Inferring Animal Pain from Circumstantial Evidence in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings:
A Detailed Commentary on State v. Johnathan Ruiz, Vt. Supreme Court (Nov. 7, 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Vermont Supreme Court’s three-justice entry order in State v. Johnathan Ruiz, Case No. 25-AP-084 (Nov. Term 2025), affirming a civil animal-forfeiture order under 13 V.S.A. § 354. Although the Court expressly notes that three-justice panel decisions are not precedential “before any tribunal,” the order provides significant guidance on:

• How “cruelty” is proven in a civil forfeiture proceeding under 13 V.S.A. §§ 352, 354;
• The evidentiary standard—“clear and convincing evidence”—in such proceedings;
• When a court may infer that an animal experienced physical pain or suffering based solely on eyewitness descriptions of violent conduct, without veterinary or expert testimony;
• The interaction between civil animal forfeiture and ongoing criminal prosecutions.

The defendant, Johnathan Ruiz, owned a young, large Cane Corso dog named Galaxy. After multiple neighbors and bystanders witnessed episodes where Ruiz kicked, punched, dragged, and dropped the dog, the State charged Ruiz criminally with two misdemeanor counts of cruelty to animals under 13 V.S.A. § 352 and, in parallel, sought civil forfeiture of Galaxy under 13 V.S.A. § 354. The Superior Court (Washington Unit, Criminal Division) granted the forfeiture, and Ruiz appealed.

The appellate issue was narrow but important: whether there was sufficient evidence, under the “clear and convincing” standard, to support the trial court’s conclusion that Ruiz’s conduct caused Galaxy “physical pain or suffering” within the meaning of the animal-cruelty statutes, where the State offered only lay eyewitness testimony and no veterinary or expert evidence.

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the forfeiture order, holding that the trial court could reasonably infer physical pain and suffering from the nature and violence of Ruiz’s acts—kicking, punching, dragging by the neck, and dropping the dog from several feet—without any additional “independent evidence” such as expert opinion, medical records, or a particular quantum of whimpering or crying from the animal.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

The trial court held multiple evidentiary hearings at which several witnesses testified:

• Ownership and context. Defendant lived in an apartment in downtown Montpelier and owned Galaxy, a male Cane Corso with a brindle coat. Galaxy was about eight months old and weighed approximately 80 pounds in May 2024.
• July 9, 2024 incident.
  • A witness with a clear, close view saw Ruiz walking Galaxy. She testified that Ruiz:
    • Yelled at Galaxy with profanity-laced commands;
    • Grabbed the leash, dragged Galaxy along the ground, and at times by the neck along asphalt;
    • Lifted Galaxy “well clear” of the ground and then sharply dropped him to the ground with a brisk arm motion;
    • Kicked and punched Galaxy multiple times with forceful, aggressive kicks and punches;
    • Heard Galaxy squeal at least once.
  • A second witness, from her apartment, heard yelling and saw a man with a large dog (matching Galaxy’s description) swearing, pulling the dog by the neck leash, and delivering one or more brisk kicks. She could not positively identify Ruiz, but her account corroborated the first witness’s description of the conduct.
  • Police responded to calls that day but did not locate the individual.
• September 2024 incident.
  • After Galaxy urinated in Ruiz’s apartment, Ruiz took the dog outside and tied him to a tree by a leash.
  • Ruiz’s upstairs neighbor, who recognized his voice and knew him personally, looked out and saw Ruiz drag Galaxy—which was lying on its side—to a tree and then deliver three hard kicks to the restrained dog.
  • After police visited, the neighbor heard Ruiz back inside his apartment yelling something like, “you made the police come here—look what you did,” followed by banging sounds and the dog whimpering and crying. She called police again.
  • Another witness saw a man kicking a dog on the sidewalk, yelled “hey,” and had a face-to-face interaction when the man turned toward her. She later identified Ruiz as the person she had seen.
• Police ultimately obtained a search warrant and seized Galaxy. The State then pursued civil forfeiture under § 354, in addition to filing criminal cruelty charges under § 352.

