Clarification of “Marital Status” Under NYCHRL: Exclusion of Relationship-Specific Discrimination

Introduction

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s summary order in Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC addresses a pivotal question under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL): whether the term “marital status” encompasses discrimination based on an employee’s marriage to—or separation from—a specific individual. Kelvin Hunter, the long-time executive producer of The Wendy Williams Show, alleges that his termination in April 2019 was motivated solely by Wendy Williams’s filing for divorce, in violation of the NYCHRL’s ban on discharge “on the basis of marital status.” Debmar-Mercury LLC and its principals sought dismissal, arguing that “marital status” does not extend to relationship-specific actions. After interlocutory review and the New York Court of Appeals’ guiding decision in McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp., the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and clarified the scope of “marital status” under the city law.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit granted interlocutory review of the district court’s denial of Debmar-Mercury’s motion to dismiss Hunter’s marital-status discrimination claim. Historical state precedent confined “marital status” to the condition of being single, married, divorced, legally separated or widowed, without reference to the identity of a spouse. An intermediate appellate court (Morse v. Fidessa Corp.) had construed two post-2005 amendments to the NYCHRL to broaden “marital status” to relationship-specific claims. The Second Circuit awaited guidance from New York’s highest court, which arrived in McCabe (Dec. 17, 2024). There, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that “marital status” refers exclusively to the legal condition of marriage or its absence, not to discrimination motivated by the particular person to whom one is married. Applying McCabe, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss Hunter’s claim to the extent it rests on relationship-specific discrimination.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board (51 N.Y.2d 506, 1980): Held under the state Human Rights Law that “marital status” refers to being married or single, not the identity of the spouse. An employee’s firing for being married to her manager was not marital-status discrimination.
Hudson View Properties v. Weiss (59 N.Y.2d 733, 1983): Extended the same definition of “marital status” to housing discrimination under both the city and state laws.
Levin v. Yeshiva University (96 N.Y.2d 484, 2001): Reaffirmed the distinction between an individual’s marital condition and the identity or situation of the spouse when interpreting housing-discrimination provisions.
Morse v. Fidessa Corporation (165 A.D.3d 61, 2018): An intermediate appellate court ruled that two later amendments to the NYCHRL required a liberal, expansive interpretation of “marital status,” encompassing relationship-specific discrimination—a view later rejected by the New York Court of Appeals.
McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. (--- N.Y.3d ----, 2024 WL 5126078): The New York Court of Appeals definitively held that “marital status” under the NYCHRL means only the legal condition of being single, married, separated, divorced, or widowed, and does not cover discrimination based on marriage to a particular individual.

Legal Reasoning

The key question was statutory interpretation of “marital status” in the NYCHRL. The Second Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s denial of dismissal. It recognized longstanding New York precedents restricting “marital status” to one’s general condition vis-à-vis marriage, without regard to the identity of the spouse. The intermediate appellate ruling in Morse seemed to expand the term in light of two local amendments emphasizing a liberal construction of the law. However, New York’s highest court in McCabe resolved the conflict by reaffirming the classic definition: “marital status” is about whether one has participated in a marriage, not about the nature of one’s relationship with a particular spouse. The court rejected distinctions between employment and housing contexts, and declined to base its ruling on any remedial opportunities (such as purchasing co-op shares) present in McCabe but absent in Hunter. Consequently, Hunter’s claim, which alleges termination solely because of his marital status with Wendy Williams rather than because he was divorced per se, falls outside the NYCHRL’s coverage.

Impact

This ruling provides several important clarifications:

It places employment-based marital-status claims under the same narrow scope as housing-based claims: employers may not discriminate against married, single, divorced or widowed persons, but they may take adverse actions based on whom an individual has married or divorced without violating the NYCHRL.
It reins in attempts to expand the reach of the NYCHRL via liberal construction in the marital-status context, preserving consistency with the New York Court of Appeals’ precedents.
It guides lower courts to disregard Morse and similar intermediate decisions insofar as they conflict with McCabe’s holding.
Litigants seeking remedies for adverse actions tied to personal relationships will need to consider alternate theories—such as gender, sexual orientation, or other protected categories—rather than marital-status discrimination under the NYCHRL.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Marital Status: Legally, “marital status” means whether a person is married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed—nothing more. It does not include discrimination because of the specific person to whom one is married or from whom one has divorced.
Interlocutory Appeal: An appeal taken before the trial court has issued a final judgment. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district court can certify a non-final order for immediate review when it involves a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for difference of opinion.
Summary Order: A decision by the appellate court that does not create binding precedent. In the Second Circuit, summary orders are non-precedential, but they interpret and apply established law.
Liberal Construction Requirement: A mandate that the NYCHRL be interpreted broadly to maximize protection of civil rights. Despite this mandate, the Court of Appeals held that it does not override the plain meaning of statutory terms such as “marital status.”

Conclusion

Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC underscores that “marital status” under the NYCHRL remains tethered to the legal condition of being married, single, divorced, or widowed, without embracing discrimination based on marriage to—or divorce from—a particular individual. By aligning with McCabe and classic state precedents, the Second Circuit dispelled ambiguity generated by intermediate decisions and preserved doctrinal consistency across employment and housing contexts. Moving forward, plaintiffs challenging adverse employment actions motivated by personal relationships must seek alternative legal theories rather than rely on a relationship-specific interpretation of marital-status discrimination.