Clarifying Accrual of Section 1983 Due Process Claims in Land-Use Disputes

Introduction

Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2025) centers on Philip G. Potter’s challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to actions taken by the Village of Ocean Beach and its officials. Potter’s amended complaint alleged violations of substantive and procedural due process as well as Monell liability arising from:

• The revocation of his Certificate of Occupancy (“CO”) for a seasonal residence;
• Criminal citations issued in early 2012 for alleged building‐code violations;
• The denial of rental permits in 2016, 2017 and 2018;
• The Village’s refusal to conduct a state‐court‐ordered hearing on the CO revocation.

The District Court (Brown, J.) dismissed all claims as time-barred. Potter appealed, primarily contending that the CO revocation occurred in 2015 (not 2011) and thus his due process claims were timely. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, sitting in summary order, affirmed dismissal of Potter’s § 1983 claims. The court held:

1. Plaintiff’s claims based on the 2012 criminal citations and the 2016–2018 denials of rental permits accrued more than three years before his August 29, 2023 complaint and are therefore time‐barred.
2. Potter’s CO-revocation claims likewise accrued outside the three-year statute of limitations because he knew, by the third year of repeated permit denials, that the Village was treating his CO as revoked.
3. Neither the continuing‐violation doctrine nor equitable estoppel revived his stale claims.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) – State law governs limitations period, federal law governs accrual.
• Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) – New York’s three-year CPLR 214(5) applies to § 1983 claims.
• Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) – Accrual when plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.
• DeSuze v. Ammon, 990 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2021) – A claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury and causation.
• Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998) – Accrual triggered when plaintiff knows enough facts to seek legal advice.
• Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007) & Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) – Pleading standards on plausibility.
• Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) – Discrete acts doctrine and continuing‐violation distinction.

These authorities shaped the court’s resolution of when Potter’s due process and Monell claims accrued and whether any tolling doctrine applied.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Statute of Limitations and Accrual
Under federal law, § 1983 claims accrue when a plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Here:

• Potter received criminal citations in early 2012 and knew of his alleged injury then.
• The Village denied rental permits in 2016–2018 expressly on the ground that his CO was invalid.
• By 2018, Potter had ample notice of the Village’s final position on his CO status and “reason to know” his due process rights were allegedly violated.

Each of these discrete acts started the limitations clock, and all were older than three years when Potter sued in August 2023.

b. Continuing Violation and Equitable Estoppel Doctrines
The court rejected application of the continuing-violation doctrine because it applies only where individual acts are so interrelated and ongoing that separate accrual would frustrate relief. Here, each permit denial and each citation was a discrete event with its own cause of action. Equitable estoppel was unavailable because Potter did, in fact, file suit in state court in 2019 challenging his CO revocation; he did not rely to his detriment on any Village misrepresentations that delayed his federal filing.

3. Impact

This decision confirms in the Second Circuit:

• Land-use § 1983 claims accrue at the point of definitive agency action, not at initial suspicion of a violation.
• Repeated denials of permits based on a local authority’s “final” administrative position will trigger the statute of limitations on due process claims.
• Summary orders—though non-precedential—underscore the importance of tracking accrual and timely filing in protracted land-use disputes.

Future litigants in zoning, permitting and certificate‐revocation contexts must monitor final administrative acts and pursue judicial review within the governing three-year window.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• § 1983 Claim: A lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges deprivation of federal rights by state or local officials.
• Accrual: The moment when a legal claim “ripens” and must be filed within the applicable statute of limitations.
• Continuing Violation: A theory that multiple wrongs can form one ongoing injury, potentially tolling the limitations period—here held inapplicable to discrete permit denials.
• Equitable Estoppel: Prevents a defendant from invoking the statute of limitations if the defendant’s misconduct caused the plaintiff to delay—rejectable where the plaintiff did timely sue in another forum.
• Monell Liability: Permits § 1983 suits against municipalities for constitutional violations resulting from official policy or custom—dismissed here as time-barred.

Conclusion

Potter v. Ocean Beach reaffirms that § 1983 due process claims in land-use and building-code contexts accrue when the plaintiff knows of a local authority’s final, injurious decision—not at an earlier, tentative stage. Repeated permit denials based on an asserted certificate revocation, even if the underlying administrative revocation hearing was never formally concluded, placed Potter on notice long before his suit. His failure to file within three years of these discrete acts doomed his claims. The judgment underscores the critical need for timely litigation in protracted zoning and permitting disputes.