B. Trial Court’s Conclusion

Based on these findings, the trial court held that the State had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ruiz “tortured or tormented” Galaxy in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 352, as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 351(10) (acts causing physical pain, suffering, or death to an animal). It emphasized:

• The deliberate, repeated, and forceful nature of the kicks, likened to kicking a soccer ball;
• The repeated dragging of an 80-pound dog by a neck leash along the ground and asphalt;
• The act of lifting the dog several feet in the air and dropping him sideways onto the ground;
• The extended duration (7–10 minutes) of some of the abusive conduct; and
• The dog’s squeal and subsequent whimpering/crying, alongside the physical actions observed.

The trial court found these actions caused “needless and excessive physical pain or suffering” and ordered immediate forfeiture of Galaxy to the City of Montpelier (or its designee) under § 354, including authority to place the dog with a new owner and to recoup care costs under § 354(g)(1).

C. Issue on Appeal and Holding

On appeal, Ruiz did not seriously contest identity or the factual findings regarding what he did. Instead, he argued:

• There was insufficient evidence that his conduct caused Galaxy “physical pain or suffering.”
• The court improperly “inferred” pain from the conduct without “independent” proof that Galaxy experienced pain, such as extensive crying, veterinary testimony, or other expert evidence.

The Vermont Supreme Court rejected these arguments and affirmed:

• The clear-and-convincing standard does not require independent or expert proof of animal pain;
• Neither § 351(10) nor § 354 requires that the animal vocalize (squeal, whimper) at all, let alone at some particular intensity or frequency;
• The trial court could reasonably infer from the nature and violence of the acts themselves—to an 80-pound dog—that physical pain or suffering was “highly probable.”

The Court concluded pointedly: “No reasonable person could conclude otherwise.”

III. Statutory and Procedural Framework

A. The Animal-Cruelty Statutes

• 13 V.S.A. § 352 – criminal cruelty to animals. Among other things, a person commits cruelty if they “torture,” “torment,” or “cruelly harm” an animal.
• 13 V.S.A. § 351(10) – defines “torture” or “torment” in relevant part as:

  “an act by an animal owner . . . whereby physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted to be caused to an animal.”

• 13 V.S.A. § 354(f)(1) – civil forfeiture standard:

  The State bears the burden “of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the animal was subject to cruelty, neglect, or abandonment in violation of section 352 or 352a.”

B. Civil Forfeiture Independent of Criminal Prosecution

The forfeiture proceeding runs independently of any criminal prosecution:

• 13 V.S.A. § 354(d) – the forfeiture proceeding “shall not be delayed pending disposition of any criminal proceeding.”
• 13 V.S.A. § 354(f)(3) – provides use immunity for a defendant’s testimony or information given in the forfeiture case; it cannot be used against the defendant in a criminal case (except for perjury/false statement).

Thus, in Ruiz, the forfeiture could proceed and be decided while the misdemeanor criminal charges were still pending, and Ruiz could participate in the forfeiture hearing without automatically incriminating himself for the criminal trial.

C. Clear and Convincing Evidence

The court, citing In re N.H., 168 Vt. 508, 512 (1998), reiterates that “clear and convincing evidence” means the existence of the contested facts must be “highly probable.” This standard is:

• Higher than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard used in ordinary civil cases (more likely than not);
• Lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” used in criminal prosecutions.

The forfeiture statute thus creates a relatively demanding evidentiary threshold for the State, reflecting the seriousness of depriving an owner of property (here, a companion animal), but still below the criminal standard.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Deferential Appellate Review of Factual Findings

The Court starts by emphasizing its deferential standard of review:

• Citing Jackson v. Jackson, 2025 VT 29, ¶ 22, the Court notes that it will uphold the trial court’s conclusions where they are “reasonably drawn from the evidence presented.”
• Citing Vermont Women’s Health Center v. Operation Rescue, 159 Vt. 141, 147 (1992), it explains that even under the clear-and-convincing standard, appellate review focuses on whether there is “substantial evidence” to support the findings.
• The Court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party” and defers to the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility and weight of the evidence.

