Circumstantial Evidence and Comparator Proof in Title VII Cases: Commentary on Brown v. FCA US LLC (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Jolena Brown v. FCA US LLC, No. 25‑1405 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2025), affirming summary judgment against a long‑tenured employee alleging race and sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and parallel claims under Michigan’s Elliott‑Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA).

Although designated “Not recommended for publication,” the opinion offers a sharp, practical restatement of several recurring Title VII themes:

• What is required to satisfy the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case—especially the role of “comparator” evidence when the plaintiff relies on circumstantial proof.
• How courts evaluate self‑serving declarations and speculation at the summary judgment stage.
• The knowledge and causation requirements for Title VII retaliation claims, including the limits of inferring causation from timing alone.
• The boundary between protected “opposition” under Title VII and internal complaints that merely raise wage or timekeeping concerns without a clear tie to protected traits.

The case arises from FCA’s decision to terminate Jolena Brown, a Black woman who had worked at Chrysler/FCA since 1999. Once a “top performer” in human resources and labor relations, Brown’s performance ratings began to decline after 2017. Following a formal performance improvement plan (PIP) and continued documented deficiencies, FCA ultimately terminated her in January 2021. Brown responded with federal and state discrimination and retaliation claims.

The district court granted FCA’s motion for summary judgment on all Title VII claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the ELCRA claims. On appeal, Brown principally argued that she could establish discrimination without comparator evidence and that FCA retaliated against her for internal complaints, including a 2018 discrimination complaint and later timekeeping/wage concerns. The Sixth Circuit rejected those arguments and affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit, per Judge Hermandorfer (joined by Judges Nalbandian and Davis), affirmed summary judgment in FCA’s favor on both Brown’s discrimination and retaliation claims, and left undisturbed the dismissal of the Michigan ELCRA claims without prejudice.

A. Discrimination Claims

Applying the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework, the court assumed three elements of the prima facie case were satisfied:

• Brown is a member of protected classes (Black and female).
• She suffered adverse actions (placement on a PIP and termination).
• She was qualified for her positions.

The dispute centered on the fourth element: whether Brown was (a) replaced by someone outside her protected class, or (b) treated differently than similarly situated, non‑protected employees.

The court held that Brown failed to meet this requirement. She identified no white or male comparators with similar performance problems who were treated more favorably, and produced no evidence that someone outside her protected classes replaced her. Her attempt to rely on circumstantial evidence in lieu of comparator evidence also failed because:

• The record showed documented performance problems preceding the PIP and termination.
• Her assertions that she was transferred to a “failing department,” overworked, and denied mentoring or “professional camaraderie” were unsupported, conclusory, and insufficient under Rule 56.
• A single, late‑raised allegation that a supervisor took a white male coworker to lunch and “chit‑chatted” with him, while ignoring her, was (i) unsupported by any corroborating evidence, and (ii) in any event not an adverse employment action within the meaning of Title VII after Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024).

Because Brown failed at the prima facie stage, the court did not need to reach pretext.

B. Retaliation Claim

For retaliation, the court again applied the McDonnell Douglas framework and held that Brown failed to make a prima facie case:

• Her 2018 internal race discrimination complaint against supervisor McDonough was protected activity under Title VII.
• But there was no evidence that the decisionmakers who placed her on the PIP and terminated her (supervisor Ed Novacco and HR specialist Kelly Bennyhoff) knew about that 2018 complaint.
• Even assuming knowledge, Brown could not establish but‑for causation under Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
• The nearly three‑year gap between the 2018 complaint and the 2020–2021 adverse actions, combined with longstanding, documented performance issues predating the complaint, undercut any inference of retaliation.

Brown tried to broaden the set of “protected activities” by pointing to:

• Unspecified “internal complaints about unequal treatment.”
• Reports of “timekeeping and wage violations.”
• Her “resistance to conduct she reasonably believed was unlawful,” including allegedly refusing to provide “protected health information” about Black employees.

The court rejected these theories because Brown:

• Did not show she actually complained to management about unequal treatment beyond the 2018 complaint.
• Did not connect timekeeping/wage reports to discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or other Title VII‑protected characteristics.
• Did not identify any specific unlawful practice she was opposing, or tie the alleged request for confidential health information to discriminatory treatment.

Accordingly, no triable retaliation claim remained.

