistic ability to vindicate due process-based claims of ineffective assistance.

2. Continuances and Case Management in Juvenile Courts

By applying the same abuse‑of‑discretion and prejudice framework to continuances in juvenile cases as in adult cases, the Court underscores that:

juvenile courts are expected to manage dockets efficiently while respecting due process,
last‑minute continuance requests, especially those lacking a concrete showing of what additional preparation will produce, are disfavored, and
juveniles must demonstrate how denial of a continuance actually impairs their defense, not simply that more time might have been helpful.

This aligns with broader policy interests in avoiding unnecessary delay in juvenile matters, where timely intervention, treatment, and supervision are often critical to serving both public safety and the child’s best interests.

3. Substantive Protection vs. Formal Distinction from Criminal Law

The opinion illustrates the tension between:

the formal classification of juvenile delinquency proceedings as civil, and
the reality that they carry consequences—including loss of liberty—that closely resemble criminal sanctions.

On the one hand:

the Court acknowledges that the right to counsel is grounded in due process, not the Sixth Amendment’s “criminal prosecutions” clause, and
expresses reluctance to mechanically apply Strickland in a non‑criminal context.

On the other hand:

the Court in practice applies a Strickland-style analysis (deficiency plus prejudice),
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of conduct constituting a felony, and
uses concepts and standards familiar from criminal procedure (Brady, continuances, recusal).

In re Interest of Jerel S. thus both highlights and softens the nominal civil/criminal distinction: substantive protections are increasingly criminal‑like even as doctrinal sources remain rooted in due process.

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

For readers less familiar with legal terminology, several concepts in the opinion merit simple explanation.

1. “Terroristic Threats”

Despite its name, the Nebraska offense of “terroristic threats” does not require any connection to terrorism in the political or international sense. Under § 28‑311.01, it primarily covers:

threats to commit a crime of violence,
made with the intent to either:
- terrorize (cause intense fear or anxiety in) another person, or
- cause evacuation or serious public disruption.

The key elements are:

a threat (words or actions that convey a serious promise to commit violence),
a qualifying crime of violence as the threatened act (e.g., killing, assault), and
a specific intent to terrorize—to induce intense fear or anxiety in the victim.

2. De Novo Review “on the Record”

“De novo on the record” means the appellate court independently reviews all the evidence presented below and makes its own judgment, rather than simply checking for legal errors. However, it is still limited to the evidence that was introduced in the juvenile court; it does not take new testimony or evidence.

3. Abuse of Discretion

A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is:

based on reasons that are clearly untenable (e.g., wrong legal standard, arbitrary or irrational reasoning), or
when the decision deprives a litigant of a substantial right or just result.

In the context of continuances, a reviewing court will typically uphold the denial unless the moving party shows both that the trial court’s reasoning was unreasonable and that the denial harmed the party in a concrete way (prejudice).

4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Test

Under Strickland v. Washington, to prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show:

Deficient performance: counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.
Prejudice: there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different.

A “reasonable probability” is more than a mere possibility; it is a level of likelihood sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

5. Due Process vs. Sixth Amendment

The U.S. Constitution provides:

the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for “all criminal prosecutions,” and
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, which guarantees fundamental fairness in state court proceedings.

Juvenile delinquency proceedings are formally not “criminal prosecutions,” so the right to counsel there arises from due process principles articulated in In re Gault, not directly from the Sixth Amendment. That difference fuels the debate over whether Strickland (a Sixth Amendment case) is the appropriate standard in juvenile contexts.

6. Continuance

A “continuance” is a postponement of a scheduled court hearing or trial. Parties typically seek continuances for reasons such as:

needing more time to prepare,
unavailability of key witnesses,
late‑discovered evidence.

Courts consider:

how long the case has been pending,
why the request is made,
whether the requesting party has been diligent,
and whether a delay would prejudice the other side or the public interest.

In Jerel’s case, the request came on the morning of adjudication, without a clear showing of what additional work would be done or what evidence would be obtained with more time.

7. Brady v. Maryland

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), requires prosecutors to disclose to the defense any evidence that is:

favorable to the accused (exculpatory or impeaching), and
material to guilt or punishment.

Counsel referenced Brady in requesting documents from the related case and from the competency evaluation, but the record did not identify any specific exculpatory material withheld by the State.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of In re Interest of Jerel S.

In re Interest of Jerel S. is, at the case-specific level, an affirmance of a juvenile adjudication for conduct amounting to terroristic threats. The Court:

accepted the foster parent’s account over the juvenile’s,
found sufficient evidence of threats and intent to terrorize,
held that trial counsel’s performance, while perhaps imperfect, was constitutionally adequate, and
upheld the denial of a last‑minute continuance as within the trial court’s discretion and non‑prejudicial.

More broadly, the decision:

Clarifies the standard of review for denials of continuances in juvenile delinquency proceedings (abuse of discretion plus prejudice), aligning juvenile practice with Nebraska’s criminal and civil law.
Explores and frames the unresolved doctrinal questions surrounding:
- the constitutional basis and scope of a juvenile’s right to effective counsel,
- whether Strickland or a different test should govern ineffective assistance claims in such proceedings, and
- how those claims can be meaningfully litigated given the absence of a postconviction or remand mechanism for factual development.
Emphasizes the importance of concrete prejudice in both ineffective assistance and continuance contexts; speculative assertions and generalized dissatisfaction with counsel’s performance will not suffice.
Reaffirms the centrality of credibility determinations in juvenile fact-finding and the limited willingness of appellate courts to displace trial courts’ assessments of witness believability.

In sum, while the Court leaves key doctrinal doors open for future cases—particularly regarding the standard for ineffective assistance in juvenile adjudications—In re Interest of Jerel S. significantly shapes the practical landscape for juvenile defense and appellate practice in Nebraska. It underscores that juveniles, like adults, bear substantial burdens to demonstrate both error and prejudice on appeal and highlights systemic questions that may warrant legislative or judicial attention moving forward.