This framework is crucial: Ruiz’s argument did not allege that witnesses were incredible or that the trial court misdescribed their testimony; he instead contested the inference of pain from that testimony. The Court treats that inference as part of the trial court’s factfinding, subject to deferential review.

B. No Requirement of “Independent” or Expert Evidence of Animal Pain

Ruiz argued that the trial court could not infer physical pain from the violent acts alone, and that the dog’s pain had to be proven by additional evidence—such as:

• More extensive vocalization (e.g., prolonged crying or whimpering);
• Veterinary or medical evidence documenting injuries or signs of pain;
• Expert testimony about canine responses to forceful kicking or dragging;
• Some broader category of “independent evidence” beyond descriptions of the acts themselves.

The Court firmly rejects this reading:

• The statutes, 13 V.S.A. §§ 351(10) and 354, contain no requirement of independent or expert corroboration;
• Nothing in the statutory text implies that vocalization is necessary or that a specific amount of squealing or crying must be shown;
• Nothing requires that pain be proven only through direct evidence (e.g., explicit testimony that “the dog was obviously in pain” from a vet).

Instead, pain and suffering may be established through circumstantial evidence, including the observable nature and degree of force used against the animal. This is entirely consistent with how courts treat pain in human assault cases.

C. Relying on Circumstantial Evidence: Analogy to Human Assault Cases

The Court cites State v. Alers, 2015 VT 74, ¶¶ 23–24, 199 Vt. 373, which held that physical pain can be shown circumstantially and that a factfinder may infer pain or injury from the nature of an assault even without direct testimony about pain. Applying this analogy to animal cruelty:

• If a human victim is repeatedly kicked in the stomach with force, dragged, and dropped from a height, a jury is permitted to infer physical pain without needing a medical expert;
• Similarly, where an 80-pound dog is:
  • Kicked with “full swings” like kicking a soccer ball;
  • Punched multiple times;
  • Dragged along asphalt by a neck leash while resisting;
  • Dropped from several feet in the air onto its side;
  the trial court can infer that such conduct causes physical pain and suffering.
• The dog’s squeal and subsequent whimpering are supportive, but not determinative, factors.

The Court’s statement that “[n]o reasonable person could conclude otherwise” underscores that, at some level of obvious violence, an inference of pain is not only permissible but virtually compelled.

D. Responding to Defendant’s Reliance on Out-of-State Authority

The trial court had noted that other jurisdictions have upheld animal-cruelty convictions based on similar conduct. The Supreme Court references one such case:

• People v. Minutolo, 215 A.D.3d 1260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023) – where video and witness testimony showed the defendant punching a dog three to five times while the animal whimpered and cried. The New York court found the evidence legally sufficient to show the dog was “cruelly beat[en].”

The Vermont court clarifies that Minutolo did not hold that vocalization (whimpering, crying) is required to prove abuse; it was simply part of the evidence in that case. Each case must be decided on its own facts; there is no rigid rule requiring a particular form or degree of audible distress.

E. Integration with Vermont Animal-Cruelty Precedent

The Court situates this case within its evolving animal-cruelty jurisprudence, particularly:

• State v. Washburn, 2024 VT 45, 219 Vt. 552 – where the Court upheld findings of cruelty based on:
  • Denial of drinking water for long periods;
  • Frequent restraint in small cages;
  • Inadequate medical care, nutrient deficiency, parasites, dehydration, and underweight condition.

  In Washburn, the cruelty involved neglect and long-term improper care. The Court there noted that cruelty could be shown in “a variety of circumstances,” including chronic deprivation.

In Ruiz, the cruelty is of a different type: direct, acute physical abuse rather than chronic neglect. The Court’s reasoning confirms that:

• Washburn-type evidence (starvation, medical neglect, confinement conditions) is one way to prove cruelty;
• But overt acts of violence—kicking, punching, dragging, dropping—are another, equally valid basis;
• Physical abuse does not require showing long-term injury, permanent disability, or visible wounds to qualify as cruelty; temporary but intense pain or suffering suffices.

