Clarifying Accrual of Credit for Time Served and Elapsed Time in Montana: State v. Pillans Precedent

Introduction

In State of Montana v. William James Pillans (2025 MT 100), the Montana Supreme Court addressed two recurring but complex sentencing issues: the proper accrual of credit for time served and the allowance of “elapsed time” credit upon revocation of a suspended sentence. William Pillans’s convoluted procedural history—encompassing multiple arrests, bench warrants, releases, plea agreements, and revocation petitions across three related cases—provided the Court an opportunity to clarify how district courts must calculate these credits under Montana Code Annotated §§ 46-18-201, 46-18-203 and 46-18-403. Justice Shea’s opinion establishes a precise jurisdiction‐and‐detention test for time‐served credit and reaffirms that elapsed time credit is mandatory unless specific supervisory violations are shown in the probation officer’s record.

Parties:

Plaintiff/Appellee: State of Montana
Defendant/Appellant: William James Pillans
Trial Judge: Hon. Amy Eddy, Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County
Appellate Opinion: Justice James Jeremiah Shea

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district court’s May 11, 2023, judgment in Pillans’s three concurrent cases (DC-18-098, DC-18-298, DC-18-329). Two central holdings emerged:

Accrual of Credit for Time Served: Credit begins to accrue when the sentencing court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the defendant is detained pursuant to that jurisdiction. This includes initial arrests and later bench warrants, but not unrelated detentions that do not appear on the record of the sentencing case.
Allowance of Elapsed Time Credit: Upon revocation of a suspended sentence, a district court must grant all “street time” credit unless the probation officer’s records and recollections demonstrate specific violations during the period in question.

Applying these principles, the Court adjusted Pillans’s credits upward in each case, clarifying exactly which intervals counted toward time served and granting additional elapsed time credit where the record failed to show particularized breaches of supervision.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court relied on and refined several prior rulings:

State v. Risher, 2024 MT 309: Established that credit accrues when the sentencing court gains jurisdiction and the defendant is detained under that case’s authority.
State v. Crazymule, 2024 MT 58: Confirmed de novo review for legality of credit‐calculation and emphasized reliance on the case record alone.
State v. Spagnolo, 2022 MT 228: Held that initial arrest triggers accrual of time‐served credit.
State v. Jardee, 2020 MT 81: Warned against denying elapsed time credit based on a mere “pattern” of misbehavior.
State v. Gudmundsen, 2022 MT 178: Required specific violations in probation‐officer records to justify withholding street‐time credit.

Legal Reasoning

1. Time‐Served Credit
The Court harmonized three statutes—§ 46-18-403 (preconviction credit), § 46-18-201(9) (post-conviction credit), and § 46-18-203(7)(b) (revocation credit)—under a uniform test: the court must look solely at the record in the sentencing case to determine when it had jurisdiction over the defendant and when the defendant was detained under that jurisdiction. Arrests or holds in unrelated matters do not count unless reflected as warrants or detainers in the case before sentencing.

2. Elapsed Time Credit
Under § 46-18-203(7)(b), any time served under supervision without proven violations must be credited. The district court may not deprive a defendant of “street time” credit based on informal “patterns” of misbehavior—only documented, specific breaches in the officer’s records suffice.

Impact

The decision in State v. Pillans provides clear, durable guidance for Montana sentencing courts:

Predictability: Sentencing judges can now apply a straightforward jurisdiction-and-detention test for credit, avoiding ad hoc or case-specific twists.
Record Discipline: Probation officers must document discrete violations if they wish to litigate street-time credit; vague reports will no longer withstand appellate scrutiny.
Uniformity: The Court’s approach aligns credit calculations across initial sentencing and revocation scenarios, reducing legal confusion and costly appeals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Time‐Served Credit vs. Elapsed Time Credit:

Time-Served Credit refers to days physically spent in custody before sentencing or revocation. Under Pillans, those days count only if the custody is recorded in the sentencing case (e.g., arrest dates or bench warrants).
Elapsed Time Credit (also “street time”) covers periods when a defendant remains at liberty on a suspended sentence. Unless the probation officer’s file shows concrete rule breaches during that span, every day “on the street” must be credited.

Conclusion

State v. Pillans marks a significant refinement of Montana’s sentencing-credit jurisprudence. By articulating a clear test for when custody days “count” and reaffirming the defendant’s right to street-time credit absent particularized infractions, the Supreme Court has bolstered fairness and consistency in criminal sentencing. District courts and the Department of Corrections will now apply uniform standards: consult only the case record for jurisdictional detentions, and demand specific documented violations before denying elapsed time. This precedent will guide countless future cases and reduce uncertainty for defenders, prosecutors, and sentencing judges alike.