III. Precedents and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

A. Summary Judgment Standards

• Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)
  Cited for the basic Rule 56 proposition that, once the moving party has shown an absence of evidence on an essential element, the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence “on which the jury could reasonably find” in its favor. The court uses this to emphasize that Brown, not FCA, bore the burden at the prima facie stage once FCA pointed to evidentiary gaps (no comparators, no proof of knowledge, etc.).
• Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)
  Quoted for the principle that when a party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element, summary judgment is appropriate. The court invokes Celotex explicitly in the retaliation discussion, holding that Brown failed to show causation.
• Patterson v. Kent State Univ., 155 F.4th 635 (6th Cir. 2025) and Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2000)
  Used to underscore that “mere conjecture and speculation,” “vague assertions,” and “conclusory” allegations cannot defeat summary judgment. This underpins the court’s refusal to credit Brown’s bare assertions about department failure, workloads, and mentoring without record support.
• Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240 (6th Cir. 2003)
  Cited to reinforce that “mere conclusory and unsupported allegations” in a declaration are insufficient to survive summary judgment. The court classifies Brown’s late‑filed declaration—especially the one‑sentence allegation about a white male coworker getting more “camaraderie”—as the sort of unsupported assertion Bell deems inadequate.
• U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1997)
  Invoked for the requirement that a nonmovant must cite “specific portions of the record” to create a genuine factual dispute. This directly counters Brown’s reliance on abstractions and uncorroborated narrative rather than documents, testimony, or data.

B. Discrimination Framework and Comparator Requirement

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
  Provides the burden‑shifting structure for circumstantial discrimination claims:
  1. Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case.
  2. Employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
  3. Burden shifts back to plaintiff to show pretext.
  The court stops at step one, finding Brown never clears the prima facie hurdle.
• Briggs v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 11 F.4th 498 (6th Cir. 2021)
  Supplies the standard four‑part prima facie test for Title VII discrimination: membership in a protected class, adverse action, qualification, and either replacement by someone outside the class or differential treatment of similarly situated non‑protected employees. Brown’s case fails on this fourth element.
• Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2016)
  Clarifies how to assess whether employees are “similarly situated”: consider whether they shared the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and engaged in comparable conduct under similar circumstances. The Brown court cites Jackson in articulating this flexible, context‑specific approach, then emphasizes that Brown provided no evidence of any employee who matched even this more relaxed comparative framework.
• Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1998)
  Stands for the proposition that comparator analysis is not an “exacting” or “rigid” requirement; a plaintiff need not show an exact match in every respect. Brown cites Ercegovich to argue that she can prevail without comparators. The panel acknowledges the flexible standard but responds that—even under this lenient view—some relevant comparator evidence is still necessary in circumstantial cases; Brown had none.
• Mensah v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 621 F. App’x 332 (6th Cir. 2015), Morris v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 320 F. App’x 330 (6th Cir. 2009), and Gjokaj v. U.S. Steel Corp., 700 F. App’x 494 (6th Cir. 2017)
  These unpublished decisions are deployed as analogues: in each, the plaintiff’s failure to identify a similarly situated comparator (or to show differing treatment of comparable misconduct) doomed the prima facie case. Brown’s inability to name any employee retained after failing a similar PIP triggers the same outcome.

C. “Civility Code” and Adverse Employment Action

• Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)
  Famous for the observation that Title VII is not a “general civility code.” The court uses this to marginalize Brown’s complaints that a supervisor socialized with a white male coworker and allegedly ignored her. Without more, such slights do not amount to actionable discrimination.
• Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024)
  Cited for the standard that an adverse employment action must impose “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” Brown’s “lunch and chit‑chat” allegation—devoid of evidence it affected pay, duties, promotions, evaluations, or other core terms—fails to qualify.

