Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision affirms a 123-month sentence imposed on Leslie Meyers following his convictions for animal-fighting offenses under the Animal Welfare Act and for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. The appeal centered on two issues: first, whether the district court clearly erred in finding—at sentencing—that Meyers hanged his dog to death after a dogfight; and second, whether the court committed procedural error by not reviewing interview transcripts of government witnesses and by allegedly relying on unspecified extrinsic judicial materials.

The panel (Judges Newsom, Lagoa, and Wilson) held that the district court’s factual findings were supported by reliable, specific, and sufficiently corroborated circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the record. It also held that Meyers’s procedural claims were raised for the first time on appeal and failed under plain-error review because he did not show that any alleged error affected the outcome.

At its core, the opinion reinforces two practical principles of federal sentencing law: (1) district courts may base sentencing findings on circumstantial evidence, including motive evidence, so long as the findings are plausible in light of the entire record and rest on reliable sources; and (2) unpreserved procedural objections are reviewed only for plain error, a standard that requires the appellant to demonstrate an outcome-affecting error.

Summary of the Opinion

• Standard of review and evidentiary baselines: The Eleventh Circuit applied clear-error review to the district court’s fact-finding and reiterated that sentencing facts may rest on trial evidence, undisputed statements in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), or evidence presented at sentencing, provided it is reliable and specific and subject to testing.
• Finding that Meyers killed his dog: The court upheld the district court’s conclusion that Meyers hanged his dog to death. Although no witness saw the precise moment of the fatal hanging, the record included multiple pieces of corroborated circumstantial evidence linking Meyers to the hangings and supporting that the hangings proximately caused the dog’s death. Motive evidence—stemming from the reputational loss after the dog failed a “courtesy scratch”—was admissible and probative.
• Procedural claims and plain-error review: Because Meyers did not raise below the claims that the court failed to review interview transcripts or improperly relied on extrinsic judicial materials, the panel reviewed only for plain error. He failed to show any error affected his substantial rights or the fairness of proceedings, especially given that the sentencing ruling was independently supported by sworn testimony and undisputed PSI facts.
• Disposition: The sentence was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2011), quoting United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2008):
  The panel restated the clear-error standard: an appellate court will reverse factual findings only when left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. This frames the deference owed to sentencing fact-finding when supported by the record.
• United States v. Polar, 369 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004):
  Polar establishes permissible sources for sentencing facts: evidence adduced at trial, undisputed PSI statements, and evidence presented at sentencing. The court invoked this to validate reliance on the PSI, Agent Bridges’s testimony, and other live testimony.
• United States v. Lawrence, 47 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1995):
  Lawrence supplies two linked rules: (1) sentencing evidence must be reliable and specific and allow the parties to test its reliability; and (2) when the defendant disputes a sentencing fact, the government bears the burden to prove it by a preponderance. The panel inferred that this reliability threshold was satisfied by multiple, mutually reinforcing accounts and the opportunity for cross-examination.
• Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985):
  Anderson’s lodestar principle: where the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the whole record, an appellate court may not reverse even if it would have weighed the evidence differently. Only findings that are internally inconsistent or facially implausible warrant reversal. This case undergirds the panel’s deference to the district court’s inferential findings about causation and identity.
• United States v. Arcila Ramirez, 16 F.4th 844 (11th Cir. 2021):
  Arcila Ramirez confirms that necessary elements may be established via circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences. The panel used this to answer Meyers’s argument that no one directly witnessed the fatal hanging and that some witnesses struggled with in-court identification.
• United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 2010):
  Rothenberg provides the ordinary standard for procedural reasonableness review (legal issues de novo; factual findings for clear error). It sets the baseline before the panel switches to plain-error review due to waiver/forfeiture.
• United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014):
  Vandergrift holds that unpreserved procedural reasonableness arguments are reviewed for plain error. The panel relied on this to limit review of Meyers’s new claims about transcripts and extrinsic materials.
• United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2015), quoting United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003 (11th Cir. 2007):
  Generalized objections are insufficient to preserve specific appellate grounds; the trial court and opposing party must be apprised of the specific basis for relief. This authority justified treating Meyers’s new complaints as forfeited.
• United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005), quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002):
  These cases supply the four-part plain-error framework and the requirement that the error must have affected the outcome (substantial-rights prong). The panel emphasized that Meyers failed to identify transcript content or extrinsic material that would have changed the result.

