Circumstantial Proof Can Sustain § 841(b)(1)(C) “Death Results” Liability Despite Postmortem-Redistribution Uncertainty

1. Introduction

In United States v. Lawrence Coley, III (11th Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Lawrence Coley III’s conviction for distribution of fentanyl resulting in death (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C)) and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl. The appeal focused on a single question: whether the district court should have granted Coley’s Rule 29 motion because the evidence was allegedly insufficient to prove that Coley distributed fentanyl to Gerald Conner and that Conner’s death “result[ed] from” using that fentanyl.

The case arose from Conner’s death after a morning exchange indicating a meetup and an $80 Cash App payment to Coley, followed by toxicology showing fentanyl (and fluorofentanyl) in Conner’s blood. The defense emphasized gaps: no video of the meetup, no drugs found in the car, uncertainty about what Conner did throughout the day, and expert testimony that postmortem redistribution could inflate the fentanyl concentration measured at autopsy—particularly where chest (central) blood, not femoral (peripheral) blood, was tested.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, it held a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Coley distributed fentanyl to Conner on the day of Conner’s death and (2) Conner’s use of that fentanyl was the but-for cause of death for purposes of the § 841(b)(1)(C) “death results” enhancement element. The panel treated the government’s proof as a coherent circumstantial chain: the text messages arranging a meet, Conner’s “I see you,” the contemporaneous $80 Cash App transfer, the long-standing pattern of drug-related transfers to Coley (and to no one else), testimony that Conner obtained pills from Coley, and toxicology consistent with a fentanyl overdose even accounting for postmortem redistribution.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Beach, 80 F.4th 1245 (11th Cir. 2023)
- Role in the opinion: Beach provided the appellate framework: de novo review of sufficiency/Rule 29 denials, evidence viewed in the government’s favor, and affirmance if any reasonable construction supports guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Doctrinal effect here: Beach’s deferential posture toward jury verdicts was outcome-determinative. The panel repeatedly relied on the principle that the government need not “disprove every potential hypothesis,” and credibility choices belong to the jury.
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014)
- Role in the opinion: Burrage supplied the governing causation rule for § 841(b)(1)(C): the government must prove the victim’s use of the distributed drug was the but-for cause of death, and because the enhancement raises statutory minimums and maximums, it is an element to be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Doctrinal effect here: The panel framed the sufficiency question around Burrage’s but-for requirement, then concluded the jury could rationally find fentanyl use caused death even amid medical uncertainty (e.g., possible alternate causes not definitively excluded).
United States v. Guevara, 894 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2018)
- Role in the opinion: Guevara was cited for the proposition that sufficiency review treats direct and circumstantial evidence the same—no discount for circumstantial proof.
- Doctrinal effect here: This principle allowed the panel to treat texts, payment records, course-of-dealing evidence, and later controlled buys as capable of proving distribution and causation without an eyewitness to the fatal transaction.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning is best understood as two linked sufficiency determinations: distribution and but-for causation.

A. Distribution: proving the fatal sale without direct observation

Coley argued the government failed to prove he met Conner or delivered fentanyl that day, and that Conner could have obtained drugs elsewhere or redistributed them. The court held the jury could reasonably infer a distribution from multiple converging facts:

Real-time coordination: Texts on the morning of August 26 arranging a meet at a Marathon station, Conner’s update from the McDonald’s drive-thru, and the final “I see you.”
Contemporaneous payment: An $80 Cash App transfer that morning matching the agreed purchase amount.
Course-of-dealing: A long transaction history (about $24,000) in price increments consistent with pill purchases, and evidence Conner used Cash App with no one else.
Pattern evidence from controlled buys and seizures: After Conner’s death, controlled buys from Coley yielded “M30” blue counterfeit oxycodone pills containing fentanyl; a search uncovered more identical pills.
Witness account of the supply relationship: Taylor testified that Conner obtained pills from Coley and that the pills in the controlled buys matched what Conner and Taylor had been buying.

The court accepted that none of these items alone proves a hand-to-hand sale; the point was that a reasonable jury could treat their combined force as proof beyond a reasonable doubt under the sufficiency standard.

B. “Death results”: postmortem redistribution and tolerance did not defeat but-for causation on this record

The defense tried to convert toxicology uncertainty into reasonable doubt: chest-blood sampling can be inflated by postmortem redistribution, Conner was a habitual user who may tolerate higher concentrations, and the medical examiner could not “completely rule out” other causes (e.g., stroke or heart disease) based on the limited materials reviewed.

The panel nevertheless held that the jury could find but-for causation, emphasizing:

Measured fentanyl was high relative to overdose experience: 25 ng/ml was higher than the reported median in Alabama overdose cases (15 ng/ml), and testimony indicated even 8–12 ng/ml (the range suggested after accounting for possible two- to threefold redistribution) can be lethal.
Toxicology as “one piece,” but sufficient when paired with context: The government did not rely solely on a number; it paired toxicology with circumstantial proof of a fresh purchase and the absence of trauma signs.
Sufficiency review tolerates competing expert narratives: The jury could credit the government experts’ bottom-line conclusions (fentanyl overdose consistent with findings) over defense theories (coded “coffee” talk; non-match arguments; missing norfentanyl).

In effect, the court treated the redistribution/tolerance points as arguments to the jury, not as legal barriers requiring acquittal when the record still permits a rational finding of but-for causation under Burrage v. United States.

3.3. Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is a clear signal of how the Eleventh Circuit is willing to analyze sufficiency challenges in overdose prosecutions:

Text-and-payment evidence can carry the distribution element: A contemporaneous electronic payment aligned with incriminating texts may substitute for missing surveillance footage or eyewitness proof of the meetup.
Postmortem redistribution disputes do not necessarily defeat “death results”: Even where experts acknowledge uncertainty and sampling limitations, a jury may still find but-for causation when (a) even adjusted concentrations remain potentially lethal and (b) the broader record points to a drug-induced death.
Course-of-dealing evidence matters: A long history of similar transactions—especially exclusivity evidence (no payments to other sellers)—can bolster both identity of supplier and inference of continued sourcing on the fatal date.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 29 motion (judgment of acquittal): A request that the judge overturn the case because no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented.
Sufficiency of the evidence (on appeal): The appellate court does not re-try the case; it asks whether a reasonable jury could have reached the verdict, viewing evidence and inferences favorably to the government.
§ 841(b)(1)(C) “death results” element: If death results from using the distributed drug, the statute increases punishment; after Burrage v. United States, the government must prove the drug use was a but-for cause of death.
But-for causation: The death would not have occurred “but for” the victim’s use of the drug distributed by the defendant.
Postmortem redistribution: After death, drug concentrations can shift within the body; central (chest) blood can show higher levels than peripheral blood, potentially inflating measured concentration relative to the moment of death.
Circumstantial evidence: Indirect proof (texts, payments, patterns) from which a jury may infer a fact (a sale; ingestion; cause of death). Under United States v. Guevara, it is not treated as inherently weaker than direct evidence.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Lawrence Coley, III reinforces that, in § 841(b)(1)(C) overdose prosecutions, the government may prove both distribution and Burrage’s but-for causation largely through circumstantial evidence—texts, app-based payments, course-of-dealing proof, and toxicology—without a witnessed hand-to-hand sale or a perfectly precise toxicological reconstruction of the moment of death. The decision’s practical significance lies in its tolerance for real-world evidentiary limitations (missing surveillance, uncertain postmortem effects) so long as the total record still permits a rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.