D. Retaliation: Knowledge and Causation

• Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2014)
  Provides the four‑part prima facie test for retaliation: protected activity, employer knowledge, materially adverse action, and causal connection. Brown satisfies (1) for her 2018 complaint, arguably (3) with PIP and termination, but fails (2) and (4).
• Fenton v. HiSAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827 (6th Cir. 1999)
  Emphasizes that the relevant “management decisionmakers” must know of the protected activity. The Brown court applies Fenton to hold that Brown’s speculation about shared HR “structure” is insufficient to show that Novacco or Bennyhoff actually knew of the 2018 complaint.
• Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2002)
  Cited to dismiss Brown’s “conspiratorial theories” and raw speculation about corporate knowledge and retaliation. It reinforces the need for specific evidence, not inferences built on assumptions.
• Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013)
  Establishes that Title VII retaliation requires proof that the adverse action would not have occurred “but for” the protected activity. The panel relies on Nassar to reject Brown’s causation theory, noting the three‑year gap and the existence of independent, documented performance issues.
• Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll., 698 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2012) and Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2009)
  These cases address temporal proximity as evidence of causation. The Brown opinion uses them to emphasize that:
  • Temporal proximity can support causation only when the adverse action is “very close” in time to the protected activity.
  • A gap of over a year—as here, nearly three years—is generally insufficient, particularly when other evidence undercuts the inference.

E. What Counts as “Protected Activity”

• Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2008)
  Explains that Title VII “unlawful employment practices” involve actions taken on the basis of protected characteristics such as race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Internal reports are protected only if they oppose such practices.
• Jackson v. Genesee Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 999 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2021)
  Holds that internal advocacy related to an employee’s job duties can still be protected opposition—but only when it is directed at discrimination that would violate Title VII. Brown’s generalized references to “timekeeping and wage violations” failed to show any link to discrimination, so they did not qualify as protected activity under Niswander and Jackson.

IV. Legal Reasoning in Depth

A. The Court’s Approach to the Prima Facie Discrimination Case

1. Elements Not in Dispute

FCA did not contest that Brown, as a Black woman, is covered by Title VII’s protections, nor that she was qualified for her HR and labor relations positions. Brown conceded that the only adverse actions at issue were (1) placement on the PIP and (2) her termination. The dispute thus narrowed to the fourth prima facie element.

2. Comparator Evidence (or the Lack Thereof)

The court focuses on the “similarly situated” limb of the fourth element. Under Jackson and related cases, Brown needed to show that other employees—outside her protected classes—shared relevant characteristics such as:

• Same or comparable supervisor.
• Subject to the same performance standards and disciplinary regime.
• Engaged in comparable performance deficiencies or misconduct.

Brown, however, “could not list a single employee” retained despite failing similar PIP objectives. She also offered no evidence that she was replaced by someone outside her protected classes. This evidentiary void mirrors earlier cases (e.g., Mensah, Morris, Gjokaj) where a lack of comparators proved fatal.

Brown argued that comparator evidence is “not a rigid requirement” and that circumstantial evidence could substitute for comparators. The court’s response is significant:

• It agrees that the comparator requirement is flexible and not an exacting one—Ercegovich remains good law.
• But it clarifies that flexibility is not the same as elimination: in a circumstantial case like Brown’s, a plaintiff must offer some comparator evidence to satisfy the similarly situated element. It rejects the notion that other circumstantial evidence can entirely obviate this requirement, at least under the facts presented.

In practice, this narrows the room for plaintiffs to rely purely on generalized workplace circumstances, such as difficult assignments or heavier workloads, in lieu of actual comparative treatment data.

3. Rejection of Alternative Circumstantial Evidence

Brown tried to salvage her prima facie case by pointing to:

• Her assertion that she was placed on a PIP “without prior documented performance concerns.”
• Claims of being transferred to a failing department and assigned excessive workloads.
• Alleged denial of mentoring and professional camaraderie, including the “lunch and chit‑chat” allegation involving a white male coworker.

The court methodically dismantles each:

• Documented performance concerns: The record plainly shows that Brown’s performance ratings fell from an “8” in 2016 to “5” in both 2017 and 2018, with explicit references to missed deadlines, poor follow‑through, and communication problems. This contradicts her claim of no prior issues.
• Failing department and excessive workloads: Brown cited no record evidence beyond her own conclusory statements. Under U.S. Structures, Smith, and Bell, such unsupported assertions cannot create a genuine issue of material fact.
• Mentoring and camaraderie: The “white male coworker lunch” allegation appears for the first time in Brown’s post‑discovery declaration, and even there only as a single sentence without corroboration. The court characterizes it as “unsupported,” invoking Bell to treat it as insufficient evidence. It also notes that, even if accepted as true, this type of interpersonal slight does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action, particularly under Muldrow’s “some harm” requirement and Burlington Northern’s rejection of Title VII as a general civility code.

