Clarifying Batson Mootness in North Carolina: Step One Is Not Moot Absent a Step-Three Ruling

Introduction

In State v. Wilson, the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed a recurring procedural problem in Batson litigation: when does step one of the Batson inquiry become moot? The case arose from a Cleveland County murder trial in which the State used peremptory challenges to strike two Black female prospective jurors. The defense raised a Batson objection. The trial court denied the objection at step one, expressly finding no prima facie case. A divided Court of Appeals held that step one had been mooted because the State offered race-neutral reasons and the trial court referenced juror demeanor, and it remanded for a new Batson hearing under State v. Hobbs.

The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Berger clarified that mootness at step one is an exception that applies only when two conditions are met: (1) the State proffers race-neutral reasons and (2) the trial court rules on the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination—i.e., completes step three. Merely permitting or hearing the prosecutor’s reasons does not moot step one. The Court emphasized robust deference to trial judges at step one and rejected what it viewed as the Court of Appeals’ overbroad use of mootness to bypass that deference.

Justice Earls dissented, joined by Justice Riggs, contending that the trial court, in substance, proceeded to step three by crediting the State’s reasons and thus step one was moot under Hobbs, warranting a remand for a full step-three analysis including comparative juror analysis.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring step one moot. The Court announced and applied the following rule:

Mootness of step one is the exception, not the rule. Step one becomes moot only when the State supplies race-neutral reasons (step two) and the trial court evaluates those reasons and rules on the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination (step three).
Soliciting or hearing the State at step one is permissible. Trial courts may invite and consider the State’s arguments in assessing whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing. Doing so does not, by itself, move the proceeding to step two or moot step one.
Trial courts may consider immediately observable juror demeanor at step one. Judges need not ignore plainly observable conduct that could justify a peremptory strike when deciding whether a prima facie inference arises.
Outcome in Wilson: The trial court clearly ruled that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case. The record did not show that the court reached step three. Therefore, step one was not moot, and the Court of Appeals’ remand for a Hobbs hearing was improper.

Disposition: Reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals to conduct the correct review—whether the trial court’s step-one ruling (no prima facie case) was clearly erroneous.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986): Established the three-step framework: (1) defendant must make a prima facie showing of race-based peremptories; (2) State must give race-neutral explanations; (3) court decides purposeful discrimination. Wilson re-centers Batson’s allocation of roles by stressing that step one is a meaningful threshold that should not be bypassed absent a true step-three ruling.
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991): Held that once the prosecutor offers race-neutral reasons and the trial court rules on the ultimate question, the prima facie issue becomes moot. Wilson adopts this articulation but cabins it: both State reasons and a step-three ruling are required for mootness.
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005): Clarified that step one asks only for an inference of discrimination; even implausible State reasons still require step-three assessment once step one is met. Wilson cites Johnson in explaining that even “frivolous” reasons still move the process to step three—but only if the court actually undertakes step three.
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), and Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019): Benchmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the importance of a searching step-three analysis and comparative juror evidence. In Wilson, the majority acknowledges the centrality of step three but limits when a case gets there via mootness.
State v. Hobbs, 374 N.C. 345 (2020): North Carolina’s modern template for robust step-three analysis, including weighing “the evidence in its totality.” Wilson reads Hobbs to require step three only when the trial court actually considers and rules on the State’s reasons—rejecting the Court of Appeals’ broader view that hearing reasons alone moots step one.
State v. Campbell, 384 N.C. 126 (2023): Reaffirmed deference to step-one determinations and cautioned that it is error to require step-two reasons absent a prima facie showing. Wilson distinguishes Campbell and uses it to underscore that mootness is not a backdoor to avoid deference at step one.
State v. Tucker, 385 N.C. 471 (2023): Emphasized that compelling the State to give reasons after a no-prima-facie ruling is error. Wilson extends Tucker’s logic to disapprove using the State’s volunteered comments to bootstrap a mootness finding when the trial court itself never reached step three.
State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131 (2001); State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328 (2005); State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709 (2005): These decisions establish North Carolina’s adoption of Batson, the deference due to trial courts at step one, and the “clearly erroneous” standard of review. Wilson recommits to those principles.
Higgins v. Cain, 720 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2013): Cited for considering “all relevant circumstances” at step one. Wilson leans on this to approve trial courts considering plainly observable demeanor in assessing prima facie discrimination.
United States v. Moore, 895 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Iron Moccasin, 878 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1988): Support the practicality/deference themes and warn against “mini-trials” during jury selection. Wilson relies on these to keep step-one rulings streamlined and deferential.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The opinion rests on three reinforcing propositions.

