Church Autonomy as Structural Immunity—Not Rule 12(b)(1)—and Its Application to Non‑Hierarchical Ministries and Third‑Party Interference: Commentary on McRaney v. North American Mission Board (5th Cir. Oct. 28, 2025)

Introduction

In McRaney v. North American Mission Board (NAMB), the Fifth Circuit delivers a sweeping, historically‑grounded restatement of the First Amendment’s church autonomy doctrine and applies it to bar tort claims arising out of a dispute between Baptist ministries over evangelistic strategy and leadership. The court not only resolves the underlying case on the merits in favor of NAMB; it also clarifies major points of doctrine with system‑wide procedural consequences:

It conceptualizes church autonomy as a constitutional, structural immunity from suit that must be resolved at the threshold and is immediately appealable—yet it is generally not a Rule 12(b)(1) subject‑matter bar, so federal courts may and should enter merits judgments with res judicata effect.
It rejects any limitation of church autonomy to hierarchical denominations, confirming that the doctrine protects non‑hierarchical traditions (like Baptists) on equal terms.
It applies the ministerial exception, as a component of church autonomy, to bar not only suits against a minister’s employing institution but also tort claims against related or cooperating religious bodies alleged to have interfered with ministerial employment or opportunities.

The parties are Pastor Will McRaney (former Executive Director of the Baptist Convention of Maryland/Delaware, BCMD) and NAMB (an SBC entity). After a breakdown over a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) for evangelism and church planting, BCMD terminated McRaney; he then sued NAMB for tortious interference, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging pre‑ and post‑termination harms. The district court granted summary judgment to NAMB, but also characterized its ruling as jurisdictional; the Fifth Circuit affirms the merits disposition and vacates the jurisdictional dismissal label.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit withdraws its prior opinion and issues a substitute opinion authored by Judge Oldham; Judge Ramirez dissents.
Holding on the merits: All of McRaney’s tort claims (pre‑ and post‑termination) are barred by the church autonomy doctrine. Adjudicating them would require secular courts to decide religious questions or intrude on internal church governance and ministry staffing decisions protected by the First Amendment.
Scope of doctrine: The court delineates four illustrative strands—(1) the ministerial exception (selection/dismissal of leaders and those who teach the faith); (2) nonreviewability of religious doctrine and belief; (3) deference on questions of church governance, discipline, and “true church” identity; and (4) protection of internal religious communications.
Non‑hierarchical protection: The doctrine applies to Baptists and other non‑hierarchical faiths; it turns on the subject matter, not denominational structure. Limiting it to hierarchical polity would violate denominational neutrality.
Procedural posture clarified: Church autonomy is a structural immunity from suit, to be resolved at the earliest stage and subject to immediate appeal; but it is not a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional defect. Thus, federal courts should enter merits judgments (with prejudice), producing res judicata preclusion in state court.
Remedy: The court affirms summary judgment for NAMB and vacates the district court’s characterization of its ruling as a jurisdictional dismissal.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Shaping the Decision

Watson v. Jones (1871): Early articulation of civil courts’ non‑involvement in “strictly and purely ecclesiastical” matters; recognized deference to ecclesiastical tribunals. The Fifth Circuit reads Watson’s “ordinary principles” language as limited to church property disputes, not as a license to adjudicate religious controversies through tort or contract claims.
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral (1952) and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976): Ground church autonomy in the First Amendment; forbid courts from second‑guessing ecclesiastical decisions, including governance, discipline, and reorganization.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC (2012) and Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey‑Berru (2020): Confirm the ministerial exception as a component of church autonomy; protect institutional authority to select those who minister or teach the faith, regardless of secular or religious motives, and even as against neutral, generally applicable employment laws.
Jones v. Wolf (1979): Permits “neutral principles” analysis in certain church property disputes; the Fifth Circuit emphasizes its careful limitation to that context and its warning not to entangle courts in doctrinal interpretation.
Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith (5th Cir. 2018): Protects internal religious communications from discovery because the process of inquiry itself can impinge church autonomy.
Starkey v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis (7th Cir. 2022) and Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (4th Cir. 1997): Apply ministerial exception to bar tort claims against non‑employer church entities where adjudication would litigate ministerial employment relationships or the church’s authority over those relationships.
Additional supportive cases on nonreviewability of religious doctrine and discipline in civil defamation or tort suits: Harris v. Matthews (N.C. 2007); Lippard v. Holleman (N.C. Ct. App. 2020); Schoenhals v. Mains (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); McNair v. Worldwide Church of God (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
Recent reinforcement of doctrinal framing: Catholic Charities Bureau v. Wisconsin LIRC (U.S. 2025) (Thomas, J., concurring) emphasizing church autonomy’s roots in the separation of spheres between church and state; and state high court commentary such as SMU v. SCJ of the United Methodist Church (Tex. 2025) discussing non‑binary jurisdictionalist framing.