V. Precedents and Authorities Discussed

A. Vermont Cases on Evidence and Standards of Proof

1. Jackson v. Jackson as Trustee, 2025 VT 29
   • Cited for the proposition that appellate courts sustain trial court conclusions if reasonably drawn from the evidence.
   • Illustrates the deferential standard applied to factfinding even in higher-burden civil cases.
   • In Ruiz, this supports affirming the trial court’s inference of pain from the conduct described.
2. Vermont Women’s Health Center v. Operation Rescue, 159 Vt. 141 (1992)
   • Key case on the clear-and-convincing standard in Vermont civil proceedings.
   • Holds that findings may be upheld if supported by “substantial evidence” even when contradicted by other credible evidence.
   • In Ruiz, this underscores that the presence of some conflicting or mitigating evidence does not defeat a clear-and-convincing finding so long as the record as a whole supports it.
3. In re N.H., 168 Vt. 508 (1998)
   • Defines “clear and convincing” as requiring that contested facts be “highly probable.”
   • Used in Ruiz to articulate the precision of the burden the State must meet in forfeiture proceedings.
4. State v. Washburn, 2024 VT 45, 219 Vt. 552
   • Recent animal-cruelty case concerning neglect and poor conditions.
   • Demonstrates that clear-and-convincing evidence of cruelty can arise from:
     • Denial of water;
     • Inadequate medical treatment;
     • Underweight, nutrient-deficient, and parasite-ridden animals.
   • Ruiz extends the reasoning to direct physical abuse, confirming that cruelty includes both neglect-based and abuse-based scenarios.
5. State v. Alers, 2015 VT 74, 199 Vt. 373
   • Assault case involving human victims; held that pain can be proven through circumstantial evidence and inferred from the nature of the assault.
   • Provides the doctrinal bridge allowing the Court in Ruiz to rely on the same reasoning for animals: if the conduct would plainly cause pain to a human, the factfinder may infer pain to an animal.

B. Out-of-State Case

6. People v. Minutolo, 215 A.D.3d 1260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)
   • New York case upholding a conviction where the defendant punched a dog multiple times while it whimpered and cried, based on video and witness testimony.
   • In Ruiz, cited to show that intentional striking or kicking of an animal with sufficient force to cause substantial pain is widely recognized as actionable cruelty.
   • The Vermont Court is careful to note that Minutolo did not impose a requirement that the victim animal must audibly cry or whimper for cruelty to be proven.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Civil vs. Criminal Proceedings in Animal Cruelty

• Criminal charge (13 V.S.A. § 352):
  • Focuses on punishing the defendant (jail, probation, fines).
  • Standard of proof: beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Constitutional protections (e.g., Fifth Amendment) fully apply.
• Civil forfeiture (13 V.S.A. § 354):
  • Focuses on the status and welfare of the animal, not punishment per se;
  • Standard of proof: clear and convincing evidence;
  • Proceeding is independent from the criminal case and can move forward while criminal charges are pending.
• Use immunity (13 V.S.A. § 354(f)(3)):
  • Protects a defendant from having their civil-forfeiture testimony used against them in a criminal case, reducing the self-incrimination risk of participating in the forfeiture hearing.

B. “Torture” and “Torment” Under Vermont Law

“Torture” or “torment” (13 V.S.A. § 351(10)) essentially means any act by an owner that causes physical pain, suffering, or death to an animal. Important points:

• Not limited to causing visible injury or long-term disability;
• Includes needless or excessive pain inflicted in the moment, such as repeated hard kicks;
• Covers both acts and omissions (e.g., failing to provide water or medical care where suffering results).

C. Circumstantial vs. Direct Evidence

• Direct evidence – directly proves a fact, e.g., a vet testifying “the dog had a broken rib causing obvious pain,” or a recording of the defendant admitting “I kicked him because I wanted him to feel pain.”
• Circumstantial evidence – suggests a fact by reasonable inference, e.g.:
  • Witnesses see a person kicking a dog in the stomach repeatedly with great force;
  • The dog squeals and later whimpers;
  • From these facts, one infers the dog experienced pain.

