Clarification of Accomplice Liability: Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence under RCW 9A.08.020

Introduction

In State v. Zghair, 2025 WL ___ (Wash. 2025), the Washington Supreme Court addressed whether there was sufficient evidence to support a second-degree felony murder conviction predicated on second-degree assault with a firearm enhancement. The respondent, Abbas Salah Zghair, was convicted of killing Silvano Ruiz-Perez by shooting him and was sentenced to 192 months plus a mandatory 60-month firearm enhancement. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to prove that Zghair either personally fired the fatal shot or knowingly aided another perpetrator. On direct review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that under Washington’s accomplice statute (RCW 9A.08.020) and federal due-process standards, the totality of circumstantial evidence permitted a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Zghair acted with the requisite knowledge and intent.

Summary of the Judgment

Writing for the majority, Justice Whitener applied the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard—viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution—and concluded that the jury reasonably could infer that:

• Zghair drove the victim around in his white Pontiac late at night;
• The victim was shot at close range near or inside that vehicle;
• Blood and bird shot (from a shotgun) were found on the car’s rear seat;
• Witnesses heard two gunshots followed by a heated exchange;
• Traffic and cell-site data placed Zghair and the victim together at all critical times;
• Zghair, when later questioned, admitted a gun was used in the murder and that he knew the victim was Hispanic.

The Court held that, under RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(ii), accomplice liability can be established by proving that a defendant “aided or agreed to aid another person in … committing [the crime]” with actual knowledge that his conduct would promote or facilitate that crime. The Court rejected the notion that the State must prove knowledge of a formal “plan” and held that actual knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Because a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Zghair knowingly facilitated an intentional shooting, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the conviction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979): Established the “light most favorable” sufficiency test under the Due Process Clause.
• In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970): Requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of a crime.
• State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216 (1980): Washington’s adoption of the Jackson standard.
• State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897 (2016): Confirms de novo review of sufficiency claims as a matter of constitutional law.
• State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243 (2017): Equates direct and circumstantial proof.
• State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634 (1980): Validates the reliability of circumstantial evidence.
• State v. Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d 1 (2013): Holds that inferences from circumstantial evidence must be reasonable, not speculative.
• State v. Cronin, 142 Wn.2d 568 (2000): Requires actual knowledge, not mere constructive knowledge, for accomplice liability.
• State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471 (2000): Confirms that accomplice liability hinges on knowledge of the crime to be committed.
• State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703 (1999): Permits inference of mens rea from proven facts.
• State v. Rotunno, 95 Wn.2d 931 (1981): Distinguishes mere presence from accomplice liability, requiring a “ready to assist” state of mind.
• State v. Anderson, 63 Wn. App. 257 (1991) & State v. Hanley, 33 Wn. App. 2d 99 (2024): Clarify that conduct after the fact may constitute a separate offense (rendering criminal assistance) but do not bar after-the-fact evidence in proving accomplice knowledge.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s analysis proceeded in three steps:

1. Standards of Review. Under Jackson and Washington authorities (Green, Homan, Rich), sufficiency claims receive de novo review, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the State. Credibility questions and evidence conflicts lie with the jury.
2. Accomplice Liability Under RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a). A person is guilty as an accomplice if, with “knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime,” he “aids … another person in … committing [the crime].” The Court emphasized:
   • Actual knowledge is required, not mere “should have known.”
   • Knowledge of a formal “plan” is not a statutory element; rather, the State may prove aid or agreement in either planning or commission.
   • Knowledge may be established by reasonable circumstantial inferences: cell-site tracking, vehicle ownership, forensic traces, surveillance video, and pre-Miranda admissions.
3. Application to the Facts. The combination of:
   • Video and location data placing Zghair and the victim together;
   • Evidence the shotgun shot bird shot at close range;
   • Blood and shot pellets in the car’s rear seat;
   • Witnesses hearing gunshots and overhearing an argument;
   • Zghair’s admission to detectives that “I don’t know how to use a gun” but that he knew a gun was used in the murder;
   sufficed to show that a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Zghair knowingly facilitated an intentional shooting.

Impact

State v. Zghair clarifies several points for future prosecutions and defenses:

• No “plan” requirement. Accomplice liability focuses on actual knowledge of the offense and aid in its commission or planning, not on proof of a discrete pre-arranged plan.
• Circumstantial evidence. Cell-site data, video surveillance, forensics, and admissions can combine to satisfy knowledge and intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Deference to factfinder. Juries are entitled to weigh conflicting inferences; appellate courts must not reweigh or substitute their judgment.
• Limits on sufficiency review. While rare, convictions may still be overturned if only speculative inferences support critical elements.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Felony Murder in the Second Degree – A death resulting from the commission of certain felonies (here, second-degree assault).

Second-Degree Assault – Intentionally using a deadly weapon to harm or offend another person.

Accomplice Liability (Complicity) – Under RCW 9A.08.020(3), one who with knowledge that they are promoting or facilitating a crime, either (a) solicits or encourages it or (b) aids in its planning or commission.

Sufficiency of the Evidence – Under Jackson v. Virginia, the due-process clause bars conviction unless a rational jury, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find every element beyond a reasonable doubt. All reasonable inferences go to the prosecution; credibility and conflict resolution go to the jury.

Circumstantial vs. Direct Evidence – Both are equally valid. Circumstantial evidence—facts from which reasonable inferences may be drawn—is sufficient, but inferences must be reasonable, not speculative.

Conclusion

In State v. Zghair, the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed that a combination of modern investigative tools (cell-site tracking, video surveillance, forensic evidence) and traditional circumstantial inferences can satisfy the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision dispels any notion that accomplice liability under RCW 9A.08.020 demands proof of a specific pre-arranged plan. Instead, the State need only prove actual knowledge and aid (or agreement to aid) in the commission of the crime—knowledge which may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances. State v. Zghair thus strengthens prosecutorial clarity and offers defendants clear guidelines on the mens rea and actus reus necessary for accomplice liability in Washington.