CHINS-B Reversal Does Not Preclude DCF Physical-Abuse Substantiation: Distinct Causes and Issues Clarified by the Vermont Supreme Court

Note on precedential weight: This was an entry order by a three-justice panel, which the Court expressly notes is not precedential before any tribunal. Nonetheless, the decision offers a clear articulation of the separation between juvenile CHINS proceedings and DCF registry substantiation actions and will be persuasive in practice.

Introduction

This commentary examines the Vermont Supreme Court’s entry order in In re Appeal of A.N., Case Nos. 24-AP-262 & 25-AP-077 (Sept. 5, 2025), affirming the Human Services Board’s decision upholding the Department for Children and Families’ (DCF) substantiation of a mother (A.N.) for physical abuse of her seven-year-old child (J.N.).

The case arises from an August 2021 incident in which A.N. forcibly attempted to bring J.N. back into their apartment, resulting in bruising and scrapes, witnessed by behavioral interventionists and captured in video snippets. A.N. argued that a separate juvenile proceeding—In re J.N., 2023 VT 34, which reversed a CHINS-B neglect adjudication stemming from the same incident—barred DCF’s substantiation through claim or issue preclusion. She also disputed the Board’s factual findings about the incident and contended that DCF had to prove an intent to harm.

The Supreme Court affirmed, clarifying that a CHINS-B neglect decision (even a reversal) does not preclude a later DCF substantiation for physical abuse, because the causes of action and dispositive issues are distinct, and because the substantiation issue was not decided in the juvenile case.

Summary of the Opinion

• Affirmance of substantiation: The Court held that the Board’s findings—that A.N., acting in anger, yanked and dragged J.N. along a concrete path and stairs, causing fingerprint-like bruising and a knee scrape—supported a substantiation for physical abuse under 33 V.S.A. § 4912 and DCF’s rules, by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Preclusion rejected: Neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion barred the substantiation:
  • Claim preclusion: CHINS proceedings and substantiation are different causes of action with distinct statutory frameworks, purposes, and procedures; a substantiation for physical abuse could not have been litigated in the CHINS-B case.
  • Issue preclusion: The juvenile appeal addressed whether J.N. was “without proper parental care necessary for her well-being” (neglect), not whether A.N. committed physical abuse under Chapter 49. The “issues” were not the same; no final judgment resolved the abuse substantiation issue.
• Evidentiary rulings and motion to reopen: The Board properly excluded evidence about the CHINS appeal (including a Supreme Court closing argument video) as irrelevant to the substantiation issue, and it properly denied A.N.’s motion to reopen.
• Standards of review: The Court reviewed the Board’s substantiation decision for abuse of discretion, and reviewed preclusion questions de novo.

Detailed Analysis

I. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

Vermont maintains a confidential child protection registry of individuals “substantiated” for child abuse or neglect. See 33 V.S.A. §§ 4915(a), 4915b, 4912(16); DCF’s Response to Child Abuse and Neglect Rules § 2001(14). The registry is designed to safeguard children by allowing certain employers and agencies to check whether an individual has been substantiated for abuse or neglect.

• Substantiation standard: A report is substantiated when, after investigation, DCF finds accurate, reliable information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child has been abused or neglected (33 V.S.A. § 4912(16)).
• Abuse definitions:
  • “Abused or neglected child” includes a child whose welfare is harmed by acts or omissions of a parent (33 V.S.A. § 4912(1)).
  • “Harm” can be through “physical injury,” defined as death, or permanent or temporary disfigurement or impairment of any bodily organ or function by other than accidental means (33 V.S.A. § 4912(6)(A), (11)).
  • DCF Rules define “physical abuse” as the infliction of physical injury (or serious physical injury) by a person responsible for the child’s welfare (§ 2001(14)).
• Board review: An individual may appeal a substantiation to the Human Services Board, which reviews de novo; DCF bears the burden to justify the substantiation by a preponderance (Fair Hearing Rules § 1003(O)(4); In re R.H., 2010 VT 95, ¶¶ 16-17).

II. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• In re H.H., 2020 VT 107
  • Explains the purpose of the registry (safeguarding children).
  • Sets out the issue-preclusion possibility where the identical issue was necessarily decided in a prior CHINS case (¶ 23).
  • Applied here: The Court distinguishes this case because the CHINS-B decision addressed neglect, not abuse; thus the “same issue” prerequisite was not met.
• In re M.E., 2010 VT 105
  • Highlights the distinct legislative goals, functions, and procedures between substantiation (Chapter 49) and juvenile (Chapter 51) proceedings (¶ 13).
  • Applied here: Supports the conclusion that claim preclusion does not apply because the causes of action are dissimilar.
• Faulkner v. Caledonia County Fair Ass’n, 2004 VT 123
  • Articulates claim-preclusion doctrine: same parties, same or substantially identical subject matter and cause(s) of action; bars what was or could have been litigated (¶ 8).
  • Applied here: The Court finds the causes of action are not the same or substantially identical, so claim preclusion fails.
• Shaddy v. Brattleboro Retreat, 2012 VT 67
  • Confirms de novo review of preclusion questions (¶ 9).
  • Applied here: The Court reviews A.N.’s preclusion arguments de novo and rejects them.
• In re R.H., 2010 VT 95
  • Confirms DCF’s burden (preponderance) and Board’s de novo role.
  • Provides abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing Board’s decision (¶ 21).
• In re S.C.-M., 2025 VT 48
  • Restates the appellate court’s limited review of Board decisions: correct legal standard, support for findings, and support for conclusions (¶ 23).
• Mullin v. Phelps, 162 Vt. 250 (1994)
  • Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or make credibility findings anew (p. 261).
  • Applied here: The Court defers to the Board’s credibility determinations and factual inferences.
• Meyncke v. Meyncke, 2009 VT 84
  • Disagreement with a court’s reasoning does not, by itself, demonstrate abuse of discretion (¶ 15).
  • Applied here: A.N.’s disagreements with the Board’s assessment are insufficient to show error.
• In re J.N., 2023 VT 34
  • Reversed a CHINS-B neglect adjudication arising from the same incident because the trial court’s reasoning effectively applied an abuse analysis to a neglect petition.
  • Applied here: The Court explains that In re J.N. does not bar a separate registry substantiation for physical abuse, because neglect and abuse inquiries are distinct.

III. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata)

Claim preclusion bars subsequent litigation where the parties, subject matter, and cause(s) of action in both matters are the same or substantially identical, and encompasses claims that were or could have been litigated previously. The Court holds that a CHINS-B neglect proceeding (Chapter 51) and a DCF substantiation for physical abuse (Chapter 49) are categorically distinct: they pursue different legislative purposes, use different procedures, and ask different ultimate questions. DCF could not have sought a registry substantiation within the CHINS-B action, so claim preclusion does not apply.

B. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel)

The Court applies the five familiar elements of issue preclusion (from In re H.H.):

1. Preclusion asserted against a party in the earlier action.
2. Issue resolved by a final judgment on the merits.
3. Same issue raised in the later action.
4. Full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue previously.
5. Fairness in applying preclusion.

The doctrine fails on the “same issue” and “actually decided” elements. The CHINS-B appeal decided that one incident of physical discipline, as found by the trial court, did not establish that the child was “without proper parental care necessary for her well-being” (the neglect standard). It did not decide whether A.N. inflicted a “physical injury” by “other than accidental means,” the core of a physical-abuse substantiation. Because the issues are materially different, no issue-preclusive effect attaches.

C. Evidentiary and Procedural Rulings

• Exclusion of CHINS-based evidence: The Board excluded testimony about the Supreme Court’s CHINS decision and a video/transcript of argument in that appeal as irrelevant to whether A.N. committed physical abuse under Chapter 49 and DCF rules. The Supreme Court agreed with this relevance-based exclusion.
• Denying the motion to reopen: The Board found no “good cause” to reopen; preclusion did not apply; the Court affirmed that denial.

D. Merits of the Substantiation

On the merits, the Court emphasized its deferential standard to the Board’s factfinding and credibility determinations. The Board relied on:

• Testimony from behavioral interventionists who witnessed the incident.
• Video segments capturing portions of the altercation.
• Physical observations of “fingerprint-like” bruising and a fresh knee scrape consistent with dragging on concrete.
• J.N.’s statements describing being yanked and dragged while she gripped the railing, and her visible fear and distress.
• Petitioner’s own statements, which the Board assessed as reflecting anger rather than a measured safety response.

