Clarification of Employer Awareness and But-For Causation in Title VII Retaliation Claims: Khazin v. City of New York

Introduction

In Khazin v. City of New York, 24-1236-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 8, 2025), the Second Circuit affirmed the Eastern District of New York’s grant of summary judgment for the City and individual NYPD supervisors on former Sergeant Valentin Khazin’s retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). Khazin alleged that after he refused to discriminate against a Black subordinate and filed multiple Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints, he was disciplined, denied training, and suffered other adverse actions in retaliation. This decision clarifies two critical elements of Title VII retaliation law: the employer’s required awareness of protected activity and the necessity of “but-for” causation to survive summary judgment.

Summary of the Judgment

On appeal from a district court summary judgment entered March 30, 2024, the Second Circuit applied a de novo standard of review. It held:

Khazin did not establish a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim for his purported refusal to follow orders, because the record lacked any indication that the NYPD understood his conduct as opposing unlawful discrimination.
Certain discipline and administrative actions (e.g., placement on a training waitlist) were not “materially adverse” under Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White.
Even assuming some actions were materially adverse, Khazin failed to show “but-for” causation: the City articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons (disciplinary investigations predating or remote in time from his complaints), and Khazin offered only conclusory denials and speculation to suggest pretext.
The constructive discharge claim likewise lacked a causal nexus to protected activity.
Challenges under NYSHRL and NYCHRL were deemed abandoned for insufficient briefing.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The court’s reasoning relied on well-established retaliation precedent:

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (411 U.S. 792, 1973): The three-step burden-shifting framework for retaliation claims.
Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. (716 F.3d 10, 2d Cir. 2013): Employer awareness requires understanding that the employee opposed conduct prohibited by Title VII.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (548 U.S. 53, 2006): Definition of “materially adverse” action in retaliation context.
Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC (737 F.3d 834, 2d Cir. 2013): “But-for” causation standard for retaliation.
Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp. (248 F.3d 87, 2d Cir. 2001) & Burkybile v. Bd. of Educ. (411 F.3d 306, 2d Cir. 2005): Timing alone, absent proximate temporal proximity, does not establish causation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): Standard for granting summary judgment.

2. Legal Reasoning

The panel began with the McDonnell Douglas framework:

Prima facie case: protected activity, employer awareness, materially adverse action, causal connection.
Defendant’s burden: legitimate, non-retaliatory reason.
Plaintiff’s burden: show the proffered reason is pretextual and that retaliation was the “but-for” cause.

Employer Awareness: Khazin’s refusal to follow orders concerning a Black subordinate did not clearly signal opposition to discrimination. Under Kelly, an employer must reasonably understand that an employee’s conduct opposes prohibited discrimination. Here, no written or verbal communication tied Khazin’s actions to discrimination concerns.

Materially Adverse Actions: The court applied Burlington Northern’s “reasonable dissuasive” test. Routine administrative inconveniences and training delays were “petty slights” (Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159) and not actionable.

But-For Causation and Pretext: For the remaining adverse actions, the City showed they stemmed from an off-duty employment investigation beginning December 2015 (before Khazin’s first EEO complaint) and from disciplinary proceedings in 2018–19 (long after his last protected activity). Khazin offered only conclusory affidavits and denials, insufficient to raise a triable issue of pretext under Zann Kwan and Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co. (654 F.3d 347).

Constructive Discharge: With no evidence tying his alleged forced exit to protected complaints, this claim likewise failed.

3. Impact

Although a non-precedential summary order, Khazin reinforces key principles for practitioners:

Document protected complaints with clarity—employers must understand an opposition is based on discrimination.
“But-for” causation remains a rigorous standard at summary judgment: timing alone is rarely enough.
Conclusive affidavits and generalized allegations of motive do not defeat summary judgment; factual specificities and comparative proof are essential.
Under Burlington Northern, not every workplace annoyance supports retaliation; counsel should focus on tangible harms that “well might dissuade” an employee.

Going forward, both employees and employers in the Second Circuit should heed these reaffirmed thresholds when framing and defending retaliation claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prima Facie Case: The initial showing that (1) you engaged in protected activity, (2) your employer knew, (3) you suffered a harm a reasonable person would find adverse, and (4) there’s some link between the two.
Burden-Shifting: After the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the employer explains its neutral reason. Then the plaintiff must prove that the employer’s reason is a pretext for retaliation.
Materially Adverse Action: Any action serious enough to deter a reasonable employee from making discrimination complaints. Simple annoyances or routine inconveniences are not enough.
“But-For” Causation: The retaliation must be the decisive cause of the adverse action, not just a contributing factor.
Constructive Discharge: When working conditions are so intolerable that a reasonable person would quit, and that intolerability is caused by prohibited conduct.

Conclusion

Khazin v. City of New York offers a concise reaffirmation of fundamental Title VII retaliation standards in the Second Circuit: employers must understand the nature of a discrimination complaint, and plaintiffs must show clear “but-for” causation with evidence beyond speculation. While summary orders do not bind future panels, this decision provides valuable guidance on the strategic framing and evaluation of retaliation claims under federal and parallel state and city anti-discrimination laws.