Citizen-Informant Trespass Tips and Repeated Hand-in-Pocket Movements as Grounds for Terry Stops and Frisks: Commentary on United States v. Devin Travis (3d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Third Circuit’s non-precedential opinion in United States v. Devin Travis addresses two core questions in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:

1. When does a citizen-informant’s 911 call, especially from on-site security personnel, provide reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop?
2. When do a suspect’s repeated returns of hands to pockets after police commands, in the context of a nighttime investigative stop, justify a protective frisk for weapons?

Although explicitly “not precedential” under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, the opinion is a detailed application of established doctrine that will likely be cited for its persuasive value in future suppression litigation. The Court—through Judge Ambro, joined by Judges Restrepo and McKee—reverses a District of New Jersey order suppressing a loaded revolver discovered during a pat-down of defendant Devin Travis, who was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.

At stake is how courts evaluate the reliability and content of a citizen-informant tip (here, a building security guard) and how they treat arguably innocuous physical movements (placing hands in pockets) when officer safety is implicated. The decision also clarifies the timing of a seizure and of a frisk for purposes of measuring reasonable suspicion, and rejects several analytical moves by the district court, including:

• Its view that the tip did not describe criminal or suspicious conduct;
• Its demand for corroborative video evidence before acting on the tip;
• Its reliance on the officers’ allegedly “poor” investigation and their more lenient treatment of an accompanying woman; and
• Its characterization of Travis’s hand movements as consistent compliance rather than suspicious conduct.

II. Background and Procedural Posture

Shortly after midnight on February 13, 2024, a security guard at an East Orange, New Jersey apartment building called 911. She reported that a man, later identified as Devin Travis, was:

• “trying to get inside the building” after being “kicked out already,” and
• “circling the parking lot” and “checking cars” to see if they were open.

Officers Jah-vel Henry and Errol Lindo responded. The guard, viewing a live security camera feed, told them the suspect was still on the property and standing at a back door. She escorted the officers to that location, where they encountered Travis and an unidentified woman. The officers:

• Allowed the woman into the building;
• Questioned Travis about why he was trying to enter (he said he was visiting someone);
• Asked for identification (he had none); and
• Directed him, multiple times, to remove his hands from his pockets.

Each time Travis removed his hands, he soon returned them to his pockets. After the second such return, the officers ordered him to place his hands on the wall for a pat-down. Travis protested that they had no reason to search him, physically resisted when they tried to begin the frisk, and was then handcuffed to a nearby fence. A pat-down revealed a loaded revolver in his pants.

Travis, a convicted felon, was charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the firearm, arguing:

1. The officers lacked reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and seizure; and
2. The officers lacked probable cause to arrest or search him.

The District Court (Judge Zahid N. Quraishi) agreed on both grounds and suppressed the gun. The government appealed only the reasonable-suspicion ruling; it did not challenge the district court’s probable-cause analysis.

The Third Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, reviewed factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo (citing United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002)), and reversed, holding that:

• The officers had reasonable suspicion to seize (stop) Travis based on the guard’s tip; and
• They had separate, additional reasonable suspicion to frisk him for weapons based primarily on his repeated return of his hands to his pockets during a late-night encounter following a suspicious-activity call.

III. Summary of the Third Circuit’s Opinion

A. Holdings

The Court’s key holdings can be summarized as follows:

