Circumstantial Proof of Knowledge in Aggravated Identity Theft: United States v. Aceituno

Introduction

United States v. Aceituno (1st Cir. June 2, 2025) addresses the sufficiency of evidence required to prove the “knowing” element of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Appellant Lester Aceituno challenged both the district court’s denial of his Rule 29 motion—arguing insufficient proof that he knew the identities belonged to real persons—and alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. The First Circuit rejected both arguments, affirming a 30-month sentence on convictions for conspiracy to commit bank fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349) and two counts of aggravated identity theft. Key issues include:

How much circumstantial evidence is required to show knowledge of another’s identity?
What role do repeated verifications and bank procedures play in inferring knowledge?
When does a prosecutor’s rebuttal cross the line into misconduct?

The parties at trial were the United States (appellee), represented by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and Lester Aceituno (appellant), represented by the Federal Public Defender’s Office. Judge Landya B. McCafferty presided below; the panel on appeal consisted of Judges Gelpí, Lynch, and Thompson.

Summary of the Judgment

The First Circuit affirmed Aceituno’s convictions, holding:

Sufficient evidence—viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict—supported a finding that Aceituno “knowingly” used real persons’ identifying information by submitting stolen names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and counterfeit IDs to banks and mailboxes that ran those data through verification systems.
The district court properly denied the Rule 29 motion; circumstantial evidence of repeated submissions to ChexSystems, signature-card certifications, and knowledge gleaned from co-conspirator testimony met the “knowing” threshold under Flores-Figueroa v. United States.
No prosecutorial misconduct occurred. The government’s closing arguments drew reasonable inferences from the record, and its rebuttal to defense counsel’s extraneous historical analogies did not impair the trial’s fairness.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Flores-Figueroa v. United States (556 U.S. 646, 2009): Holds that aggravated identity theft under § 1028A requires proof that the defendant knew the “means of identification” belonged to “another person.”
United States v. Valerio (676 F.3d 237, 1st Cir. 2012): Affirms that repeated submission of stolen identities to verification systems—showing a “willingness” to face scrutiny—supports an inference of knowledge.
United States v. Soto (720 F.3d 51, 1st Cir. 2013): Finds knowledge where co-conspirators explained that only real identities would open accounts, establishing a shared understanding of the scheme’s reliance on authenticity.
United States v. Morel (885 F.3d 17, 1st Cir. 2018): Recognizes circumstantial evidence in tax refund fraud contexts as sufficient to prove the knowing use of real identities.
United States v. Agosto-Vega (617 F.3d 541, 1st Cir. 2010): Confirms that knowledge often must be established circumstantially in identity-theft prosecutions.
United States v. Godin (534 F.3d 51, 1st Cir. 2008): Contrasts circumstances where fabricated numbers—rather than real identities—led to acquittal; distinguished in Aceituno because here real persons’ data were used.
United States v. Carmona (103 F.4th 83, 1st Cir. 2024) and Concepcion-Guliam (62 F.4th 26, 1st Cir. 2023): Define the standard of viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied de novo review to the sufficiency challenge and plain-error review to the prosecutorial misconduct claim. Central to its reasoning:

Circumstantial Evidence of Knowledge: Aceituno opened at least four Eastern Bank accounts and one mailbox, each time signing forms certifying under penalty of perjury that the Social Security numbers were correct. Eastern Bank’s policies required verbal and posted warnings that it would run customer data through ChexSystems. Aceituno observed these warnings, yet proceeded—reinforcing an inference he knew the identities were real.
Repeated Submissions: The court emphasized that Aceituno’s multiple attempts—five or more—to verify identities through a government-linked database solidified the jury’s inference of knowledge, echoing Valerio and Morel.
Conspiratorial Context: Testimony from co-conspirator Chinedu Ihejiere established that “Abby” (the scheme leader) made clear the necessity of real identities to open accounts, and that Aceituno participated in that process firsthand.
Rejection of Direct-Evidence Requirement: The opinion reaffirmed that neither direct admissions nor personal generation of stolen data are required. Knowledge “frequently cannot be proven in any other way” than circumstantial proof of conscious risk.
Closing-Argument Review: Prosecutor remarks about bank warnings were fair inferences from Childs’s testimony. The rebuttal—calling out defense references to tsunamis and Sir Walter Raleigh—stood as legitimate efforts to refocus jurors on the evidence, without denigrating defense counsel.

Impact

United States v. Aceituno clarifies and strengthens the precedent for proving the “knowing” element of aggravated identity theft by:

Validating the use of procedural warnings (e.g., ChexSystems notices) as circumstantial evidence of knowledge.
Confirming that multiple identity-verification attempts may cumulatively satisfy the mens rea requirement.
Reinforcing that a defendant’s mere participation in a fraud scheme—coupled with awareness of verification steps—can establish knowledge without direct proof.
Guiding prosecutors to focus on documentary and testimonial evidence about bank policies and co-conspirator admissions in similar cases.
Advising defense counsel on the limits of closing-argument analogies: courts will tolerate rebuttals that aim to keep jurors grounded in the record.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Aggravated Identity Theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A): An offense requiring that a defendant knowingly transfer, possess, or use another person’s identifying information in connection with certain predicate felonies (e.g., bank fraud).
Rule 29 Motion: A request for acquittal at the close of the government’s case (or at trial’s end), arguing insufficient evidence to sustain the charges.
ChexSystems: A consumer reporting agency that banks use to confirm Social Security numbers and other identity information before opening deposit accounts.
Plain-Error Review: An appellate standard applied when no timely objection was made at trial. The defendant must show a clear or obvious error that affected substantial rights and the fairness of the proceedings.
Circumstantial Evidence of Knowledge: Indirect proof that a defendant understood the nature of the identity information—here, drawn from repeated verifications, certifications under penalty of perjury, and co-conspirator testimony.

Conclusion

United States v. Aceituno cements the principle that courts may infer a defendant’s knowledge of real identities from their repeated submission of stolen data to formal verification systems and from corroborating co-conspirator testimony. By affirming that no single piece of direct evidence is required, the decision broadens prosecutorial tools in aggravated identity theft cases and clarifies defense contours. Simultaneously, it reaffirms prosecutorial latitude in closing argument so long as rebuttals remain tethered to the record. As a precedent, Aceituno will guide both prosecutors and defense counsel in evidentiary strategies and argumentation when knowledge of identity authenticity is in dispute.