Legal Reasoning

1) Clear-error review and the evidentiary mosaic. The appellate court examined the record as a whole and concluded the district court’s account was plausible, not internally inconsistent or facially implausible. Three pillars supported the finding that Meyers killed his dog by hanging:

• Undisputed PSI and corroborated testimony: The PSI (¶ 33) and USDA Agent Bridges’s testimony placed the dog dead under the rear bumper of Meyers’s own vehicle. Bridges also testified that Meyers handled the dog during and after the fight and identified him on video in that role.
• Eyewitness statements to attempted hangings: Attendee Alonza Jordan reported observing Meyers attempt to hang the dog from the SUV tailgate. When the tailgate didn’t bear the weight, Meyers picked the dog up by the belt around its neck and walked behind the car while holding the dog in the air. Jordan reiterated that he saw two attempted hangings and later testified to those attempts at sentencing.
• Corroboration on causation: Timothy White (the opposing handler) testified the dog was not mortally injured during the fight, reducing alternative explanations for death. Referee Starlin Morgan saw the dog hanging after the fight. White also heard someone tell Meyers to hang his dog “with the other dog.” The dog was undisputedly found dead thereafter. Although no one saw the precise moment of death, the district court reasonably inferred that the hangings proximately caused it.

2) Motive as corroborative evidence. Motive, while not an element, can strengthen an inferential chain. Agent Bridges testified that handlers seek “extra prestige” from a dog’s “courtesy scratch”—a display of aggression against a downed opponent at fight’s end—and that failing to perform one harms a handler’s reputation. It was undisputed the dog failed the courtesy scratch, and Jordan reported hearing others goad Meyers to kill the dog. The district court could permissibly treat this motive evidence as consistent with and supportive of the causation and identity findings.

3) Circumstantial proof and identification issues. The absence of a direct eyewitness to the fatal moment did not preclude the finding. The panel cited Arcila Ramirez to reaffirm that circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences can establish key facts. Identification uncertainties at the hearing were mitigated by Agent Bridges’s earlier video identification and the undisputed role of Meyers as the handler of the dog found dead under his vehicle.

4) Procedural objections and plain-error review. Meyers’s claims that the court failed to review interview transcripts and relied on unspecified extrinsic judicial material were not preserved. Under Carpenter and Straub, general reasonableness objections do not preserve specific grounds. Applying Ramirez-Flores/Rodriguez/Cotton, the panel held that Meyers did not demonstrate that any alleged omission or reliance affected the outcome because the district court’s findings were independently supported by sworn testimony and undisputed PSI content. Without a concrete proffer of transcript content contradicting the court’s findings—or identification of specific “extrinsic” material and its effect—the plain-error standard could not be met.

Impact

On sentencing fact-finding in animal-cruelty and analogous cases:

• Affirmation of circumstantial pathways: The decision underscores that district courts may rely on circumstantial evidence, including motive and contextual cues, to resolve disputed sentencing facts such as identity and cause of death. Direct eyewitness testimony to the precise moment of harm is not required when the record supports a plausible inferential narrative.
• Use of PSI and multi-source corroboration: Undisputed PSI statements remain powerful anchors for sentencing findings, especially when coupled with agent testimony and lay eyewitness accounts that “cross-corroborate” one another.
• Proximate cause at sentencing: The court’s acceptance of “proximate cause” reasoning—linking post-fight hangings to the death despite an uncertain time of death—may guide future cases involving a sequence of harmful acts where the exact fatal instant is not witnessed but the causal chain is reasonably inferable.
• Motive as a probative corroborator: Reputation-based motives in illicit subcultures (here, dogfighting) can meaningfully corroborate factual inferences at sentencing, provided they are tied to record evidence and not speculation.

On preservation and appellate posture:

• Specificity matters: Defense counsel should articulate precise procedural objections in the district court—e.g., request and describe specific witness interview transcripts, identify alleged extra-record materials, and explain how they bear on disputed facts—to preserve de novo review and avoid the formidable plain-error standard.
• Outcome-focused burden under plain error: On appeal, it is not enough to posit a procedural misstep; the appellant must show a likely effect on the outcome. The panel’s analysis illustrates how appellate courts will deem alleged omissions harmless where the record independently sustains the finding.