The court therefore concludes that Brown has not provided any admissible circumstantial evidence compelling enough to substitute for the missing comparator proof.

B. The Retaliation Analysis

1. Protected Activity: Narrowing the Field

The court readily acknowledges that Brown’s 2018 internal complaint alleging race discrimination by supervisor McDonough qualifies as “protected activity” under Title VII. Brown had complained that McDonough downgraded her performance rating and avoided interaction with Black employees. FCA investigated through an external investigator, partially corrected the rating, and informed Brown of the findings. Brown herself testified that she viewed the matter as “resolved.”

However, Brown tried to broaden the protected activity universe by pointing to:

• “Internal complaints about unequal treatment.”
• Reports of timekeeping and wage discrepancies.
• Refusal to engage in conduct she believed unlawful, including alleged demands for confidential health information about Black employees.

The court filters these through the Niswander/Jackson framework:

• Title VII “unlawful employment practices” are discriminatory actions based on protected traits.
• Opposition is protected only if it targets such practices or what the employee reasonably believes to be such practices.

Brown’s evidence failed these tests. She did not show that:

• She filed any additional internal discrimination complaints beyond the 2018 complaint (her deposition confirms she did not).
• Her wage/timekeeping reports were tied to discrimination against protected groups, rather than generic payroll accuracy issues.
• The request for health information (even if improper) was connected to decisions or practices “taken on the basis of” race or sex.

Therefore, the court confines the protected activity analysis to the 2018 discrimination complaint.

2. Employer Knowledge: Rejecting Structural Inference

The second prima facie element requires proof that the employer (specifically, the decisionmakers) knew of the protected activity. Relying on Fenton, the court asks whether the “relevant management decisionmakers”—here, Novacco and Bennyhoff—knew about Brown’s 2018 complaint when they placed her on the PIP and later terminated her.

Brown produced no evidence that:

• Her complaint was communicated to Novacco or Bennyhoff.
• Either referenced the complaint in emails, memos, or conversations.
• They were named in the internal investigation or otherwise implicated.

Instead, she speculated that, because everyone worked within the same HR and labor management structure, they “must” have known. The court labels this as “conspiratorial theories” and speculation, which Mulhall says cannot substitute for evidence. Brown also undercuts her own theory by testifying that she considered the 2018 complaint resolved and took no further action.

This leaves the record devoid of proof that the decisionmakers knew of her protected activity—a fatal defect at the prima facie stage.

3. Causation and the Role of Timing

Even if one assumed knowledge, Brown still needed to show a causal connection under the stringent but‑for standard of Nassar. The court emphasizes:

• The near three‑year gap between the February 2018 complaint and the late‑2020 PIP and January 2021 termination.
• The existence of documented performance problems beginning in early 2017—before the protected activity.

Citing Blizzard and Lindsay, the Sixth Circuit holds that such a lengthy gap cannot, by itself, support an inference of causation. Temporal proximity is probative only when the adverse action follows closely on the heels of the protected activity, generally measured in months rather than years.

Brown attempted to bridge this gap by alleging a pattern of escalating adverse treatment “all following her protected activity.” The court finds these allegations “vague” and unsupported by specific record evidence; they do not suffice to link the alleged pattern to the 2018 complaint, nor to override the clear documentation that Brown’s performance issues emerged independently of the complaint.

The testimony of the decisionmakers further undermines causation:

• Novacco declared that Brown’s race, sex, age, and any protected activity played no role in the decision to terminate her.
• Bennyhoff testified that Brown was terminated for failure to meet the PIP’s requirements, not for any complaint activity.

Brown did not depose Novacco substantively on his knowledge of the 2018 complaint and did not ask Bennyhoff about it either. The court underscores that she cannot now rely on the silence of the record—a silence created by her own litigation choices—to manufacture causation.