1. Moment of seizure: A seizure occurred when the officers initially approached Travis, blocked his entry into the building, and ordered him to pull down his mask and remove his hands from his pockets—conduct that would signal to a reasonable person that compliance was not optional (citing Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2018)).
2. Reasonable suspicion for the stop: At that moment, the officers possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the building security guard’s tip that Travis:
   • Was repeatedly trying to re-enter after being “kicked out” (supporting defiant trespass under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:18-3(b)), and
   • Was circling the lot and checking car doors, conduct the Court deemed suspicious even if technically lawful.
   The guard’s tip bore sufficient indicia of reliability and did not require corroboration by video before officers could act.
3. Citizen-informant reliability and corroboration: A tip from a building security guard with live surveillance access—who reiterates the tip in person to responding officers and can be held accountable—is inherently reliable enough that additional corroboration is not required to establish reasonable suspicion (citing United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Torres, 961 F.3d 618 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. McCants, 952 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2020); and United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2006)).
4. Timing of reasonable-suspicion analysis: Reasonable suspicion is measured at the moment of seizure; Travis’s later assertion that he was visiting someone cannot retroactively erase reasonable suspicion that already existed at the time he was first seized (citing United States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 2015)).
5. Stop vs. frisk: The investigative stop did not, by itself, justify a pat-down; a frisk requires independent reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous (citing United States v. Gatlin, 613 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2010); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
6. Reasonable suspicion for the frisk: The frisk was justified by:
   • Travis’s repeated re-entry of his hands into his pockets after commands to keep them out—a recognized indicator that a suspect may be armed (citing United States v. Hill, 811 F. App’x 761 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Cornelius, 391 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Harris, 313 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2002));
   • The late hour; and
   • The already-suspicious behavior that prompted the call (citing United States v. Jackson, 120 F.4th 1210 (3d Cir. 2024); United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2010)).
7. Objective vs. subjective intent: The analysis turns on objective facts at the time the frisk began, not on when the officer subjectively decided to conduct it or on his motives (citing Goodrich, 450 F.3d at 559; United States v. Pittman, 338 F. App’x 147 (3d Cir. 2009)).
8. Irrelevance of comparative treatment: The fact that officers treated an unidentified woman more leniently (e.g., allowing her to enter the building) is irrelevant to whether reasonable suspicion existed as to Travis. The question is what the officers objectively knew about Travis, not whether they could have conducted a “better” investigation.

B. Outcome

Because both the stop and the frisk were constitutionally justified under Terry, the Third Circuit reversed the suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Factual Scenario in Context

This was not a spontaneous, officer-initiated encounter on the street. Officers responded to a specific 911 call from the building’s own security guard, whose job was precisely to identify trespassers and suspicious activity on the property. The guard’s report had several key features:

• Travis had been “kicked out” of the building but was still trying to enter—a direct suggestion of defiant trespass under New Jersey law.
• He was circling the parking lot and checking cars to see if they were open—behavior strongly associated with potential theft or unauthorized entry, especially late at night.
• The guard had a live camera feed and contemporaneously informed the officers that Travis was still at a particular back door to the building, and then escorted them there.

On scene, the officers:

• Confronted Travis at the door where the guard’s cameras showed him;
• Blocked his entry and questioned his presence;
• Noted that he lacked identification; and
• Observed him repeatedly return his hands to his pockets despite commands not to do so.

Those facts, taken together “as a whole,” are the core of the Court’s totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.

B. The Legal Framework

1. The Fourth Amendment and the Terry Doctrine

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures,” generally requiring warrants supported by probable cause (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). Terry v. Ohio carves out an important exception:

• An officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop (a “Terry stop”) when he has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)).
• A separate, more specific suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous justifies a limited frisk (pat-down) for weapons (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Gatlin, 613 F.3d at 378).

The Court emphasizes—following Terry—that the analysis is two-stage:

1. Was the initial stop justified at its inception by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity?
2. Was the frisk justified by reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and dangerous?

2. Reasonable Suspicion vs. Probable Cause

Reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding standard than probable cause” (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123). It requires:

• “At least a minimal level of objective justification” for the stop, and
• A “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person” of criminal activity, looking at “the totality of the circumstances” (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981); Brown, 448 F.3d at 246–47).

Probable cause, by contrast, requires a “fair probability” that evidence of a crime will be found or that the person has committed a crime. The district court found no probable cause for arrest or full search, and the government did not appeal that point. The Third Circuit’s analysis is therefore confined to reasonable suspicion under Terry.

C. Determining the Moment of Seizure

Before asking whether reasonable suspicion existed, a court must determine when the seizure occurred because that moment fixes the set of facts that may be considered (citing Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2008); Lowe, 791 F.3d at 430).

A person is seized when, under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would understand that he is not free to leave or to decline the officers’ requests, and the person actually submits to that show of authority (citing Haberle, 885 F.3d at 176; Brown, 448 F.3d at 245).

The district court found—and the Third Circuit agreed—that the seizure occurred when:

• Officers, guided by the guard, converged on Travis at the back door;
• They blocked his entry into the building;
• They ordered him to pull down his mask and remove his hands from his pockets; and
• Officer Henry testified that Travis was not free to leave during the encounter.

Under those circumstances, a reasonable person in Travis’s position would not have felt free to disregard the officers or walk away. The government did not meaningfully contest this on appeal.