For district courts: While this opinion affirms the approach taken, it also implicitly encourages best practices: (1) clearly identify the sources of relied-upon information; (2) ensure opportunities to test reliability (e.g., cross-examination at sentencing); and (3) articulate how circumstantial components cohere into a plausible whole. Doing so fortifies findings against clear-error and plain-error attacks.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Clear error: A deferential appellate standard. A finding stands unless the appellate court is firmly convinced the lower court got the facts wrong. If the district court’s version is plausible in light of the whole record, it is not clearly erroneous even if another view is also plausible.
• Preponderance of the evidence: The burden at sentencing for disputed facts. The government must show it is more likely than not that the fact is true.
• PSI (Presentence Investigation Report): A report prepared by probation that compiles offense details, criminal history, and other relevant facts. Undisputed PSI statements may be treated as established facts at sentencing.
• Reliable and specific evidence: Information used at sentencing must be concrete and trustworthy enough that the parties can challenge it (for example, via cross-examination or contrary evidence).
• Circumstantial evidence: Proof of a fact through an inference from other facts (e.g., the dog found dead under the defendant’s car soon after attempted hangings), as opposed to direct eyewitness proof of the fact itself.
• Proximate cause: A causal link sufficiently direct that the act is considered the legal cause of the outcome. Here, repeated hangings were reasonably inferred to have caused the dog’s death.
• Plain error: A demanding standard for unpreserved objections. The appellant must show an error that is obvious, affected substantial rights by changing the outcome, and seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
• Procedural reasonableness: Concerned with the method of arriving at a sentence (e.g., consideration of proper evidence, correct standards), not the length of the sentence itself.
• Per curiam; Non-Argument Calendar; Unpublished: A per curiam opinion is issued in the court’s name without a single identified author. Non-argument calendar cases are decided on the briefs without oral argument. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent, though they may be cited for persuasive value in some contexts.
• Courtesy scratch (dogfighting term): A post-fight display where a dog shows aggression by attacking a downed opponent. Within the illicit subculture, it confers prestige; failure can cause reputational harm, which the court treated as motive evidence here.
• Extrinsic judicial materials: Materials from other proceedings or outside the record in the case at bar. Reliance on such materials can raise due process concerns if parties cannot confront or contest them; here, the panel found no outcome-affecting reliance.

How the Record Supported the Findings

• Location of the body: Dog found dead under the rear bumper of Meyers’s vehicle (undisputed PSI; Agent Bridges).
• Role and identification: Bridges identified Meyers on video and as the dog’s handler during and after the fight.
• Attempted hangings: Jordan observed two attempted hangings, including lifting the dog by a belt around its neck and walking behind the car.
• Condition after the fight: White testified the dog was not mortally injured during the bout, reinforcing that death resulted from post-fight conduct.
• Observation of hanging: Referee Morgan saw the dog hanging after the fight.
• Motive evidence: Courtesy scratch failure; comments urging Meyers to kill the dog; testimony about reputational incentives.
• Temporal chain: Failed courtesy scratch → goading → attempted hangings → dog found dead under Meyers’s car; a cohesive causal narrative the district court could reasonably accept.

Conclusion

United States v. Meyers offers a clear, if unpublished, reaffirmation of two core sentencing tenets in the Eleventh Circuit: first, district courts may rely on reliable, specific circumstantial evidence—and consider motive—to resolve disputed facts, so long as the findings are plausible on the whole record and not internally inconsistent; and second, unpreserved procedural objections will be reviewed for plain error, a standard that requires appellants to show an outcome-changing impact.

For practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of building or challenging the evidentiary mosaic at sentencing: cross-corroboration among PSI statements, agent testimony, and eyewitness accounts can be decisive. It also highlights the necessity of preserving specific procedural objections in the district court—identifying the precise materials at issue and articulating how they bear on disputed facts—to avoid the steep climb of plain-error review. Finally, in animal-fighting prosecutions and other contexts where direct evidence of the fatal act may be scarce, this case demonstrates how courts may permissibly infer causation and identity from a coherent sequence of reliable circumstantial proof, including motive and post-event behavior.

Holding: Affirmed. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Meyers fatally hanged his dog, and there was no plain error in the alleged procedural omissions.