C. Treatment of Evidence: Declarations, Memory, and Documentation

A recurring theme is the court’s insistence on concrete, contemporaneous evidence. Examples:

• Brown claimed she completed portions of the PIP but admitted she could not recall providing documentation to Novacco or Bennyhoff and produced no documents in discovery. The court gives decisive weight to the lack of supporting records, especially where the PIP explicitly required documentation at each checkpoint.
• The late‑filed declaration containing the “lunch” anecdote is treated with skepticism. While the opinion does not explicitly invoke the “sham affidavit” doctrine, it effectively treats the declaration as too conclusory and too little, too late—especially where it contradicts or goes beyond her deposition without explanation.
• Brown’s subjective belief that her performance was acceptable and that she was overworked or singled out is explicitly discounted under Grizzell v. City of Columbus Div. of Police, 461 F.3d 711 (6th Cir. 2006), which holds that a plaintiff’s mere personal beliefs about discrimination are insufficient without objective support.

The opinion thus reinforces that, by the time a case reaches summary judgment, plaintiffs must have assembled more than personal impressions and broad accusations; they need specific, admissible facts.

V. Impact and Practical Significance

A. Comparator Evidence in Title VII Discrimination Cases

Although unpublished, Brown v. FCA US LLC sends a clear signal about comparator evidence in the Sixth Circuit:

• The court remains committed to a flexible, non‑hypertechnical comparator standard (Ercegovich), but it does not allow plaintiffs to bypass comparators entirely in cases based purely on circumstantial evidence.
• General allegations about atmosphere, workload, or management style—without at least one example of a similarly situated comparator treated better—are unlikely to survive summary judgment.
• Employees and counsel must use discovery to identify potential comparators (e.g., others on PIPs, others with documented performance disputes) and develop evidence of differential treatment.

For defense counsel, Brown underscores the value of:

• Keeping detailed, contemporaneous performance records that demonstrate a legitimate non‑discriminatory trajectory leading to adverse actions.
• Documenting and enforcing PIPs consistently across employees, such that plaintiffs cannot easily identify more lenient treatment of similarly situated colleagues.

B. Retaliation Law: Knowledge and Causation as Gatekeepers

The decision reinforces that:

• A retaliation plaintiff must prove that the actual decisionmakers knew about her protected activity. Organizational charts or shared reporting structures do not suffice.
• Long gaps between protected activity and adverse action, especially when performance problems predate the protected activity, will generally defeat causation absent strong corroborating evidence.
• Plaintiffs cannot rely on speculation about corporate “retaliatory atmospheres” or unexplored suspicions; they must marshal specific, admissible facts tying the adverse decision to the protected conduct.

This is particularly important in large organizations, where knowledge cannot be presumed simply because a complaint entered the corporate system. Internal complaint processes should identify which personnel are informed of the complaint and the outcome; lack of dissemination can bolster a defense that decisionmakers acted independently of any protected activity.

C. Defining Protected Activity: Beyond Generic Workplace Complaints

Brown illustrates the limits of what qualifies as protected “opposition” conduct:

• Complaints about wage or timekeeping irregularities are not automatically Title VII‑protected. They may implicate other statutes (e.g., FLSA, state wage laws) but do not become Title VII activity absent a discrimination component related to race, sex, etc.
• Employees seeking Title VII protection must either:
  • Explicitly or implicitly tie their complaint to discrimination based on a protected characteristic, or
  • Show that they reasonably believed the practice complained of violated Title VII.
• Vague references to “unlawful” practices or “confidentiality violations” are not enough without a link to protected traits.

For employers, this underscores the value of training HR personnel and managers to document:

• The exact nature of employees’ complaints.
• Whether the complaint is framed as discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or a non‑Title VII issue (such as pay errors or scheduling disputes).

D. The Role of External Investigations and Corrective Steps

An important, if subtle, theme is FCA’s handling of Brown’s 2018 complaint:

• It hired an external investigator to review the allegations against McDonough.
• It restored Brown’s rating from “4” to “5” after finding McDonough had deviated from the proper process, even though no discrimination violation was found.

This history bolsters FCA’s credibility and undercuts an inference of discriminatory animus. It shows responsiveness and a willingness to correct procedural irregularities, which courts commonly view as evidence of good faith rather than retaliation.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Prima Facie Case and Burden‑Shifting Under McDonnell Douglas

In discrimination and retaliation cases relying on circumstantial evidence, courts often use the McDonnell Douglas framework:

1. Plaintiff’s prima facie case: A set of basic facts that, if unexplained, suggest discrimination or retaliation may have occurred.
2. Employer’s legitimate reason: Employer must then state a non‑discriminatory reason for the action (e.g., poor performance, restructuring, misconduct).
3. Pretext: Plaintiff must show that the proffered reason is not the true reason—either by showing it is false, not actually relied upon, or insufficient to justify the decision.

