Clarification of Ambiguous Sentences: The Role of Written Judgments in Federal Sentencing Post-United States v. Tracey Shaw

Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Tracey Shaw, 25a0147p (6th Cir. June 5, 2025), addresses a fundamental issue in federal sentencing: when and how a written judgment may be used to resolve ambiguities in an orally pronounced sentence. Tracey Shaw pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). During sentencing, the district court’s oral pronouncement regarding mandatory substance‐abuse treatment on supervised release was unclear, vacillating between delegating treatment discretion to the probation office and mandating treatment “as directed.” The subsequent written judgment unequivocally required Shaw to “participate in substance abuse testing and treatment as directed by the probation officer.” Shaw appealed, arguing that the written judgment conflicted with the oral sentence and that the appeal waiver in his plea agreement barred his challenge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that (1) a defendant may challenge a conflict between oral and written sentences despite an appeal waiver, and (2) where the oral sentence is ambiguous, the written judgment may clarify the court’s intent and is constitutional when it mandates treatment “as directed by” probation.

Summary of the Judgment

The court’s unanimous opinion (Judge Helene White) and concurrence (Judge Murphy) resolved two main issues:

Scope of Appeal Waiver: Shaw’s waiver of “the right to appeal any sentence . . . within the applicable guideline range” did not bar his challenge. He was not contesting the length or substantive reasonableness of his sentence, but rather seeking to avoid enforcement of a written judgment provision that allegedly conflicted with the orally pronounced sentence.
Oral vs. Written Sentence Conflict: Constitutional due process entitles a defendant to the sentence pronounced in his presence. If the oral pronouncement is unambiguous, it controls; if it is ambiguous, the written judgment may be used to clarify the court’s intent. Here, the oscillating language at the hearing (“as directed” vs. “if directed”) created ambiguity. The written judgment’s clear mandate—“shall participate in substance abuse testing and treatment as directed by the probation officer”—resolves the ambiguity and is constitutionally permissible because it merely delegates administrative details, not the core judicial decision to require treatment.

Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Hayden, 102 F.4th 368 (6th Cir. 2024): Established that the oral pronouncement of sentence in the defendant’s presence is the binding judgment.
United States v. Harris, 51 F.4th 705 (7th Cir. 2022): Held that a conflict between oral and written sentences is not an appeal of the sentence itself but a challenge to a non-binding written nullity.
United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021): Confirmed that challenging a written judgment condition is not appealing the actual sentence.
United States v. Penson, 526 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2008) & Sasser v. United States, 352 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1965): Described the written judgment as “mere evidence” of the sentence.
United States v. Denny, 653 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2011): Held that when an oral sentence is ambiguous, the written judgment may clarify it.
United States v. Carpenter, 702 F.3d 882 (6th Cir. 2012): Approved mandatory treatment “as directed by the probation officer,” distinguishing it from impermissible delegation “if directed.”
United States v. Logins, 503 F. App’x 345 (6th Cir. 2012): Reaffirmed that probation officers may administer, but not impose, court-ordered supervised‐release conditions.
Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916) & United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241 (3rd Cir. 2005): Emphasized that courts have exclusive Article III authority to impose criminal punishment, including supervised‐release conditions.

Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning unfolded in three parts:

Waiver Does Not Bar Written / Oral Conflict Claim: Appeal waivers typically preclude challenges to a sentence’s length or reasonableness but do not strip a defendant of the right to insist that the sentence publicly pronounced at his hearing is the one that governs. Shaw’s claim attacked the enforceability of a written provision that he never heard pronounced, not the guideline range or substantive terms.
The One-Sentence Rule: Due process guarantees a defendant’s presence at sentencing and assures that the oral pronouncement, made in his presence, constitutes the binding judgment. Any conflicting written entry is a “nullity.”
Ambiguity Doctrine and Constitutional Delegation: When a sentencing transcript vacillates between mandatory and discretionary treatment language, the ambiguity allows resort to the written judgment for clarification. Constitutional separation of powers requires that judges decide mandatory conditions, but courts may delegate the administrative details (frequency, program specifics, duration) to probation officers. The written judgment here mandates treatment while deferring details—fully permissible under Carpenter and its progeny.

Impact

This decision reinforces several critical sentencing principles:

District courts must be precise in oral sentencing to avoid reliance on written judgments for clarification.
When ambiguity arises, defendants will not evade mandatory conditions by pointing to conflicting colloquy; written judgments may resolve uncertainties.
Appellate courts will allow challenges to written-vs-oral conflicts despite appeal waivers, preserving the defendant’s right to be present for and bound only by the sentence publicly pronounced.
The holding sharpens the line between judicial and probationer authority: judges set mandatory conditions; probation officers manage logistical implementation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Oral Pronouncement vs. Written Judgment: The oral pronouncement of sentence—made in the defendant’s presence—is the sentence. A written judgment is simply a record. If they conflict, the oral sentence prevails—unless it is ambiguous.

Sentencing Appeal Waiver: A defendant often waives the right to appeal a sentence’s length or reasonableness. That waiver does not bar him from insisting that the court’s public pronouncement is what matters; he may still challenge a written provision never uttered at sentencing.

Article III Delegation Doctrine: Only judges can decide which conditions are mandatory. Probation officers, as non-judicial actors, may implement the judge’s orders—designing treatment programs, scheduling tests, setting duration—but cannot decide whether to impose a condition.

Supervised Release Conditions: Special conditions (drug treatment, therapy, employment) form part of a defendant’s punishment following incarceration. The judge must impose them; probation carries them out.

Conclusion

United States v. Tracey Shaw crystallizes the interplay between oral sentencing, written judgments, and constitutional separation of powers in federal sentencing. It confirms that:

The oral pronouncement is the binding sentence; conflicting written entries are “nullities.”
Written judgments may clarify ambiguous oral sentences by resolving uncertainties about mandatory conditions.
Delegation of “administrative details” to probation officers is lawful, provided the judge decides the core conditions.
Appeal waivers do not extinguish a defendant’s right to challenge a written condition never pronounced in open court.

As a result, sentencing judges must strive for unambiguous oral rulings. Defendants retain a narrow avenue to ensure that only the sentence pronounced in court—supported by a consistent written judgment—controls their punishment.