Clarification of Interlocutory Appeal Jurisdiction and Standards for Preliminary Injunctions and Anonymity Motions in Prisoners’ §1983 Actions

Introduction

In Sloley v. NYS DOCCS, 24-662-cv (2d Cir. May 16, 2025), the Second Circuit addressed two closely related procedural questions in a pro se prison-civil-rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) the scope of immediate appellate review of interlocutory orders denying preliminary injunctive relief, and (2) the standard for allowing a plaintiff to proceed anonymously or under pseudonym in federal court. The plaintiff, Maxmillian Sloley (“Sloley”), an incarcerated individual proceeding pro se, sued the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) and various prison officials and medical personnel, alleging that they refused to increase his Suboxone dosage, removed him from the medication-assisted treatment (MAT) program, and threatened a retaliatory transfer. He sought to proceed anonymously, for appointment of counsel, and for preliminary injunctive relief restoring his MAT status and preventing transfer until final judgment.

Summary of the Judgment

On January 19, 2024, the district court dismissed most of Sloley’s claims for failure to state a claim, but allowed him to proceed on two § 1983 causes of action: (1) deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and (2) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district court denied Sloley’s motions to proceed anonymously, for preliminary injunction, and for appointment of counsel. Sloley appealed only the denials of anonymity and preliminary injunction; his appeal of the dismissal of other claims was dismissed for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to grant preliminary injunctive relief and to allow Sloley to proceed under a pseudonym, and it declined to revisit the district court’s sua sponte dismissals, which must await final judgment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

In resolving its jurisdiction and the merits of the two appealed orders, the Second Circuit relied principally on:

• 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) – granting appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions.”
• United States v. Pilcher, 950 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2020) – applying the collateral order doctrine to permit immediate appeal of a district court’s denial of a pseudonym motion as “effectively unreviewable” if postponed until final judgment.
• Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2008) – establishing the Rule 10(a) balancing test for proceeding under pseudonym, weighing the plaintiff’s anonymity interest against the public’s right of access.
• Agudath Israel of Am. v. Cuomo, 980 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2020) – reiterating the four-factor test for preliminary injunctions: likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest.
• Burns v. Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2018) – outlining the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim by a prisoner.
• Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2009) – defining the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.

Legal Reasoning

1. Appellate Jurisdiction. The court confirmed that it has jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) to review denial of preliminary injunctive relief, and under the collateral order doctrine (as articulated in Pilcher) to review the denial of a pseudonym motion. The court declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s dismissal of other claims, because resolving those dismissals would require a broader inquiry separate from the abuse-of-discretion review applicable to the injunctive and anonymity orders.

2. Preliminary Injunction Standard. Applying the four-factor test from Agudath Israel, the court found that Sloley failed the threshold requirement of showing likelihood of success on the merits.

• First Amendment retaliation: Sloley alleged only that Dr. Andola removed him from the MAT program, but he did not identify any specific protected speech or grievances of which she was aware, nor did he show a causal nexus between his complaints and his removal.
• Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference: Sloley did not demonstrate that Dr. Andola’s decision to terminate his MAT participation was motivated by culpable intent to deprive him of constitutionally adequate medical care, rather than a permissible medical judgment.
• Dosage challenge: Mere disagreement with the refusal to increase his Suboxone dosage fails to establish deliberate indifference, and there was no plausible First Amendment retaliation link to the dosage decision.
• Retaliatory transfer: Sloley’s speculative claim of a threatened transfer did not show an imminent or concrete injury sufficient for injunctive relief.

Absent a clear showing of likelihood of success on these legal and factual questions, the denial of the preliminary injunction could not be disturbed as an abuse of discretion.

3. Anonymity Under Rule 10(a). The court reiterated that “the title of [a] complaint must name all the parties,” so that public scrutiny of judicial proceedings is preserved. Following Sealed Plaintiff, the court balanced Sloley’s asserted need for anonymity against the public’s interest in open access. Finding no “highly sensitive” subject matter, no risk of physical or psychological harm from identification, and noting that Sloley himself had publicly filed complaints using his name and ID number, the court held that the district court did not err in denying permission to proceed pseudonymously.

Impact

This decision reinforces several procedural principles in prisoner § 1983 litigation:

• Interlocutory appeals of injunctive orders in prisoner cases are available under § 1292(a)(1); appeals of pseudonym denials are permitted under the collateral order doctrine.
• Pendant appellate jurisdiction will not be invoked to review broader dismissals that fall outside the narrow scope of injunctive or anonymity rulings.
• Prisoners seeking preliminary relief must satisfy the stringent four-factor test, with special emphasis on demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits of both First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims.
• Anonymity is granted only in exceptional circumstances involving sensitive subject matter, substantial risk of harm, or pre-existing confidentiality; mere pro se or prisoner status does not suffice.

Lower courts will rely on this guidance when addressing interlocutory motions in prison-civil-rights suits, ensuring that only those plaintiffs who meet demanding standards for both relief and confidentiality may proceed under shield of anonymity or with injunctive protections.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Interlocutory Appeal. An appeal filed before final judgment, limited to certain categories of orders (e.g., injunctive orders under § 1292(a)(1)). Such appeals require a clear statutory or doctrinal basis.

Collateral Order Doctrine. A narrow exception allowing immediate appeal of certain non-final orders that conclusively determine important rights separate from the merits and would be unreviewable if postponed (e.g., orders denying pseudonym motions).

Preliminary Injunction Test. A four-part balancing test requiring plaintiffs to show (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) likelihood of irreparable harm without relief, (3) a balance of equities tipping in their favor, and (4) that injunctive relief serves the public interest.

Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference. A two-pronged test: (1) an objective showing of a “sufficiently serious” medical need, and (2) a subjective showing that officials knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health.

First Amendment Retaliation. A prisoner must show: (1) protected conduct (e.g., filing grievances), (2) adverse action by the defendant, and (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the action.

Pseudonym Motion under Rule 10(a). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires naming all parties in filings; to proceed under a pseudonym, a balancing test considers the sensitivity of the subject matter, risk of harm, and prior confidentiality of the plaintiff’s identity.

Conclusion

Sloley v. NYS DOCCS clarifies the narrow scope of interlocutory appellate review in prisoner § 1983 litigation and reaffirms stringent standards for issuing preliminary injunctions and granting anonymity. By affirming the district court’s denials—on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a clear likelihood of success, a substantial threat of irreparable harm, or a compelling need for confidentiality—the Second Circuit underscored that procedural safeguards for public access and rigorous injunctive criteria remain paramount. This decision will guide both district and appellate courts in screening interlocutory motions, ensuring that only those plaintiffs who meet demanding legal thresholds may secure preliminary relief or anonymity in federal court.