This timing is critical: anything that happens after that moment—such as Travis’s later statement that he was visiting a tenant—cannot retroactively negate reasonable suspicion that already existed at the moment of seizure (citing Lowe, 791 F.3d at 430).

D. Reasonable Suspicion for the Stop: The Security Guard’s Tip

1. What the tip said—and why it mattered

The tip reported that a man:

• Was repeatedly “trying to get inside the building” after having been “kicked out”; and
• Was circling the parking lot and checking car doors.

Contrary to the district court’s characterization, the Third Circuit identifies at least one clear allegation of illegality in this description:

• Attempting to re-enter after being “kicked out” reasonably suggests the offense of defiant trespass under New Jersey law.

Under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:18-3(b), a person commits defiant trespass if, “knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given.” The New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear that “even a brief willful entry onto another’s property may constitute a violation” (State v. Gibson, 95 A.3d 110, 116 (N.J. 2014)). By reporting that Travis was “kicked out already” yet continued to try to enter, the guard provided precisely the kind of “notice” and defiance that statute contemplates.

In addition, circling a lot and checking whether car doors are unlocked is not ordinary, benign conduct—particularly in the early hours of the morning. Even if that behavior is not itself a codified crime in isolation, it is strongly suggestive of planned unlawful entry or theft.

2. Must the tip describe clearly illegal conduct?

The district court reasoned that because “peering into cars” is not per se illegal, the tip could not support reasonable suspicion. The Third Circuit squarely rejects this, citing United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2000), for the principle that:

“[R]easonable suspicion of criminal activity may be formed by observing exclusively legal activity.”

In other words, reasonable suspicion does not require that each described action be a clearly defined crime. It requires that, looking at the “whole picture,” the facts support an objective, particularized basis for suspecting that crime is afoot. The combination of:

• Being ejected from a building yet trying to re-enter, and
• Circling the parking lot while checking whether cars were open,

easily clears that threshold.

3. Reliability of the citizen-informant tip

The Court then evaluates whether the tip was reliable enough to be credited without additional corroboration. Following Torres (961 F.3d at 623–24) and Brown, it considers several non-exclusive indicia of reliability:

1. In-person versus anonymous: Although the guard initially spoke to a 911 dispatcher, she personally met the officers, repeated and confirmed her observations, and guided them to the suspect’s precise location.
2. Accountability: Because the guard interacted face-to-face with the officers at a known location (her workplace), she was fully identifiable. If her allegations were fabricated, she could be held responsible—an important reliability factor under Torres.
3. Special access to information: The guard had real-time access to the building’s live surveillance system, giving her observational capabilities beyond those of an ordinary passerby.
4. Recency: She was describing suspicious conduct that she had just witnessed via live feed, rather than stale information.

Together, these factors made the guard’s tip “inherently reliable,” in sharp contrast to anonymous, unaccountable tipsters. Cases such as Nelson, 284 F.3d at 478, and Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, similarly recognize that identified citizens (especially victims or on-duty security personnel) are presumptively reliable absent contrary indications.

4. Was corroboration required?

The district court faulted the officers for not personally reviewing security footage to corroborate the guard’s story before detaining Travis. The Third Circuit concludes that this imposes a standard unsupported by law:

• Corroboration is especially important when a tip is anonymous or otherwise unreliable (as in some applications of Brown and related cases).
• But when a tip is inherently reliable (identified citizen, present on scene, with special knowledge and accountability), no additional corroboration is required to establish reasonable suspicion (citing McCants, 952 F.3d at 423: “[t]he absence of corroborative evidence ... d[oes] not negate the reasonable suspicion created by the [tip]”).

Thus, officers were not required to view the surveillance video; the guard’s orally relayed observations sufficed.

5. The timing problem: Travis’s “innocent explanation”

The district court also reasoned that Travis’s statement—that he was visiting someone in the building—undermined reasonable suspicion. The Third Circuit holds this to be analytically misplaced, because:

• Reasonable suspicion is assessed at the moment of seizure (citing Lowe, 791 F.3d at 430; Torres, 534 F.3d at 210);
• The seizure occurred when officers initially converged on Travis, blocked his movement, and gave commands—not later, after questioning; and
• Therefore, his subsequent “innocent” explanation cannot retroactively invalidate the reasonable suspicion that justified the initial stop.

Officers are not required to “disprove” every benign explanation a suspect offers after a lawful stop has been initiated.