The Fifth Circuit’s Legal Reasoning

1) A unitary, robust church autonomy doctrine—and the “Religion Clause” as a singular provision

The court undertakes an extended historical and doctrinal survey, from pre‑Norman English practice through Magna Carta, the colonial experience, and the Founding, to modern Supreme Court jurisprudence. It underscores that the First Amendment’s “Religion Clause” is unitary in text and purpose; its two halves (limits on establishment and protections for free exercise) operate complementarily, not in tension. From this background, the court derives a single, integrated church autonomy doctrine safeguarding “independence in matters of faith and doctrine and in closely linked matters of internal government.”

2) A structural immunity from suit—resolved early, immediately appealable, but not Rule 12(b)(1)

The opinion carefully parses the “jurisdictional” debate:

Structural immunity from suit: Church autonomy restrains judicial power in a constitutional, structural sense. Like state sovereign or qualified immunity, it is a threshold protection against the burdens of litigation (including discovery) and is immediately appealable when denied. The harm from intrusion into ecclesiastical affairs is irreparable.
Not a Rule 12(b)(1) subject‑matter defect: While the doctrine limits what courts may adjudicate, it does not deprive a federal court of subject‑matter jurisdiction in the technical sense. Treating it as a 12(b)(1) dismissal would invite relitigation in state court and undermine the doctrine. Instead, federal courts should enter merits judgments (e.g., via Rule 12(b)(6) or summary judgment), producing preclusive res judicata effect across jurisdictions.
Practical effect: Courts must resolve church autonomy defenses early, and denials are subject to interlocutory review; but when the defense applies, courts should enter judgment on the merits with prejudice.

3) Subject matter, not denominational structure, triggers the doctrine

Rejecting the dissent’s premise that Baptists’ non‑hierarchical polity takes their disputes outside church autonomy, the court grounds its holding in denominational neutrality. The Constitution does not favor hierarchical churches over congregational or non‑hierarchical bodies. The question is whether the dispute would require a court to resolve religious questions or intrude on internal religious governance—not whether the parties occupy a vertical chain of ecclesiastical command.

The court reads Watson’s “ordinary principles of voluntary associations” as confined to certain property disputes and reaffirms that even within congregational structures, matters of discipline, doctrine, ministry, and internal governance remain beyond judicial cognizance.

4) The ministerial exception bars claims against third‑party religious entities

The court treats the ministerial exception as a component of the broader autonomy doctrine and emphasizes two core points:

Function, not title: McRaney’s role as BCMD Executive Director was ministerial because it centered on evangelism, church planting, and leading religious mission. The focus is on whether the position conveys, teaches, or leads the faith.
Third‑party application: The exception bars tort claims against non‑employer religious entities (e.g., a cooperating board or diocese) where adjudication would “litigate the employment relationship” between a minister and a religious organization or second‑guess inter‑organizational decisions about how and by whom to spread the faith. Public policy concerns—such as chilling internal religious deliberations and strategic coordination—reinforce this application.

5) Why McRaney’s claims cannot be adjudicated using “neutral principles” of tort law

Although framed in secular tort labels (interference, defamation, IIED), the claims would require the court to decide inherently religious questions or to second‑guess protected internal judgments:

The SPA is “steeped in religious doctrine”: It memorializes shared evangelistic goals, “Biblical Authority,” “Kingdom Advancement,” and alignment with the Baptist Faith & Message. Determining breach would require assessing religious aims such as “penetrating lostness,” “making disciples,” and church planting strategies.
Defamation and fault elements: Testing the “falsity” of statements about a minister’s leadership, character, or compliance with religious partnership expectations would enmesh the court in evaluating “Christ‑like” qualities, pastoral suitability, and the alignment of tactics with religious doctrine—questions off‑limits to civil adjudication.
Proximate cause and damages elements: In interference claims, examining whether NAMB’s actions proximately caused BCMD’s termination decision or other ministries’ non‑selections would intrude on the protected authority of religious bodies to select their leaders and speakers based on faith, trust, and doctrinal fit.

6) The post‑termination allegations are likewise barred

McRaney’s allegations regarding lost speaking invitations, missed ministry employment opportunities, and NAMB’s “no‑entry” photo founder for the same reasons:

Missed roles and disinvitations: Adjudicating whether a church or religious group declined to hire or host McRaney because of protected religious judgments (rather than alleged defamation) would compel courts to evaluate the ministries’ reasons and priorities, infringing their right “to be selective about those who will serve as the embodiment of their message.”
No‑entry photo: Decisions about exclusion from premises or participation in events, especially amid doctrinal dispute and security concerns, fall within protected church discipline and internal governance. Civil tort review of such measures threatens the autonomy of religious organizations to manage their internal boundaries.

7) Disposition and guidance

The court affirms the district court’s grant of summary judgment to NAMB on the merits but vacates the district court’s characterization of the ruling as jurisdictional. It underscores the costs that discovery and litigation impose on religious autonomy, reiterating that the “very process of inquiry” can be unconstitutional in this sphere.

The Dissent’s Approach and the Majority’s Response

Judge Ramirez would permit McRaney’s claims to proceed under neutral principles of tort law, emphasizing that:

The dispute is not intra‑church governance because Baptists lack hierarchical structures; there is no “Baptist Church” with superior tribunals.
At least some alleged statements (e.g., whether McRaney resigned; whether he sought to enrich himself) are secular and verifiable without deciding doctrinal issues.
The ministerial exception should not apply to third‑party entities that did not employ the plaintiff.