Deference is owed to a trial court’s step-one determination. Step one is a “fact-intensive” inquiry entrusted to judges who witness demeanor, candor, and context in real time. Appellate review of a step-one ruling is for clear error. This institutional competence underwrites the Court’s caution against converting step one into a perfunctory hurdle via overuse of mootness.
Mootness is a narrow exception requiring an actual step-three ruling. Citing Hernandez and Hobbs, the Court clarifies that step one becomes moot only when (a) the State provides race-neutral reasons and (b) the trial court then “rules on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination.” Simply inviting or hearing the prosecutor’s reasons does not, without more, transform a step-one denial into a step-three adjudication.
Trial judges may consider obviously relevant facts at step one, including juror demeanor. The Court reiterates that judges need not “feign blindness” to yawning, inattentiveness, or other observable conduct that can legitimately inform whether an inference of discrimination arises. Notably, the majority refuses to presume that a judge’s reference to demeanor derives from the prosecutor’s argument rather than the court’s own observations.

Applying these principles, the Court reviewed the voir dire exchange: defense raised Batson; the court immediately flagged one juror’s connection to the defendant’s family; the State articulated reasons; defense countered; and the court then expressly ruled: “I don’t believe there’s been a prima facie case for a Batson challenge.” The court added, “For the record,” that one Black juror remained, race was not targeted in questioning, and the court had noted Juror No. 10’s demeanor. Because the explicit ruling was at step one, and the court nowhere resolved pretext or made a step-three finding, the Supreme Court held that step one was not mooted. Consequently, a Hobbs remand for a step-three analysis was improper.

Where the Court of Appeals Went Wrong

The Supreme Court identified three errors in the Court of Appeals’ approach:

Treating Campbell as prescribing exclusive scenarios where step-one mootness is inapplicable. The Supreme Court explains that Campbell reflected application of the general rule (no mootness) under its facts; it did not invert mootness into the default.
Imputing the prosecutor’s voluntary step-two reasons to the trial court. The opinion insists appellate courts should not attribute party conduct to the judge or infer that the court reached step three merely because the State spoke and the judge listened.
Conflating the court’s “for the record” comments with a step-three ruling. Referencing a juror’s demeanor or noting that another Black juror remained on the panel does not, without more, amount to a ruling on pretext or purposeful discrimination.

The Dissent’s View

Justice Earls’s dissent urges a functional reading of Hobbs and related precedent. In her view:

Step one should be considered moot once the State provides reasons and the trial court engages with those reasons—whether or not the court uses “magic words” invoking step three.
She reads Hobbs to treat “considered” and “ruled on” interchangeably in describing what triggers mootness.
Because the trial court here heard the State’s reasons, entertained the defense’s comparative juror arguments, and then made findings endorsing the State’s demeanor-based explanation, she would deem step one moot and require a Hobbs-compliant step-three analysis (including comparative juror analysis).
She warns that the majority’s formalism elevates labels over substance and risks shielding discrimination from meaningful review.

The majority responds implicitly by: (a) insisting on a clear, administrable trigger for mootness (an actual step-three ruling), (b) reaffirming the trial court’s authority to consider demeanor at step one, and (c) cautioning against “mini-trials” during jury selection. The upshot is a sharper line between step one and step three for purposes of appellate review and remand.