6. Irrelevance of the officers’ allegedly “poor” investigation

A further ground on which the district court found no reasonable suspicion was that the officers treated the unidentified woman differently than Travis, and that if they had “treated [Travis] in the same manner” they would have quickly confirmed he was visiting his girlfriend. The Third Circuit strongly rejects the premise that reasonable suspicion turns on the quality or completeness of the subsequent investigation:

• The question is not whether the police could have done more or done better;
• The question is whether, based on what they actually knew at the time of seizure, they had an objective basis to suspect criminal activity.

The opinion notes succinctly that “the quality of the investigation that follows is irrelevant.” Whether the officers could have pursued a more efficient or equitable investigative approach does not bear on the constitutional reasonableness of the initial stop under Terry.

In sum, the Third Circuit finds that the guard’s tip, considered in light of its reliability and content, gave the officers reasonable suspicion to stop (seize) Travis.

E. Reasonable Suspicion for the Frisk

1. Distinct justification required

A central doctrinal reminder appears early in the frisk analysis: “The stop and the search are independent actions, and each requires its own justification” (citing Gatlin, 613 F.3d at 378). That is:

• Even if the stop is lawful, the frisk is lawful only if officers have reason to believe the suspect is armed and dangerous.

The Court therefore asks: at the moment the officers began to pat Travis down, did objective facts justify a reasonable belief that he might be armed?

2. Travis’s repeated return of his hands to his pockets

The pivotal facts are captured on Officer Henry’s body-camera footage:

• At 46:38 – Officers first instruct Travis to remove his hands from his pockets.
• At 46:43 – Travis complies.
• At 46:56 – Travis returns his hands to his pockets for the first time.
• At 47:00 – Officers again instruct him to remove his hands.
• At 47:02 – Travis complies.
• At 47:04 – Travis returns his hands to his pockets for the second time (and, at roughly the same moment, Officer Lindo tells him to turn and put his hands on the wall).
• At 47:12 – Eight seconds after the second return to pockets, officers physically begin the frisk.

The district court had found that Travis “returned his hands to his pockets only once before being subjected to a frisk,” and emphasized that he complied with all commands. The Third Circuit corrects this factual and legal framing:

• Factually, the video shows two returns to pockets after commands.
• Legally, the relevant “inception” of the frisk is when officers actually touch Travis to pat him down (47:12), not when an officer first verbally announces or intends to frisk (47:04).

The Court relies on Terry’s directive that we ask whether “the action was justified at its inception” and on Goodrich’s rule that subjective motive or intent is not relevant to objective reasonableness (450 F.3d at 559). As Pittman explains, whether an officer “intended or was prepared to undertake the frisk” earlier is irrelevant.

Thus, by the time the frisk began, the officers had witnessed Travis twice reinsert his hands into his pockets shortly after being told to keep them out. That behavior:

• Commonly signals an effort to conceal or access a weapon; and
• Has been repeatedly recognized by federal courts as a legitimate basis for concern about officer safety.

The Court cites:

• United States v. Hill, 811 F. App’x 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2020): a suspect “returning his hands to his pockets, despite requests not to do so, suggest[ed] that he may have been armed.”
• United States v. Cornelius, 391 F.3d 965, 968 (8th Cir. 2004): refusing to remove hands from pockets justified officers’ fear for safety.
• United States v. Harris, 313 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 2002): reasonable to frisk when a suspect declined to remove his hands from his pockets.

Travis’s behavior fits squarely within the pattern these cases address. Even though he did comply each time when commanded, his repeated returns to his pockets, in quick succession, reasonably heightened the officers’ safety concerns.

3. Contextual factors: time, setting, and prior suspicion

The Court does not evaluate the hand movements “in a vacuum.” It emphasizes that:

• The encounter occurred late at night—a factor that can reasonably enhance officer caution (see Jackson, 120 F.4th at 1224; Johnson, 592 F.3d at 452).
• The officers were responding to a call about suspicious, potentially criminal behavior (trespass and possible vehicle interference).

Under Jackson, courts are instructed that “the time of night” and a suspect’s suspicious conduct are relevant to whether officers reasonably feared the suspect might be armed and dangerous. Here, those contextual factors reinforce the inference drawn from Travis’s hand movements.