These findings reasonably support the conclusion that A.N. inflicted a “physical injury” on J.N. “by other than accidental means,” satisfying the statutory and regulatory definitions of physical abuse. The Court rejected A.N.’s argument that DCF was required to prove intent to harm or disfigurement beyond what the record demonstrated.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• CHINS-B vs. Substantiation
  • CHINS-B (Juvenile Court; 33 V.S.A. § 5102(3)(B)): Asks whether a child is “without proper parental care necessary for the child’s well-being.” It is framed around the child’s need for state intervention, not the parent’s registry status.
  • Substantiation (DCF; 33 V.S.A. ch. 49; Registry): Asks whether there is reliable information to believe the child was abused or neglected by a caregiver, using the “preponderance of the evidence” standard at the Board. It is tied to public-safety screening in child-related fields.
• Claim Preclusion: Prevents re-suing the same cause of action between the same parties after a final judgment, including claims that could have been brought earlier.
• Issue Preclusion: Prevents relitigating a specific issue that was actually decided in a prior case, where the identical issue reappears and preclusion would be fair.
• “Physical injury” under 33 V.S.A. § 4912: Includes temporary disfigurement (like bruises or abrasions) or impairment of bodily function, caused by other than accidental means. There is no requirement of permanent injury.
• Intent to harm: The statutory definition does not require proof of specific intent to injure; it requires nonaccidental causation of physical injury. Force applied in anger causing bruising and abrasions fits.
• Standards of review:
  • Board proceedings: De novo review of DCF’s substantiation; DCF must prove by a preponderance.
  • Supreme Court review: Abuse-of-discretion for the Board’s decision; de novo review for legal questions like preclusion.

V. Practical Impact

• Clear separation of forums and issues: Parties cannot rely on a CHINS-B outcome—win or loss—to automatically control a later substantiation. Even if both arise from the same incident, the legal questions may differ.
• Targeted use of preclusion post-H.H.: Issue preclusion may still apply where the identical issue was necessarily decided in CHINS (e.g., a juvenile court’s explicit finding that no physical injury occurred). But absent identity of issues, preclusion is unavailable.
• Evidence strategy in Board hearings: Counsel should focus on the Chapter 49 definitions and the reliability/consistency of evidence bearing on “physical injury” by nonaccidental means. Prior juvenile case materials are admissible only if they reflect determinations of the same issue.
• Parent-discipline lines: The decision underscores that parental discipline crosses into “physical abuse” when nonaccidental force results in injury—even if the parent believed they were enforcing compliance. Context and demeanor (anger vs. measured safety response) can matter in assessing the nature of force used.
• Registry consequences unaffected by CHINS reversals: A reversal of a CHINS-B neglect adjudication does not, by itself, undo or bar a substantiation. Parties must contest the substantiation on its own merits.
• Administrative law consistency: The Court’s deference to the Board’s credibility findings and weighing of mixed testimony and video snippets highlights the importance of creating a clear record at the administrative level.

Conclusion

The Vermont Supreme Court’s entry order in In re Appeal of A.N. reinforces a critical structural point in Vermont’s child-protection system: juvenile CHINS proceedings and DCF registry substantiation actions are distinct in purpose, process, and outcomes. A CHINS-B neglect appeal addressing whether a child lacked proper care does not decide whether a parent committed physical abuse as defined in Chapter 49, and thus does not preclude a separate substantiation proceeding.

On the merits, the Court affirmed the Board’s determination that nonaccidental force resulting in bruising and abrasions—applied in anger during a coercive effort to move a resisting child—constituted physical abuse, supported by a preponderance of evidence, including witness testimony, video segments, and medical observations. The Court also confirmed the Board’s discretion to exclude irrelevant materials from the juvenile appeal and to deny reopening absent good cause.

While nonprecedential, the decision offers persuasive guidance on the limits of preclusion between CHINS and substantiation proceedings, the evidentiary focus for the Board’s de novo review, and the substantive threshold for “physical injury” under Vermont law. Practitioners should treat CHINS outcomes and registry substantiations as legally independent tracks and tailor litigation strategies accordingly.