Clarification of Due Process Notice Requirements for Rule 60(b)(4) Relief in Post-Conviction §2255 Proceedings

Introduction

United States v. Teague is a consolidated appeal before the Tenth Circuit raising questions about the availability of Rule 60(b)(4) relief in post-conviction habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Anthony David Teague, a federal prisoner convicted of making interstate threats (18 U.S.C. § 875(c)), filed a § 2255 motion in 2007 challenging his conviction. After his motion was dismissed and he failed to appeal, Teague filed a series of Rule 60(b)(4) motions beginning in 2022, asserting that he was denied due process when the district court did not explicitly invite him to file a reply or amend his motion before recommending dismissal. The district court denied relief twice—first in December 2023 and again in January 2025. Teague then sought Certificates of Appealability (COAs) to challenge those orders. The Tenth Circuit, in an order filed April 11, 2025, considered whether reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s conclusion that Teague had received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and whether the denial of an explicit invitation to reply rose to a Rule 60(b)(4) due process violation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit denied Teague’s applications for a COA and dismissed both appeals. Key holdings include:

Rule 60(b)(4) relief is limited to judgments void for jurisdictional error or a fundamental due process violation depriving a party of notice or opportunity to be heard.
Teague had actual notice of the government’s response and the right to file a reply under local rules; the absence of an express invitation did not deny him due process.
Even if notice were defective, any error was harmless because the magistrate judge did not rely on the contested affidavit and Teague’s hypothetical amended arguments were speculative.
Reasonable jurists would not debate that Teague was afforded sufficient notice or that a lack of express invitation to reply constitutes denial of due process under Rule 60(b)(4).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2006): Upholds the original conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010): Defines “void” judgments and confines Rule 60(b)(4) to jurisdictional or fundamental due process errors.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000): Establishes the COA standard when constitutional claims are rejected on the merits.
Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2006): Describes the COA requirement in habeas appeals.
Bartch v. Barch, 111 F.4th 1043 (10th Cir. 2024): Confirms that Rule 60(b)(4) has no fixed time limit for filing.
James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2013): Instructs that pro se filings are construed liberally but do not make the court a litigant’s advocate.
Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010): Requires conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment motion if courts consider matters outside the complaint, with proper notice.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s decision follows a structured analysis:

COA Standard: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), a COA is required to appeal a Rule 60(b) denial. The petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could disagree about the district court’s resolution of constitutional claims (Slack v. McDaniel).
Rule 60(b)(4) Scope: Relief is available only if the judgment is void due to a jurisdictional defect or fundamental denial of due process (Espinosa).
Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard: Teague received the government’s response and had the right to file a reply under local rules. Actual receipt of filings and awareness of procedural rules satisfied due process—even absent an explicit court directive (Espinosa).
Conversion Principle: Even if the court treated the response as a summary judgment motion without formal conversion notice (Gee), Teague’s claim fails because he had notice of the government’s evidence and an opportunity to rebut it.
Harmlessness and Speculation: Teague’s assertion that he would have amended his § 2255 motion is speculative. Because the magistrate judge did not rely on the contested affidavit, any notice deficiency was harmless.

Impact

This ruling carries significant implications for post-conviction practice:

Reinforces that Rule 60(b)(4) relief is narrowly confined to void judgments, preserving finality in habeas adjudications.
Clarifies that actual notice of filings and awareness of procedural rights satisfy due process; courts need not affirmatively invite every response.
Deters late-stage Rule 60(b)(4) motions based on procedural technicalities when parties have had meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Guides district courts on assessing harmlessness of notice errors and speculative prejudice claims in habeas litigation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Certificate of Appealability (COA): Permission required for an appeal in a habeas matter, granted only if reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s resolution of a constitutional issue.
Rule 60(b)(4): Federal Rule of Civil Procedure allowing relief from a “void” judgment, strictly applied to jurisdictional errors or fundamental due process violations.
28 U.S.C. § 2255: Statute authorizing federal prisoners to challenge the validity of their convictions or sentences.
Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition (PFRD): Magistrate judge’s preliminary report recommending disposition of a § 2255 motion.
Conversion of 12(b)(6) Motion: When a court considers evidence outside a complaint, it must convert a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion and notify the parties.
Harmless Error: A procedural defect that does not warrant relief because it had no effect on the ultimate outcome.

Conclusion

United States v. Teague clarifies the narrow confines of Rule 60(b)(4) in post-conviction § 2255 proceedings. The Tenth Circuit held that actual notice of opposing filings and a meaningful opportunity to respond satisfy due process, even if the court does not expressly invite further briefing. The decision reinforces finality in habeas proceedings, limits relief for procedural technicalities, and provides clear guidance to district courts on assessing notice errors and speculative prejudice claims. As a result, litigants seeking Rule 60(b)(4) relief must demonstrate a fundamental defect or jurisdictional error that truly renders a judgment void.