4. The district court’s view and the Third Circuit’s response

The district court saw the situation differently: at the time of the frisk, the officers had observed “nothing more than [Travis] complying with multiple commands regarding his hands and mouth covering before putting his hands back into his pockets after having just emptied his pockets on a cold February night.”

The Third Circuit addresses this in two main ways:

1. Reframing “compliance”: While it is technically true that Travis complied each time he was told to remove his hands, this framing “ignores that the officers had to issue the same instruction multiple times in the first place.” Reasonable officers could interpret the repeated need for the same command as “evasive or suspicious conduct” (again citing Jackson).
2. Totality of circumstances: The district court improperly isolated the fact that Travis eventually complied and the cold weather, without giving adequate weight to:
   • The number and rapidity of his returns to pockets;
   • The late-night timing; and
   • The underlying suspicious-trespass tip that brought the officers there.
   Under Terry and Cortez, such piecemeal analysis is precisely what “totality of the circumstances” is meant to avoid.

5. Irrelevance of differential treatment of the unidentified woman

As with the reasonable-suspicion-for-stop analysis, the district court again faulted the officers for treating Travis differently than the woman accompanying him. The Third Circuit again dismisses this as irrelevant:

• Whether or not officers might have been more lenient or probing with the woman does not change the objective level of risk they faced from Travis at the moment they decided to frisk him.
• The proper question is not whether they achieved the “best possible” or “fairest” investigative approach, but whether, objectively, the frisk was reasonable under Terry.

Given Travis’s repeated disregard for the command to keep his hands visible, the late hour, and the suspicious-trespass context, the frisk was justified.

F. Precedents Cited and How They Shape the Decision

1. Terry v. Ohio and its structure

Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), remains the structural backbone of the opinion. The Third Circuit explicitly follows its two-step inquiry:

• Was the seizure (stop) justified at its inception?
• Was the subsequent frisk justified as a protective measure?

The Court also draws from Terry’s emphasis that reasonableness must be judged at the action’s “inception” and that the inquiry is objective.

2. Illinois v. Wardlow and minimally sufficient justification

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), is cited for the proposition that reasonable suspicion requires “at least a minimal level of objective justification.” The Court uses this to emphasize:

• Officers do not have to be certain that a crime is occurring;
• They merely need enough specific, articulable facts to suspect that “criminal activity may be afoot.”

The guard’s tip easily meets this standard.

3. United States v. Brown, Cortez, and totality analysis

Brown, 448 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2006), and Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), are used to reinforce that:

• Courts must view the “whole picture,” not isolated pieces;
• Reasonable suspicion may arise from a combination of individually innocent facts; and
• The standard is objective: what would a reasonable officer think under these circumstances?

The district court’s approach—minimizing the trespass aspect of the tip, downplaying the suspicious nature of checking car doors, and disregarding context in evaluating the frisk—is depicted as inconsistent with this holistic approach.

4. United States v. Ubiles and lawful conduct

Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2000), is often cited by defendants to argue that officers cannot stop someone merely for engaging in lawful behavior (there, possessing a gun in a jurisdiction where gun possession was not by itself unlawful). Travis invoked a similar logic—“peering into cars” is legal.

The Third Circuit turns Ubiles to the government’s advantage by quoting its clarifying language: reasonable suspicion can arise from exclusively legal activity. The difference is that, unlike in Ubiles, the activity here (repeated trespass attempts plus parking-lot prowling) has a strong nexus to specific criminal offenses (defiant trespass, attempted vehicle entry).

5. Informant reliability cases: Nelson, Valentine, Goodrich, Torres, and McCants

• Nelson (284 F.3d 472) and Valentine (232 F.3d 350) recognize that identified citizen-informants—especially crime victims, witnesses, and, by analogy, security guards—can provide sufficiently reliable tips to justify stops without requiring extensive corroboration.
• Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552, elaborates on factors that enhance reliability and underscores that subjective officer motives are irrelevant; the Third Circuit invokes this in rejecting the district court’s focus on when the officer decided to frisk.
• Torres, 961 F.3d 618, supplies a flexible, non-exhaustive list of reliability indicia, which the Court applies to the guard’s tip.
• McCants, 952 F.3d 416, supports the conclusion that “the absence of corroborative evidence does not negate the reasonable suspicion” created by an otherwise reliable tip.