If the plaintiff fails at step one (as in Brown), the case ends without analyzing the employer’s reasons or pretext.

B. Comparator Employees

A “comparator” is another employee used as a yardstick to show discrimination. If an employer allegedly mistreated a Black woman, the plaintiff might point to a white male coworker with:

• Similar job duties and responsibilities.
• The same supervisor or decisionmaker.
• Similar performance or disciplinary issues.

If that coworker committed the same errors but was treated more leniently (e.g., no PIP, no termination), that is powerful evidence of discriminatory treatment. In Brown, the court emphasizes that, in a case built on circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff is expected to find at least one such comparator, or show she was replaced by someone outside the protected group.

C. Protected Activity vs. General Complaints

“Protected activity” under Title VII generally falls into two categories:

• Opposition: Complaining about or resisting suspected discrimination or harassment (e.g., filing an internal complaint of race discrimination).
• Participation: Taking part in an EEOC charge or litigation (e.g., serving as a witness in another employee’s discrimination case).

Not every workplace complaint is protected. Complaints solely about:

• Unequal workloads.
• Scheduling issues.
• Wage payment errors or timekeeping problems.
• Personality conflicts or social exclusion.

are not Title VII protected unless clearly tied to discrimination based on race, sex, etc., or reasonably believed to be such.

D. But‑For Causation

“But‑for causation” means that the adverse action would not have happened in the absence of the protected activity. It does not mean the complaint must be the only factor, but it must be the decisive one.

In Brown, the court concluded that:

• Documented performance issues starting in 2017 and continuing through the PIP reasonably explain her termination.
• The 2018 complaint—especially given the three‑year time gap—was not shown to be the “but‑for” cause of the PIP or termination.

E. Summary Judgment and Evidence

At summary judgment, courts do not weigh credibility or decide who is telling the truth. Instead, they ask whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party if it believed that party’s evidence. But:

• Speculation (what might have occurred) and suspicion are not evidence.
• Generalized statements (“I was overworked,” “they were out to get me”) carry little weight without specifics.
• Declarations must contain specific facts, not just conclusions, and ideally be corroborated by documents (emails, performance reviews, attendance records, etc.) or other witnesses.

The Brown panel repeatedly stresses that unsupported, self‑serving statements cannot alone carry a Title VII claim past summary judgment.

VII. Conclusion

Brown v. FCA US LLC is a textbook example of how the Sixth Circuit applies the McDonnell Douglas framework at summary judgment. Even though the decision is not precedential, it crisply restates and applies several important principles:

• A Title VII plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must still offer some comparator or replacement evidence to satisfy the prima facie discrimination test; other circumstantial evidence cannot completely substitute for this requirement on these facts.
• Vague, conclusory, or highly subjective assertions—particularly when raised late and unsupported by the record—are insufficient to create a triable issue.
• Retaliation claims require proof that the actual decisionmakers knew of the protected activity and that, but for that activity, the adverse action would not have occurred.
• Long gaps between protected activity and adverse action, coupled with independent performance problems, sharply undermine any inference of retaliation.
• Not every internal complaint is “protected activity” under Title VII; complaints must be tied—actually or reasonably—to discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

For plaintiffs, the case underscores the importance of:

• Identifying and developing evidence about comparators early in discovery.
• Documenting when, how, and to whom discrimination complaints are made.
• Collecting concrete evidence (emails, evaluations, witness testimony) to corroborate claims of disparate treatment or retaliatory motive.

For employers, Brown illustrates the benefits of:

• Maintaining clear, consistent documentation of performance issues and PIP compliance.
• Using external or neutral investigations for internal discrimination complaints and addressing process errors even when no violation is found.
• Ensuring that adverse employment decisions are grounded in documented, nondiscriminatory reasons independent of any protected activity.

Ultimately, the opinion reinforces that Title VII litigation at the summary judgment stage is evidence‑driven: plaintiffs must move beyond narratives and suspicions to specific, admissible facts that tie adverse actions to protected traits or conduct. Brown demonstrates how, when that evidentiary showing is lacking, courts will not hesitate to grant summary judgment, even in long‑term employment relationships and emotionally charged disputes.