Clarifying §2255(f)(3)’s “New Right” Exception: Bruen and Rahimi Do Not Provide Retroactive Second Amendment Relief for Felons

Introduction

United States v. Barragan-Gutierrez (10th Cir. Apr. 15, 2025) arises from a collateral challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by Jorge Enrique Barragan-Gutierrez, a Wyoming resident convicted in 2015 of possessing a firearm “in furtherance of” drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). After his 211-month sentence (later reduced to 181 months) became final, Barragan-Gutierrez invoked two recent Supreme Court decisions—New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022) and United States v. Rahimi (2024)—arguing that they recognized a new, broader Second Amendment right that should apply retroactively on collateral review and thus render his conviction unconstitutional. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to decide (1) whether Bruen and Rahimi created a “newly recognized” Second Amendment right extending to convicted felons; (2) if so, whether that right applies retroactively; and (3) whether § 924(c) is unconstitutional under that right. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that neither Bruen nor Rahimi “formally acknowledged” a new right applicable to § 924(c) convictions, so Barragan-Gutierrez’s § 2255 motion is time-barred.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit unanimously affirmed the denial of Barragan-Gutierrez’s § 2255 motion on two grounds:

Section 2255(f)(3) grants a one-year window to file a collateral challenge after the Supreme Court “recognizes” a new right. Bruen and Rahimi, though they refined the analytical framework for Second Amendment challenges, did not recognize a new constitutional right that covers felons or their possession of guns in furtherance of crimes. They merely applied the Heller original-public-meaning test to new fact patterns.
Because no new right was recognized, the one-year clock from the final judgment ran out in 2016, making Barragan-Gutierrez’s 2023 petition untimely. Even if timely, his constitutional challenge to § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) would fail on the merits: the statute targets firearm possession in furtherance of drug trafficking—a longstanding, historically accepted regulation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

District of Columbia v. Heller (2008): Recognized an individual right to possess a handgun for self-defense at home but emphasized longstanding restrictions (e.g., on felons).
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022): Instituted an originalist “text, history, and tradition” test and rejected means-end scrutiny, but did not expand Heller’s holdings to felons.
United States v. Rahimi (2024): Applied Bruen’s framework to uphold firearm restrictions on those subject to domestic-violence protective orders, again without creating a novel Second Amendment right for criminal defendants.
Johnson v. United States (2015) & United States v. Snyder (10th Cir. 2017): Established that Johnson’s new rule on the ACCA’s residual clause was a “new right” under § 2255(f)(3).
United States v. Greer (10th Cir. 2018) & United States v. Hopkins (10th Cir. 2019): Clarified that § 2255(f)(3) applies only to Supreme Court decisions that “formally acknowledge” new rights, not mere extensions of existing ones.
United States v. Vincent (10th Cir. 2025) & United States v. Risner (6th Cir. 2025): Post-Bruen/Rahimi decisions upholding § 924(c) against Second Amendment challenges.

Legal Reasoning

Section 2255(f)(3) creates a limited exception to the one-year time bar for collateral attacks—extending it for one year after the Supreme Court “recognizes” a new constitutional right that is “made retroactively applicable.” The Tenth Circuit has consistently held:

A right is “newly recognized” only if dictated by no prior precedent and “formally acknowledged” by the Supreme Court in a “definitive way.”
Mere applications or extensions of established rights to different factual scenarios do not suffice.
Only the Supreme Court can “recognize” a new right under § 2255(f)(3).

Bruen and Rahimi refined the analytical framework and reaffirmed Heller’s core holding, but they never announced a standalone Second Amendment right for felons or for firearm possession in furtherance of nonviolent offenses. Indeed, both opinions explicitly declined exhaustive historical analyses of every firearm restriction and reaffirmed that bans on felon-possession remain “longstanding.” Because those decisions are “applications” rather than “new” recognitions, Barragan-Gutierrez cannot invoke § 2255(f)(3).

Impact

This decision has important consequences for § 2255 practice and Second Amendment litigation:

It reaffirms that Bruen and Rahimi, while reshaping Second Amendment review, do not automatically open collateral-attack windows for all pre-Bruen convictions.
Convicted felons challenging § 924(c) or similar statutes cannot rely on Bruen or Rahimi as “new rights” under § 2255(f)(3); their petitions remain subject to the original one-year limit.
The ruling preserves Congress’s power to impose enhanced penalties for firearm use “in furtherance of” drug trafficking or other felonies, grounded in a centuries-old tradition of disarming those engaged in serious wrongdoing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Collateral Attack (§ 2255): A prisoner’s motion to vacate his federal sentence if it violates the Constitution or federal law.
One-Year Time Bar: Generally, § 2255 motions must be filed within one year of final judgment, unless a new right is recognized by the Supreme Court.
Newly Recognized Right (§ 2255(f)(3)): A Supreme Court decision that formally announces a constitutional right not previously dictated by precedent.
Originalist Test (Bruen/Rahimi): Courts must compare modern regulations to the historical tradition of firearm regulation at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification.
Felon-in-Possession Ban: Rooted in 19th-century English and American tradition, prohibiting firearm possession by convicted felons is a “longstanding” exception to the Second Amendment.

Conclusion

United States v. Barragan-Gutierrez makes clear that the “new-right” exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) is narrow: only Supreme Court rulings that definitively announce novel constitutional protections revive the one-year filing window. Bruen and Rahimi, while significant for guiding how courts evaluate firearm regulations, did not themselves create a new Second Amendment right applicable to felons or to § 924(c) convictions. Accordingly, Barragan-Gutierrez’s petition was time-barred, and the Tenth Circuit properly affirmed its dismissal. This ruling ensures stability in federal sentencing and confirms that established prohibitions on felon-gun possession remain constitutionally sound.