6. Seizure and submission cases: Haberle and Brown

Haberle, 885 F.3d 170, and Brown, 448 F.3d 239, inform the seizure analysis:

• A seizure occurs when officers communicate, by word or action, that compliance is required, and the suspect submits.
• Blocking a suspect’s movement, issuing direct commands about physical posture, and telling him he cannot enter a building are classic markers of a seizure.

7. The frisk cases: Gatlin, Johnson, Jackson, Hill, Cornelius, Harris, and Pittman

Together, these cases structure the frisk analysis:

• Gatlin, 613 F.3d 374 – stops and frisks require independent justifications.
• Johnson, 592 F.3d 442 – the totality of context, including time and setting, matters to whether an officer reasonably fears a suspect is armed.
• Jackson, 120 F.4th 1210 – underscores the relevance of late-night circumstances and suspicious conduct in evaluating frisks.
• Hill, Cornelius, and Harris – anchor the specific proposition that refusals (or repeated failures) to keep hands visible, despite police instructions, are valid grounds for a protective pat-down.
• Pittman, 338 F. App’x 147 – reinforces that the timing of a frisk is assessed objectively; the officer’s subjective decision point is irrelevant.

G. Simplifying Key Doctrines and Concepts

1. What is a “Terry stop”?

A Terry stop is a brief detention by police—short of a full-blown arrest—based on reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity. The person is not free to leave, but the stop is limited in time and scope to investigating the suspected offense.

2. What is a “frisk” under Terry?

A frisk (or pat-down) is a limited, external search of a person’s outer clothing for weapons, not for evidence of crime. It is justified only when, in addition to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, officers have specific reasons to believe the person may be armed and dangerous.

3. Reasonable suspicion vs. probable cause

• Reasonable suspicion – a lower standard; a reasonable officer, given specific facts, suspects that criminal activity “may be afoot.” It allows a brief stop and, if supported, a frisk.
• Probable cause – higher standard; based on the facts, there is a fair probability that the person committed a crime or that evidence will be found. It is required for arrests and full searches (subject to exceptions).

4. Citizen-informant vs. anonymous tipster

• Citizen-informant: Someone who identifies themselves (or is easily traceable), such as a victim, witness, or security guard. Courts generally presume they are more reliable because they can be held accountable.
• Anonymous tipster: Someone whose identity is unknown and cannot be traced. Their tips require independent corroboration because they may lie with impunity.

5. Defiant trespass under New Jersey law

In New Jersey, defiant trespass (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:18-3(b)) occurs when a person, knowing that he is not allowed to be there, enters or remains on property where notice against trespass has been given (e.g., after being told to leave, after seeing signs, etc.).

In Travis, the guard’s report that he had been “kicked out already” and was still trying to get in gave officers a reasonable basis to suspect defiant trespass.

6. Why do repeated hand-in-pocket movements matter?

From an officer-safety standpoint, hands are critical: a concealed hand can hold a weapon. When a suspect:

• Is told to keep his hands visible but repeatedly returns them to his pockets,
• Especially during a nighttime, suspicious-activity call,

officers reasonably fear he may be reaching for or adjusting a weapon. Courts across circuits recognize this as a legitimate factor supporting a frisk.

V. Potential Impact and Future Applications

A. Persuasive guidance despite non-precedential status

Although labeled “NOT PRECEDENTIAL” and thus not binding under the Third Circuit’s internal operating procedures, Travis is detailed, carefully reasoned, and tightly connected to published authority. It will likely be:

• Cited by prosecutors and trial courts within the Third Circuit as persuasive authority, especially in cases involving:
  • Security-guard or property-manager 911 calls;
  • Suspicious behavior on private property; and
  • Repeated hand-to-pocket movements during police encounters.
• Used by defense counsel to highlight the need for clear documentation (e.g., body camera timestamps) when contesting factual findings about when a frisk began or what movements occurred.

B. Clarifying standards for security-guard and property-based tips

The decision provides practical guidance for law enforcement and property managers:

• Security guards as “reliable” informants: On-duty guards who personally interact with officers, have access to surveillance, and can be identified are strong candidates for the “inherently reliable” category. Officers may rely on their 911 reports as a basis for reasonable suspicion without first subpoenaing or personally viewing camera footage.
• Trespass plus suspicious vehicle behavior: A combination of “kicked out” plus continued presence and probing of vehicles is likely enough for a Terry stop in similar fact patterns.