The majority counters that the doctrine protects religious organizations regardless of polity; that determining the truth or fault elements in this case would still require forbidden religious judgments; and that the ministerial exception’s logic extends to bar third‑party suits that effectively litigate protected ministerial employment choices and inter‑ministry governance.

Impact and Practical Implications

1) Procedural posture and litigation strategy

Raise early, resolve early: Church autonomy functions as a structural immunity from suit. Defendants should assert it at the outset; courts should resolve it at the threshold to prevent unconstitutional discovery and litigation burdens.
Immediate appeals: Denials are immediately appealable (collateral order doctrine or statutory avenues). Expect more interlocutory practice where district courts defer autonomy questions.
Merits judgments, not 12(b)(1): In federal court, successful invocation should result in a merits judgment with prejudice, carrying res judicata effect in state courts and deterring forum shopping.

2) Substantive reach across denominations and organizational forms

Non‑hierarchical protection: The doctrine protects congregational and non‑hierarchical traditions (Baptists, many Protestant congregations, synagogues, mosques, Sikh gurdwaras) equally with hierarchical churches. Subject matter—not structure—controls.
Cooperative and networked ministries: The decision recognizes modern ministry ecosystems (boards, agencies, seminaries, alliances). Tort claims that would second‑guess how cooperating ministries coordinate, fund, and staff their missions are likely barred.

3) Ministerial exception beyond the employer

Third‑party exposure curtailed: Plaintiffs cannot evade the ministerial exception by suing related ministries or upstream boards for tortious interference, defamation, or IIED when the suit would “litigate the employment relationship” or internal assessments of ministerial suitability.
Claims reframed as defamation/IIED: Courts will scrutinize whether such claims are collateral attacks on protected decisions about ministry roles, discipline, or doctrine—even if pled under secular tort labels.

4) Internal communications and discipline

Discovery resistance: Robust protection for internal religious communications (e.g., deliberations on staffing, discipline, or doctrine). Subpoena practice against religious bodies will face heightened scrutiny.
Disciplinary boundaries: Measures such as shunning, access limitations, and public communications to members during discipline may be non‑justiciable when addressed to internal audiences or in pursuit of core religious governance.

5) Limits and open questions

Neutral facts vs. religious judgments: The dissent highlights that some statements (e.g., “resigned” vs. “terminated”) are verifiable without religious inquiry. The majority’s analysis suggests that when such allegations are embedded in a dispute that cannot be untangled from religious judgments, the entire suit may be barred. Future cases may test whether discrete “secular islands” within broader ecclesiastical disputes can proceed.
Waivability: The court reserves whether church autonomy can be waived; some courts view it as non‑waivable due to its structural character. Counsel should not assume waiver is available.
Circuit dialogue: The Fifth Circuit’s integrated treatment aligns with several circuits (and recent Supreme Court signals), though nuances remain across circuits concerning immediate appeal and the precise contours of third‑party liability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Church autonomy doctrine: A First Amendment rule that civil courts may not decide religious questions or manage internal church affairs (doctrine, discipline, governance, and closely linked decisions like selecting ministers).
Ministerial exception: A component of church autonomy that bars suits by or about “ministers”—not limited to ordained clergy—whose roles involve leading, teaching, or transmitting the faith. It protects the institution’s right to choose, evaluate, and remove those who personify its beliefs, regardless of motive.
Structural immunity from suit: A protection that prevents the burdens of litigation (including discovery) from impinging constitutional interests. It must be resolved early and can be immediately appealed when denied.
Rule 12(b)(1) vs. merits dismissal: A 12(b)(1) dismissal is for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction and is without prejudice; a merits dismissal (e.g., 12(b)(6) or summary judgment) is with prejudice and preclusive. McRaney holds the latter is appropriate for church autonomy.
Neutral principles: A method allowing courts to resolve certain church property disputes using secular legal tools without interpreting doctrine. McRaney emphasizes that “neutral principles” do not authorize civil courts to decide doctrinal or ministerial questions in tort or contract clothing.

Conclusion

McRaney is a consequential articulation of the First Amendment’s protection of religious independence. It clarifies that church autonomy is a unitary, structural immunity from suit—resolved at the outset, immediately appealable, and culminating in merits judgments with preclusive effect. It rejects any hierarchy‑based limitation, affirming denominational neutrality: non‑hierarchical ministries are equally protected. And it extends the ministerial exception’s logic to bar tort claims against cooperating or related religious entities when adjudication would entangle courts in ministerial employment or internal mission decisions.

On the facts, the SPA’s evangelical aims and the parties’ disagreements about church planting, evangelism, and leadership character are quintessentially religious matters. Subjecting them to civil tort adjudication would require courts to answer religious questions and second‑guess how ministries select and coordinate those entrusted to proclaim their message. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion ensures that such disputes remain where the Constitution puts them—within the self‑governing sphere of the faith communities themselves.