Ruiz confirms that circumstantial evidence can be enough to meet the clear-and-convincing standard in animal cruelty and forfeiture cases.

D. “Nonprecedential” Entry Orders

The opinion begins with a standard Vermont warning: “Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.” This means:

• The decision does not formally bind future Vermont courts as controlling authority;
• Courts and litigants may still find it persuasive, especially because it relies heavily on, and is consistent with, precedential cases like Washburn and Alers;
• It offers a strong indication of how the Vermont Supreme Court is likely to apply those precedents in similar fact patterns.

VII. Impact and Future Implications

A. Evidentiary Threshold in Animal Forfeiture Cases

The central practical takeaway is that in Vermont civil animal-forfeiture proceedings:

• Eyewitness descriptions of direct, violent physical abuse (kicking, punching, dragging, dropping) can, by themselves, satisfy the clear-and-convincing standard that an animal was subjected to cruelty;
• The State is not required to produce:
  • Veterinary records;
  • Expert opinions on canine pain;
  • Photographs of injuries;
  • Extensive audio evidence of animal crying;
  although such evidence will often be helpful.

This significantly strengthens the practical enforceability of Vermont’s animal-protection regime, particularly in urban contexts where bystanders directly observe abuse.

B. Guidance for Prosecutors and Law Enforcement

• Police should promptly document eyewitness accounts of overt abuse (with statements, bodycam, or other recordings) even if no obvious injury is visible; such testimony may be enough to support forfeiture.
• Prosecutors can more confidently pursue forfeiture in cases of acute physical abuse, even without expert testimony, provided the lay witnesses can describe the conduct in detail.
• Minimally, evidence like:
  • Number and force of kicks or punches;
  • Size and weight of the animal;
  • Distance and manner of being dragged or dropped;
  • Duration of the incident;
  • Any sounds (squeals, whimpers);
  should be elicited on the record.

C. Implications for Defense Strategy

• Challenges focusing solely on the lack of expert or medical proof of injury are unlikely to succeed where the observed conduct is itself obviously violent.
• Defenses may need to shift toward:
  • Challenging witness credibility or vantage point;
  • Re-characterizing the conduct (e.g., arguing reasonable discipline or accidental contact, where facts permit);
  • Arguing that the acts did not rise to the level of “needless and excessive” pain under the statutory definition.

D. Broader Animal-Welfare Jurisprudence

Ruiz, though nonprecedential, continues Vermont’s broader trend of:

• Treating animals as sentient beings capable of suffering, rather than as mere property;
• Allowing courts to draw common-sense inferences about animal pain from human experience with violence;
• Recognizing the State’s strong interest in removing animals from abusive owners even before criminal convictions are finalized.

By tying the analysis to existing, precedential cases like Washburn and Alers, the Court ensures its reasoning is anchored in established law, making it a persuasive reference for future trial courts facing similar fact patterns.

VIII. Conclusion

State v. Ruiz clarifies, in the context of Vermont’s civil animal-forfeiture statute, that:

• Physical pain or suffering to an animal can be proven by circumstantial evidence alone.
• Where an owner repeatedly kicks, punches, drags by the neck, and drops a substantial dog with evident force over several minutes, a trial court may reasonably infer that the animal experienced physical pain and suffering.
• Neither the statute nor case law requires:
  • Expert or veterinary testimony;
  • A particular level of whimpering or crying;
  • Any additional “independent” proof of pain beyond detailed eyewitness accounts of the abusive acts.
• Under a deferential standard of review, appellate courts will uphold such inferences where the acts themselves obviously would cause pain to a sentient creature.

Although this is a three-justice entry order and therefore nonprecedential, it is highly consistent with and builds upon precedential decisions such as Washburn and Alers. As such, it offers powerful guidance to Vermont courts and practitioners: in animal cruelty and forfeiture cases, common-sense inferences about pain from violent conduct are not only permissible but in some circumstances inescapable.