As a result, police responding to calls from building staff or private security about suspected trespassers or prowlers can feel more confident that, if they act within Terry’s bounds, courts will not demand corroboration beyond the informant’s on-scene statements.

C. Strengthening the hand-in-pockets line of cases

Travis adds a Third Circuit appellate-level (though non-precedential) endorsement to a line of authority holding that:

• Refusal—or repeated failure—to keep hands visible, after clear police instructions, is a significant factor supporting a frisk.

Future cases involving:

• Repeated reaching toward waistbands;
• Refusal to remove hands from pockets; or
• Recurrent movements toward concealed areas (bags, belts, etc.)

will likely invoke Travis alongside published cases like Jackson, Hill, Cornelius, and Harris to argue that officers reasonably feared the suspect might be armed.

D. Boundary-setting on “poor investigation” arguments

Defense counsel sometimes argue that officers lacked reasonable suspicion because they failed to exhaust obvious investigative alternatives (e.g., asking more questions, verifying alibis, checking IDs). Travis resists importing that kind of “best practices” critique into the constitutional analysis:

• The Fourth Amendment governs whether officers had enough objective information to act, not whether they acted optimally or equitably once they had it.
• Differential treatment of similarly situated bystanders may raise other concerns (e.g., Equal Protection), but it does not negate the reasonable suspicion as to the person actually stopped and frisked.

This aspect of the opinion may constrain future attempts to defeat reasonable suspicion based on arguments that the police investigation was incomplete or could have quickly dispelled suspicion if done differently.

E. Interaction with Ubiles and gun-possession cases

Ubiles remains an important constraint where the only fact is lawful gun possession in a jurisdiction where carrying is legal. Travis does not dilute that principle. Instead, it illustrates:

• That Ubiles protects lawful status-based conduct (e.g., mere gun possession where legal) from being treated alone as suspicious; but
• Where there is reported criminal behavior (defiant trespass, suspicious prowling), even “innocent” aspects (like looking into cars) can help form reasonable suspicion.

In gun cases, Travis will likely be used to argue that once officers have a legitimate basis for a stop, additional safety-related behavior (e.g., repeated reaching into pockets) can justify a frisk even if the initial observed conduct was not plainly illegal.

F. Policy and civil-liberties implications

From a civil-liberties perspective, Travis raises familiar tensions:

• Allowing reasonable suspicion based partly on lawful behavior (like peering into cars) risks broadening police discretion, particularly in areas with heavy security presence.
• Permitting officers to frisk based on hand movements alone, in the context of a suspicious-activity call, prioritizes officer safety but may normalize intrusive searches in borderline cases.

However, the opinion also:

• Insists that tips must still point toward illegal activity in context;
• Demands meaningful indicia of reliability for citizen-informant tips;
• Separates the stop from the frisk and requires independent justification for each; and
• Maintains the objective, fact-bound nature of the reasonable-suspicion analysis.

These constraints aim to keep Terry from collapsing into unfettered discretion while still giving officers workable tools to respond to nighttime security calls and potentially armed suspects.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Devin Travis offers a clear, structured application of Terry principles to a modern urban security setting. The Third Circuit holds that:

• A building security guard’s real-time 911 report that a man repeatedly tried to re-enter after being “kicked out” and was circling the parking lot checking car doors supplied reasonable suspicion of criminal trespass and related activity.
• The guard’s status, access to surveillance, on-scene confirmation, and accountability rendered her tip inherently reliable, obviating the need for additional corroboration before officers could act.
• Reasonable suspicion is evaluated at the moment of seizure; later benign explanations do not retroactively erase it.
• The frisk required a separate justification, which was satisfied by Travis’s repeated returns of his hands to his pockets after commands to keep them visible, in the context of a late-night suspicious-activity call.
• The officers’ comparative treatment of a bystander and the alleged “quality” of their investigation are irrelevant to the constitutional question.

Even as a non-precedential opinion, Travis refines the law of citizen-informant tips and Terry frisks within the Third Circuit. It underscores that:

• Reliable, on-scene security personnel can provide sufficient grounds for investigative stops without exhaustive corroboration; and
• Repeated non-compliance (or partial compliance) with hand-visibility commands in a suspicious context can justifiably trigger a protective pat-down.

In the broader Fourth Amendment landscape, the opinion reaffirms the centrality of objective, context-sensitive analysis under Terry, while illustrating how courts will likely treat similar combinations of security-guard tips and suspect hand movements going forward.