Impact and Practical Consequences

Wilson will materially affect how Batson issues are litigated and reviewed in North Carolina:

For trial judges:
- Make your step-one ruling explicit. If denying a Batson challenge for lack of a prima facie case, say so plainly.
- You may invite and consider the State’s arguments at step one and may consider plainly observable demeanor; doing so does not automatically trigger step-two or mootness.
- Do not require the State to give reasons unless you find a prima facie showing. If you do proceed to step three, state that you are resolving the ultimate question and make findings reflecting totality-of-circumstances analysis (as Hobbs requires).
For prosecutors:
- Be cautious about volunteering detailed reasons before a step-one ruling—once a court does proceed to step three, Hobbs demands a rigorous record.
- If the court denies step one, avoid further step-two elaboration absent necessity; Tucker warns against compelled reasons after a no-prima-facie ruling.
- Document any plainly observable demeanor contemporaneously; the judge can consider that at step one.
For defense counsel:
- Build a robust step-one record: patterns, disparate questioning, comparative juror analysis, and any prosecutor statements that support an inference of discrimination.
- Recognize that merely eliciting State reasons will not, under Wilson, guarantee mootness of step one. To reach Hobbs-level review, the trial court must actually decide step three.
- If the court starts weighing pretext or making findings crediting the State’s reasons, ask the court to clarify that it is ruling at step three and request comparative analysis findings.
For appellate courts and practitioners:
- Defer to step-one rulings unless clearly erroneous. Mootness is reserved for cases where the trial court has truly completed step three.
- On remand questions, Wilson will reduce Hobbs remands that are predicated solely on the State having spoken at step one.
- Expect more litigation over whether a trial court’s remarks amount to a step-three ruling; Wilson favors explicitness and rejects presumptions that the trial court reached step three absent clear indication.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Peremptory versus for-cause strikes: For-cause strikes remove jurors who cannot be fair or meet statutory criteria; the judge must agree. Peremptory strikes are discretionary removals without stated cause—but Batson forbids using them on the basis of race (or other protected classifications).
Batson’s three steps:
1. Step one (prima facie): The defendant must show facts giving rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.
2. Step two: If step one is met, the State must give race-neutral reasons for the strike(s).
3. Step three: The court weighs everything to decide whether the strike was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.
Mootness in Batson: Step one becomes moot only when the trial court has both heard the State’s reasons and decided the ultimate issue of purposeful discrimination. Without a step-three ruling, step one remains the focal point on appeal.
Standards of review: Whether step one is moot is a legal question reviewed de novo. A trial court’s step-one finding (no prima facie case) is reviewed for clear error and is afforded substantial deference.
Demeanor evidence: Judges may consider plainly observable conduct (e.g., inattentiveness, yawning) in deciding whether an inference of discrimination arises at step one; they need not ignore what they directly observe during voir dire.

Key Takeaways

Mootness of Batson step one is a narrow exception: it applies only where the trial court actually reaches and rules on step three.
Hearing the prosecutor’s reasons or inviting the State to be heard at step one does not, by itself, moot step one or require a Hobbs remand.
Trial courts may consider immediately observable juror demeanor when deciding whether a prima facie case exists.
Deference to trial judges at step one remains robust; appellate courts should not read equivocal records as step-three rulings.
Wilson signals fewer automatic Hobbs remands; the record must show a true step-three adjudication to trigger step-one mootness.

Conclusion

State v. Wilson refines North Carolina’s Batson procedures by drawing a clear line between steps one and three. The Supreme Court reaffirms that trial courts command front-line authority at step one, and that their no-prima-facie rulings deserve substantial deference on appeal. While Hobbs remains a powerful tool for policing racial discrimination in peremptory strikes, Wilson ensures that the procedural gateway to Hobbs’s rigorous, totality-of-circumstances analysis opens only when the trial court has actually decided the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination. The decision both clarifies doctrine and offers practical guidance: be clear about which step you are on, and build a record that matches it.