Clarifying AEDPA’s “Clearly Established Law” Threshold:
No Automatic Prejudice for Counsel’s Failure to Strike a Biased Juror
Commentary on Daniel Stoffa v. Michael Zaken, No. 24-1638 (3d Cir. July 30 2025)

Introduction

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Daniel Stoffa v. Michael Zaken, confronted a recurring habeas-corpus question: when, if ever, does a criminal defendant automatically satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong when trial counsel fails to remove a juror who self-identifies as biased? The case involves Daniel Stoffa, convicted in Pennsylvania state court of multiple child-rape charges. After exhausting state remedies, Stoffa sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that counsel’s inaction during voir dire constituted ineffective assistance. The District Court denied relief; the Third Circuit affirmed.

While styled “Not Precedential,” the panel opinion delivers an important clarification: under AEDPA, a federal court cannot presume prejudice from counsel’s failure to strike a biased juror unless the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly established that principle. Absent such an explicit holding, state-court determinations that demand actual-prejudice showings under Strickland are neither “contrary to” nor an “unreasonable application of” federal law.

Summary of the Judgment

• Issue: Whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law by refusing to presume prejudice when trial counsel failed to remove an arguably biased juror.
• Holding: No. Because no Supreme Court case holds that prejudice is presumed in this specific context, AEDPA deference bars federal habeas relief. The Third Circuit therefore affirmed dismissal of Stoffa’s § 2254 petition.
• Key Rationale:
  • Under § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established law” must derive from Supreme Court holdings, not circuit precedent.
  • Strickland v. Washington (1984) requires proof of both deficient performance and actual prejudice, unless the Court itself has carved out a categorical presumption.
  • Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017) does not clearly establish such a presumption; it merely assumed it for “analytical purposes.”
  • Therefore, the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s insistence on an actual-prejudice showing was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
   The bedrock test for ineffective assistance: (1) deficient performance; (2) resulting prejudice (“reasonable probability of a different outcome”). Any departure from Strickland’s prejudice prong must rest on a Supreme Court decision designating a structural error with automatic reversal.
2. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 (2017)
   Recognized that some structural errors may not lead to automatic reversal during collateral review; the Court assumed, without deciding, automatic prejudice for a public-trial violation. The Third Circuit emphasized that an assumption is not a clearly established holding.
3. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634 (2003); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011); Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21 (2014); Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1 (2014)
   Collectively underscore two AEDPA pillars: (a) federal courts must defer to reasonable state-court applications of Supreme Court holdings; (b) circuit precedent cannot transform general Supreme Court language into a binding, specific rule.
4. Third Circuit procedural precedents (Simmons v. Beard, Eley v. Erickson) guiding which state-court decision is “last reasoned” and the standard of federal review.

B. Legal Reasoning

The panel’s analysis unfolded in three layers:

1. Identify the controlling Supreme Court rule. The only pertinent holding is Strickland, which requires actual prejudice unless the Court itself has carved out a presumption (e.g., total denial of counsel, biased trial judge).
2. Test the petitioner’s “clearly established law” assertion. Stoffa argued that seating a biased juror is a structural error that mandates presumed prejudice, relying on Weaver and sister-circuit cases (Hughes, etc.). The Third Circuit rejected this because:
   • Weaver’s language is non-dispositive; it did not “hold” that presumed prejudice is obligatory.
   • Circuit decisions cannot constitute clearly established law under AEDPA.
3. Apply AEDPA deference. Given the absence of an applicable Supreme Court holding, the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision to require an actual-prejudice showing was not “contrary to” nor an “unreasonable application of” federal law. Thus, the federal court must deny relief.

C. Potential Impact

• Habeas Litigation: Petitioners alleging ineffective voir-dire performance must marshal Supreme Court—even if old—holdings that clearly eliminate the need for proving prejudice. Without such authority, federal courts are bound by AEDPA to defer to state-court applications of Strickland.
• Trial Practice: Defense counsel must diligently exercise peremptory and for-cause challenges; post-conviction relief based on sleeper-juror bias will face formidable prejudice hurdles.
• Structural-Error Doctrine: The opinion underscores a narrowing trend: not all trial-framework errors automatically translate into habeas relief; the category of per se reversible errors remains tightly confined to issues the Supreme Court has explicitly so defined.
• Third Circuit Persuasion Power: Although “not precedential,” lower courts and practitioners often look to non-precedential opinions for guidance. This decision may influence district-court rulings within the circuit until an en-banc or published opinion states otherwise.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conclusion

Stoffa v. Zaken reiterates a cardinal rule of federal habeas corpus: deference to state courts reigns unless the U.S. Supreme Court has unmistakably spoken. The panel refused to expand presumed-prejudice doctrine in the absence of an unequivocal Supreme Court pronouncement. Consequently, defendants asserting ineffective assistance based on juror bias must still confront the demanding “reasonable probability” test. The decision tightens the doctrinal screws on post-conviction litigants and underscores the Supreme Court’s exclusive role in defining structural errors that warrant automatic relief.