Clarified Standards for Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint under CPLR 3213: Burden of Proof on Interest Payments and Documentary Evidence Requirements

Introduction

In Patel v. Edmund (2025 NYSlipOp 02216), the Appellate Division, Second Department, addressed crucial procedural and substantive questions arising from an effort to recover on a promissory note by summary judgment in lieu of complaint under CPLR 3213. Swati Patel (“plaintiff”) moved for summary judgment to collect principal, interest and attorneys’ fees under a note signed by her sister Bridgette Edmund (“borrower”) and cosigned by the defendant Rogelio Ricardo Andreas Edmund (“defendant”). The borrower died before full repayment; the defendant refused to honor the note. A Kings County Supreme Court judge granted summary judgment for $47,500 plus $4,380 in fees. On appeal, the Second Department (Dillon, J.P., Genovesi, Landicino & McCormack, JJ.) affirmed liability but reduced the damages to $40,000, finding inadequate proof of post-note interest payments. The court also clarified that:

Omissions in the return date for a CPLR 3213 motion are not necessarily jurisdictional defects;
Non-documentary “gift letters” cannot sustain a CPLR 3211(a)(1) dismissal challenge;
Attorneys’ fees awards under a note may be summarily confirmed if reasonable and unchallenged;
Courts may correct miscalculations of principal and interest on appeal without remanding for further proof.

Summary of the Judgment

The Appellate Division held:

The defendant’s direct appeal from the October 12, 2022 order was dismissed as the judgment entered March 27, 2023 terminated rights of direct appeal. All issues were consolidated on the judgment appeal.
The plaintiff made out a prima facie case for summary judgment under CPLR 3213 by submitting the executed promissory note and evidence of default.
The defendant failed to raise any triable issue of fact in opposition, and his cross-motion under CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss on documentary grounds was properly denied because he relied on a “gift letter” (non-documentary) and unsupported usury claims.
The award of $4,380 in attorneys’ fees was properly confirmed where the fees were reasonable and uncontested.
The record, however, did not support the trial court’s computation of $47,500 due. Because the plaintiff failed to provide admissible proof that the January 2020 interest payment was $2,500 (rather than $10,000), the correct unpaid principal was $40,000. The judgment was modified accordingly and otherwise affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

CPLR 3213 jurisprudence (e.g., Cutter Bayview Cleaners, Inc. v Spotless Shirts, Inc., 57 AD3d 708; Kays v Antzoulatos, 211 AD3d 925): The note and default establish prima facie entitlement. Burden shifts to defendant to show a bona fide defense by admissible evidence.
CPLR 3211(a)(1) standards (Fontanetta v John Doe 1, 73 AD3d 78; Cives Corp. v George A. Fuller Co., Inc., 97 AD3d 713): A dismissal motion based on documentary evidence requires that all essential facts be resolved as a matter of law and must rely exclusively on “documentary” evidence.
Notice and return-date formalities (Blue Lagoon, LLC v Reisman, 214 AD3d 938; Capolino v Goren, 155 AD3d 1414): The absence of an adequate return date in a CPLR 3213 notice is a procedural defect that does not automatically strip the court of jurisdiction.
Usury defenses (Stransky v DiPalma, 137 AD3d 1734): Courts may consider undisputed facts concerning the timing and amount of loan proceeds to reject usury claims.
Attorney fee awards (LG Funding, LLC v Johnson & Son Locksmith, Inc., 170 AD3d 1153): Where statutory or contractual fee provisions apply, trial courts may summarily award reasonable fees if unchallenged.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in several stages:

Proper vehicle for relief: A motion under CPLR 3213 is appropriate to enforce a promissory note “in lieu of complaint.” Once the plaintiff shows execution and default, summary judgment must follow unless the defendant raises a triable issue.
Shifting burdens: The note and default shifted the burden to the defendant to produce admissible evidence of any defense. The defendant’s reliance on a “gift letter” (unsigned, ambiguous and non-documentary) and an unsupported usury theory did not meet that burden.
Jurisdiction over procedural defects: Although New York law generally requires a return date on motions, this is a procedural safeguard rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. The court declined to elevate a technical deficiency into a dismissal ground.
Calculation of recovery: The plaintiff claimed a $10,000 interest payment in January 2020. In oral argument, counsel “adjusted” that to $2,500, but no affidavit or receipt substantiated the lower figure. The absence of proof required the court to assume no payment had been made beyond original principal, leaving $40,000 due.
Attorneys’ fees: Under Judiciary Law § 431 (note provision) and prevailing contract-fee jurisprudence, the unopposed affidavit of counsel demonstrating time expended and rates sufficed to fix the fee award.
Appellate correction of miscalculation: The Appellate Division applied settled law that, when an appeal reveals a clear mathematical or record-based error in damages, the court may correct it without remanding for further fact-finding.

Impact

Patel v. Edmund supplies key guidance for litigants and trial courts:

When pursuing CPLR 3213 relief, plaintiffs must not only show execution and default but also maintain full documentary support for any claimed interest payments and attorneys’ fees.
Defendants seeking to resist summary judgment or dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(1) must supply genuine documentary evidence (signed loan documents, receipts, bank records) to mount a bona fide defense.
Technical defects in motion papers—particularly in return-date notices—are unlikely to be fatal in the absence of prejudice or a clear jurisdictional bar.
Appellate courts will correct demonstrable miscalculations in principal or interest on appeal, reinforcing the importance of precise affidavits and exhibits at the trial level.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CPLR 3213 vs. CPLR 3211(a)(1): CPLR 3213 allows immediate summary judgment “in lieu of complaint” on a promissory note—plaintiffs need only submit the note and show default. CPLR 3211(a)(1) is a pre-answer motion to dismiss based on documentary defects or defenses. To succeed under 3211(a)(1), a movant must present binding documents that conclusively defeat the claim—mere claims or hearsay are insufficient.

Return date formalities: New York practice generally requires that a notice of motion specify a return date and place for oral argument or submission. In Patel, the court treated the missing or technically deficient return date as a curable defect rather than an absolute jurisdictional bar, focusing on whether the opposing party received fair notice of the hearing.

Documentary evidence for usury defenses: To assert usury, a defendant must point to written evidence showing the timing, rate and amount of loan proceeds relative to the note. Oral assertions or informal “gift letters” lacking signatures or corroborating financial records do not suffice under CPLR 3211(a)(1).

Conclusion

Patel v. Edmund cements several important tenets in New York promissory-note litigation:

Plaintiffs who invoke CPLR 3213 must support their monetary claims and interest computations with unambiguous, admissible proof.
Defendants resisting summary judgment must provide genuine documentary evidence to raise a triable issue or to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(1).
Procedural missteps—such as return-date omissions—will not automatically derail a meritorious motion absent prejudice or a clear loss of jurisdiction.
Appellate courts will readily correct record-based miscalculations in damage awards, underscoring the need for precision at the trial level.

The decision thus refines the interplay between procedural safeguards and substantive rights in note-enforcement actions, promoting both efficiency and fairness in New York’s summary-judgment framework.