Circumstantial Knowledge Suffices: The First Circuit’s Refined Test for Aiding-and-Abetting Carjacking in United States v. Hernández-Carrasquillo

1. Introduction

On 25 July 2025 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit handed down a lengthy consolidated opinion (United States v. Hernández-Carrasquillo, Nos. 22-1982, 23-1112 & 23-1133) affirming the convictions and sentences of three defendants for armed carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119(2)) and use of a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). Although the appeal raised a raft of issues—Brady disclosures, severance, Confrontation Clause objections, and sentencing enhancements—the decision’s lasting significance lies in its treatment of aiding-and-abetting liability for carjacking when the accused did not personally take the vehicle and the government relied almost exclusively on circumstantial proof of knowledge.

The Court clarified that a jury may infer the requisite knowledge and intent from the defendant’s prolonged participation in a violent home-invasion scheme, even when the government lacks direct evidence (e.g., admissions or eyewitness testimony) showing the defendant actually knew his confederates had driven away in the victim’s car. This articulation sharpens the Rosemond/Encarnación-Ruiz line of cases and will likely reverberate through future prosecutions that pivot on group crimes involving split-second developments.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Convictions affirmed for Anthony Rivera-Rivera, Victor M. Hernández-Carrasquillo and Jimmy Ríos-Álvarez on both federal counts.
Sufficiency of Evidence: The panel (Judge Montecalvo writing) held that a rational jury could find each appellant guilty of aiding and abetting carjacking despite their remaining at the house while two accomplices drove the victims’ Nissan to an ATM.
Brady / Severance / Confrontation: Late disclosures were negligent but not prejudicial; severance properly denied; no testimonial hearsay problem.
Sentencing: Serious-bodily-injury (§ 2B3.1(b)(3)(B)), abduction (§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(A)) and carjacking (§ 2B3.1(b)(5)) enhancements upheld; within-Guidelines sentences deemed procedurally and substantively reasonable.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014)
– Established that aiding-and-abetting § 924(c) requires the aider to have advance knowledge of the gun.
– First Circuit extrapolates the “walk-away” principle to carjacking: the aider must know the facts making the principal’s conduct criminal at a point when he could withdraw.
United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz, 787 F.3d 581 (1st Cir. 2015)
– Applied Rosemond in a firearms context; now serves as template for knowledge analysis in violent theft crimes.
United States v. García-Álvarez, 541 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2008) & United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2010)
– Previously upheld carjacking convictions where the defendant was present for the taking or for continued control of the victim. The new decision extends sufficiency when presence at the taking is absent.
Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999)
– Conditional intent element; panel relies on Holloway to affirm that violent acts earlier in the sequence support the intent to harm for the later vehicle theft.
Sentencing precedents: Whooten (abduction), Moore & Desormeaux (serious bodily injury).

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Carjacking Elements Met
– The court confirmed that the “presence” and “force or intimidation” prongs were satisfied by putting victim Luis Emilio at gunpoint and removing him to the driveway.
– Violence occurring before the keys are used can supply the conditional intent under Holloway.

b) Aiding-and-Abetting Test Refined
1. Affirmative Act: Guarding the family, tying them, and remaining until the ATM withdrawal constituted active facilitation.
2. Knowledge/Intent: For Ríos, direct evidence (FBI interview) showed awareness; for Hernández, knowledge challenge waived; for Rivera, knowledge inferred circumstantially:

He stood beside Carmen throughout discussions about using the Nissan.
Group coordination (phone call for PINs) implied shared awareness.
Length and organization of the three-hour ordeal undercut “mere presence.”

The panel stressed that although the government lacked “on-point” precedent, inference was not “overly speculative” (citing Rodríguez-Martínez).

c) Brady / Severance / Confrontation
– Late disclosure was “wholly inadequate” but not prejudicial: defense obtained a one-month continuance and used the material at trial.
– Severance: motion failed Drougas’s fourth requirement (no showing codefendant would actually testify).
– Confrontation: challenged statements were non-testimonial; Crawford therefore inapplicable.

d) Sentencing
– Serious bodily injury: hospitalization + extreme pain suffice.
– Abduction: moving victim downstairs and across yard to car at gunpoint qualifies.
– Criminal-history objection waived (plain-error not argued).
– Hernández’s within-Guidelines sentence was not an “upward variance”; court gave adequate § 3553(a) explanation.

3.3 Potential Impact

Expanded Use of Circumstantial Evidence: Prosecutors in multi-actor theft or robbery cases can rely on the decision to argue that continuous participation in a violent venture + coordination communications = sufficient knowledge.
Strategic Considerations for Defense: Defendants may need to affirmatively counter inference-building facts (duration, communication, role guarding victims) instead of focusing solely on the moment of vehicle seizure.
Guidelines Litigation: Opinion reaffirms liberal application of abduction and serious-bodily-injury enhancements; expect DOJ to cite this case when victims are moved even short distances.
Brady Enforcement: Although the panel condemned late disclosure, its harmless-error stance signals that defendants must articulate specific foreclosed strategies to win dismissal or new trial.
Severance Motions: The strict Drougas showing remains intact; defendants cannot rely on mere intention to call a co-defendant unless they secure an affidavit or proffer of testimony.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Aiding & Abetting (§ 2): The law treats a helper the same as the actual perpetrator if the helper purposely assists and knows what’s going on. Think “get-away driver who knows the bank will be robbed.”
Conditional Intent (Carjacking Statute): The crook need not want to shoot; it is enough that he is ready to do so if the driver resists.
Serious Bodily Injury (Guidelines): An injury needing medical treatment (hospital, surgery) or causing extreme pain. A few hours of observation isn’t enough, but burns, stab wounds with blood loss, or broken bones usually are.
Abduction Enhancement: Moving a victim—even across a yard or into a different room—at gunpoint to help commit or escape from the crime bumps the sentence.
Brady Material: Evidence favorable to the defense that the prosecution must disclose. Late disclosure is wrong, but reversal requires proof the delay changed the case’s outcome.

5. Conclusion

The First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hernández-Carrasquillo cements a pragmatic, inference-friendly framework for proving knowledge in aiding-and-abetting carjacking cases. Where a defendant remains actively engaged in a violent, coordinated offense, juries may infer awareness of each element—even absent direct testimony—so long as the inference is not “overly speculative.” Simultaneously, the opinion underscores that trial courts retain discretion to deny drastic remedies (dismissal, severance) unless defendants make robust, precise showings of prejudice. Sentencing-wise, the ruling confirms that modest victim movement and demonstrable pain/hospitalization will trigger potent enhancements. Going forward, prosecutors have a clearer roadmap, while defense counsel must marshal concrete evidence to rebut circumstantial inferences and to preserve post-trial review. The case thus marks a consequential—if defendant-unfriendly—development in federal robbery and carjacking jurisprudence.